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I 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
Despite the large and rapidly growing research literature on Sukuk risk analysis, little is known about the risk 
caused by different Sukuk structures. Drawing on the research literature and practice of Islamic finance, the 
study argues that different Sukuk structures affect the risk/expected return profile of Sukuk. Thus, risk 
classification schemes based on Sukuk structure provide significant insights into Sukuk risk not obtainable from 
conventional schemes. This is because Sukuk structure risk classification schemes link Sukuk risk more directly 
to the fundamental causal factors creating those risks. These links are less evident in conventional risk 
classification schemes. In the empirical research the deductive approach is applied. Statistical methods, including 
multifactor regression analysis are applied to a unique proprietary Sukuk data set provided by Idealratings, Inc. 
Sukuk structure risks will be correctly priced in an efficient market. However, the results of this study show that 
Sukuk structure risk factors have no power in explaining Sukuk market returns. The results of the thesis imply 
significant mispricing in Sukuk markets. This conclusion is in line with the comparative analysis of the 
risk/expected return profiles of Sukuk and conventional bond indices also reported in this study. These results 
on the informational inefficiency of Sukuk markets have significant implications for issuers, investors, 
governments, regulators, scholars and researchers. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background 
The Islamic finance industry has made remarkable advances since the 2008 global financial crisis; assets have 
passed the USD$1000 billion mark, profits have risen sharply and the industry has been feted for pushing into 
new markets and sectors. It has become an investment option for many investors around the world including 
in the West. Recently, the previous Prime Minster of the United Kingdom David Cameron announced at the 
World Islamic Economic Forum (WIEF), (2013), in London that the UK became the first non-Muslim country 
to issue Sukuk. He also announced plans for a new Islamic index on the London Stock Exchange. He created 
a trend and built a vision to make London an international centre for Islamic finance, according to the British 
Broadcasting Corporation news (BBC) website (http://www.bbc.com/news/business-24722440, dated 29th Oct 
2013). 
 
The appearance of the modern Islamic finance market has been highlighted in 1973 and since then innovations 
in Islamic finance have played a crucial role towards increasing the dynamics of the Islamic finance industry. 
In particular, as a Shariah compliant alternative to conventional fixed income securities, the use of Sukuk has 
become increasingly important, both as a means of raising government finance through sovereign issues and 
as a way of companies raising finance through the offer of corporate Sukuk. 
  
Sukuk are Islamic trust certificates or “Islamic bonds” (“Sukuk” is the plural of “Sakk”. In the literature 
“Sukuk” is sometimes used for both the singular and plural). Sukuk are similar in some respects to conventional 
bonds. However, there are major differences as well. This is because Sukuk are constrained by the Shariah 
(Islamic law). Most importantly, Sukuk must be structured to avoid the practices of Riba (interest or usury), 
Gharar (excessive uncertainty or ambiguity) and Maysir (gambling). 
 
The development of the modern Sukuk market is very recent. The first Sukuk was issued by Shell in Malaysia 
in 1990. From 2000, with 3 issued Sukuk worth a total of USD$336 million, the total number issued Sukuk 
grew by the end of 2007 to reach 77 with a total value of over USD$36 billion. 2012 is considered the year of 
Sukuk which reach up to USD$ 117 billion. However, the issuance volume reduce effectively after 2012 and 
reach by the end of 2016 the total figure exceeded USD$42 billion (McMillen, 2016 and IIFM newsletter 
report, 2017). 
 
It is reasonable to expect that this rapid growth in the Sukuk market will continue, and that Sukuk will become 
one of the major financial asset investment classes of the future. However, there is currently very little empirical 
finance research on Sukuk. Almost all of the papers in the literature discuss only the theory, principals, legal 
and Shariah issues underlying Sukuk. Even so, not all of the theoretical issues and problems concerning Sukuk 
have been resolved.  
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The main theoretical contribution of this thesis is the investigation of how different Sukuk structures affect the 
risk/expected return profile of Sukuk. Sukuk are more flexible than their counterpart conventional bonds. There 
is a wide variety of different types of Sukuk, structured in different ways to meet the different needs of issuers 
and investors. The impact of structure on Sukuk risk has so far been little discussed in the literature.  
 
The main reason for the lack of empirical research in Sukuk, and in Islamic finance generally, has been the 
lack of empirical data. Despite this challenge, the University of Portsmouth is fortunate to have developed a 
relationship with IdealRatings Inc, one of the leading global providers of Islamic finance data. The Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and founder of IdealRatings has recently accepted the offer of Visiting Research 
Fellow in Islamic Finance at the University of Portsmouth, for the purpose of furthering research into, and the 
development of Islamic capital markets. Due to this relationship, the author has recently obtained access to 
data on a sample of Sukuk not accessible to other researchers. This data is used to test the hypotheses arising 
from the theoretical research on Sukuk structures stated above. 
 
The main contributions of this thesis can be categorised into four areas, as illustrated in the figure below: 
 
Figure 1: Summary of the thesis’s main contribution areas 
 
 
The systematic review of the literature presents an up to date review of the relevant literature. The unique 
Sukuk data set, obtained from the core files underlying the Idealratings subscription service, are used to test 
hypotheses regarding the pricing of structure risk, and other risks, in the Sukuk market. The third area of 
contribution updates and expands on an empirical approach already applied in the literature. Due to the lack of 
empirical data in Islamic finance noted above, most empirical research contributions on Sukuk are based on 
comparisons of the available Sukuk and bond indices. This approach is updated and refined in this study. The 
fourth main area of contribution is introducing and investigating Sukuk structure risk as a risk factor. A number 
of hypotheses concerning Sukuk structure risk, in combination with several other risk factors, are empirically 
tested using the uniquely available Idealratings data set referred to above. 
To provide a 
systematic review of 
the relevant literature 
Use of a unique 
Sukuk data set 
obtained from the 
proprietary 
IdealRatings 
underlying data files 
To update and expand 
the  current literature 
on the analysis of the 
risk/return 
performance of 
Sukuk and bond 
indices
The empirical 
analysis of Sukuk 
structure as a risk 
factor
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The rest of Chapter 1 expands on this introduction with; a general overview of Islamic finance (Section 1.2), 
the meaning of Sukuk (Section 1.3), how Sukuk differ from conventional bonds (Section 1.4), the history and 
development of Sukuk in the Saudi Arabian and Malaysian markets (Section 1.5), certain other issues 
concerning Sukuk (Section 1.6), a statement of research aims, objectives, rationale, and main research 
contribution (Sections 1.7 to 1.11), and an overview of the remainder of the thesis (Section 1.12) 
 
1.2 General overview of Islamic finance 
With the Islamic Financial Services Board reporting that assets in Islamic finance are expected to reach 
USD$2.8 trillion in 2015, and with the continued growth of the global Sukuk market, opportunities for investors 
abound. The academic interest in Islamic banking and finance has grown immensely over the years. Many 
studies have been conducted on its theories and applications from different aspects, and the demand for its 
studies and research in the area continues to expand. The appeal of Islamic banking to the Muslim world is 
decades old.  
Many of the practices in conventional banking that caused the recent global financial crisis are forbidden in 
Islamic finance. Consequently, Islamic banks and financial institutions were not involved in these activities, 
and survived the aftermath of the financial crisis far better than their conventional counterparts. The 2008 
financial crisis, together with the ongoing Eurozone crises have spurred further interest in Islamic finance in 
the academic community. Currently, notable academics from conventional economics have either written 
papers on Islamic finance or commented in conferences on the viability of the Islamic finance proposition (e.g., 
S¸endeniz-Yüncü, 2011, Rogoff, 2011a; Rogoff, 2011b, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche 2013; Abedifar, 
Molyneux and Tarazi 2013; Zaheer, Ongena and Van Wijnbergen, 2013, Ongena and Roubini, 2013, Baele, 
Farooq and Ongena, 2014). This is a wanted development and may help add more solidity and diversity to 
Islamic finance research. In addition, it creates a challenge to academics and practitioners to solve the many 
theoretical and practical questions concerning the development and implementation of Islamic finance. Also, 
the innovative environment of Islamic finance instruments, such as Sukuk has increased the interest towards 
conducting more research on it. 
 
Empirical work in Islamic finance is on the rise due to the increasing availability of data. In particular, data on 
debt instruments such as Sukuk. Hence, this research is a journey that builds on the existing empirical work on 
Sukuk, and investigates further those factors hypothesised as determining the risk/expected return 
characteristics of Sukuk. 
 
With the developments and changes in the financial industry over recent decades, Islamic finance has found 
itself a fast and innovative player in its sectors. It has evolved to become one of the most dynamic and fastest 
developing business areas in global finance (Pock, 2007), which is currently growing at between 10-15% each 
year (Ainley, 2007), the value of Islamic finance assets in the world reached over one trillion US dollars in 
2012 (Mansor & Bhatti, 2011), and is continuing this growth, reaching above two trillion USD in 2015-2016, 
according to the annual report (2016) of the City UK’s, UK Islamic Finance Secretariat (UKIFS). Clearly, the 
expansion of Islamic finance has increased its position around the world after the recent financial crisis. 
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The main clients for Islamic finance are Muslim people, estimated today at around 24% of the world population 
(Kettani, 2010), (See appendix A). They are expected to be the major drivers for creating the demand in Islamic 
finance. In turn, the main players in Islamic finance are hosted in Islamic countries such as Malaysia, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In spite of this, the 
expansion of Islamic finance as an industry is quite modern. According to Iqbal and Molyneux (2005), the age 
of the Islamic finance system began in 1975. 
The philosophy of establishing a new financial system or of adapting conventional instruments in such a way 
that serves savers and investors in the Islamic world may help as well to stabilise banking systems in the rest 
of the world. Hameed and Ahamed (2010) note the rapid growth in in Islamic banking and finance, with more 
than 400 Islamic financial institutions distributed in 92 countries, and achieving growth rates of 10% annually. 
From these observations, it can be seen that the Islamic financial system has brought optional banking and 
investment services to particular customers. The Islamic financial system now plays a crucial role, side by side, 
with the conventional financial system.  
 
The distinctive factor of Islamic finance is that it has a different methodology used for investment and dealing 
with money. It has an important characteristic in that it supports risk-sharing between users and providers of 
capital. This feature is not shared in other financial systems to the same extent. The Islamic finance system is 
Islamic in the sense that it is guided by Islamic law, the Shariah, which defines the rules and guidelines for the 
appropriate functioning of the Islamic financial system. 
 
Elfakhani and Hassan (2005) emphasised that Islamic financing structures are based on participatory schemes 
and that Islamic finance gains its features from the characteristics of the Shariah Law. The most important 
element of the Shariah Law is forbidding dealing in three things: Riba (interest), Maysir (gambling and pure 
games of chance), and Gharar (selling something that is not owned or that cannot be described in accurate 
detail such as the type, size, and amount). 
 
Islamic finance theory shares common financial concepts with Ethical finance theory. Murninghan (1992) says 
that Ethical finance goes back to the attempts of some religious institutions to avoid the so-called sin industries 
such as gambling and drugs. Cowton (1994) explained Ethical investing as the use of ethical screening based 
on social factors to obtain and manage investment portfolios, while Hussein (2004) identified that the most 
important difference between Islamic and Ethical finance is that, in addition to the exclusion of particular 
sectors, Islamic finance does not deal in the fixed income market and the receipt and payment of interest is not 
permitted. This implies that Islamic finance and Ethical finance are similar in many respects, with the difference 
that Islamic finance is constrained by the Shariah as Hussein explained. The risk-sharing aspect of Islamic 
finance promotes long-term financing, a competitive advantage of Islamic banking (Zaher & Hassan, 2001). 
 
Islamic finance instruments reflecteed these features by setting up an Islamisation of conventional finance 
instruments, such as Sukuk against bonds. Both of them are used for short-, medium- and long-term investment 
but each of them has a different methodology. Sukuk markets have grown rapidly over the last decades along 
with the demand for Islamic finance instruments. Investments in Sukuk worth enormous amounts have 
appeared, and have been widely subscribed to by many Islamic banks (Usmani, 2008).  
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It has become a competitive instrument against bonds around the world. According to Zawya, 2011 was a 
record year for Sukuk issuance, reaching US$84.4 billion. In 2012 US$68 billion were issued in the first half 
of the year, an increase of 55% over the same period of 2011. The total global Sukuk issuance in 1Q of 2014 
was USD$32.9 billion, an increase of 13.8% over 1Q of 2013 (Zawya, 2014). 
 
 
Forecasts for Sukuk growth continue to be positive for the coming years, and estimates show that the total 
global Sukuk issuance may reach USD$237 billion by 2018 (Zawya, 2013). A study by Thomson Reuters 
(2013) estimates that the gap between global supply and demand for Islamic bonds is likely to peak in 2014 
and then shrink gradually for several years as issuance grows. The graph below shows Sukuk growth trends 
for the global Sukuk market forecast for the period (2009-2018). It is clearly explaining how Sukuk are growing 
in a healthy trend creating expanding in its market share appealing more investors.  
 
Figure 2: Global Sukuk Forecast 
 
 
Source: Zawya Sukuk monitor, 2012 & Thomson Reuters, 2013 
 
By contrast, the size of the current global bond issuance is estimated to be around US$349.5 billion (SIFMA, 
2013). However, according to Zawya (2014) Sukuk annual returns have out-performed those of conventional 
bonds as shown in the graph below: 
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Figure 3: JPMorgan Global Aggregate Bond Index Vs HSBC/NASDAQ US Dollar Sukuk Index:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Zawya, Sukuk Perceptions and forecast Study2014 
 
1.3 What are Sukuk? 
Sukuk, plural of Sakk (Arabic: Sakk كص, Sukuk  كوكص ) is the Arabic name for an Islamic investment trust 
certificate. Over the flourishing period of Islam in the 13th century, Sakk, which is believed to be the source 
root of the European ‘‘Cheque’’, was any certificate representing a contract or conveyance of financial rights, 
obligations or money transactions that is Shariah compliant for thriving trade activities (Adam & Thomas, 
2004). While the word Sukuk is sometimes used erroneously as a singular noun, it is correctly used as a plural 
noun for all contexts. 
 
The modern Sukuk concept is based on asset monetisation or securitisation in which the issuance of Sukuk 
(Taskeek) converts the future cash flows of an asset into present cash flow. Sukuk may be issued on existing 
as well as specific assets that may become available at a future date.  
 
The lack of low risk Islamic investment instruments limits the investment opportunities for Muslims. The stock 
market, with high volatility and real estate investments are currently the most available investment 
opportunities. In terms of fixed income instruments, conventional interest-bearing bonds are not permissible in 
the Shariah Law, and Sukuk are the Shariah compliant alternative. 
 
Sukuk are asset-based securities while conventional bonds are based on debt. Sukuk are structured according 
to Shariah principles, and referred to variously as Islamic bonds, Islamic debt securities, or Islamic trust 
certificates. In addition, Sukuk are compliant with the Islamic Law which prohibits dealing in interest. Sukuk 
are a unit of equal value representing undivided shares in the ownership of physical assets and/or services, or 
in the ownership of the assets of a particular project or investment activity. 
 
Sukuk are asset-based, balanced income, tradable and Shariah compatible trust certificates. As Sukuk are used 
to mobilise financial resources, the existence of assets on the balance sheet of a Sukuk issuer, such as a 
government, monetary authority, corporate body or financial institution is considered the primary condition for 
the issuance of Sukuk (LMC, 2008). 
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While Sukuk securitisations are different from those of bonds, the model of Sukuk securitisation is derived 
from the conventional securitisation process in which an SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle) is set up to purchase 
assets and issue financial claims on the assets. These financial asset claims represent a proportional beneficial 
ownership to the Sukuk holders. Therefore, the SPV plays a crucial role in the Sukuk life cycle.  
 
In a simple context, the steps involved in the issuance of Sukuk are first preparing a detailed feasibility study 
for finding the proper asset to suit potential investors’ appetites. Second, setting up a general framework and 
organisational structure of Sukuk certificates, including Shariah structure and legal documentation. Third, 
setting up a special purpose vehicle, SPV, to represent the investors. Finally, investment management of the 
assets underlying the Sukuk to generate the profits that pass to the Sukuk investors (LMC, 2008). Thus the 
simple lifecycle of Sukuk can be illustrated as follows:  
 
Figure 4: Sukuk certificate basic concepts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This indicates how Sukuk became a competitive player in the global financial market. On the other hand, it 
invites questions surrounding how Sukuk distinguish themselves from bonds. 
 
1.4 How are Sukuk distinct from conventional bonds? 
Due to the Islamising methods that have been adopted in Islamic finance products (Wilson, 2004), a question 
arises surrounding Islamic products and how they are distinct from conventional ones. In the Sukuk case, they 
have common functions with bonds in terms of resource mobilisation from the markets and injecting liquidity 
into projects or government. Also, both of these instruments provide stable income for investors.  However, 
there are differences between Sukuk and bonds. In general, the differences are based on the methodology of 
operation, principles of law and financial strategy. There are a lot of studies conducted on analysing the 
differences between Sukuk and bonds. Wilson (2008) comments that conventional bonds are associated with 
interest rate movement, as it structures the returns solely in terms of interest. For example, the prices of 
conventional fixed-interest bonds rise when variable market interest rates fall. Conventional bond trading is 
therefore largely about exploiting interest rate changes and trading in paper that is usually unrelated to the 
value of any underlying asset. This is a critical difference because Sukuk gain value from the asset they are 
attached to. Also, returns on Sukuk are derived either from the performance of an underlying asset or the 
contractual agreement that is based on this asset (Nanaeva and Mammadov, 2010). 
 
Profit generation  
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Furthermore, Sukuk are different from conventional bonds in terms of underlying structure and provisions 
(Ahmad & Radzi, 2011). While a bond represents the issuer’s pure debt, Sukuk represents units of equal value 
with undivided ownership in the underlying assets, usufruct, services or investment in certain projects or special 
investment activities (Kamil 2009). 
 
Khalil (2011) clarified that the conventional bond is a contractual debt obligation whereby the issuer is 
contractually obliged to pay to bondholders, on certain specified dates, interest and principal. In comparison, 
Sukuk holders are entitled to claim an undivided beneficial ownership in the underlying assets. Hence, Sukuk 
revenues are generated by the returns on the Sukuk assets as well as a share in the proceeds of the realisation 
of the Sukuk assets. 
 
Helmi, Munisamy and Ramasamy (2011) stated that Sukuk are different from conventional bonds in terms of 
rates, and in terms of the treatment of delayed payments. In conventional finance the rate of return on a 
conventional bond is an interest rate, and, in a situation where the borrower fails to repay in time the interest 
accrued is added to the principal and thus earns interest based on the length of the time the funds are utilized 
by the borrower. In contrast, Islamic finance charges a mark-up (profit) over the principal and when default or 
delay occurs in repayment a penalty is charged. In addition, the delayed amount is not added to the principal 
and no extra amount is charged. This implies that the lender faces more risk in Sukuk. Therefore, Islamic 
finance may expect to gain a higher return (profit rate) than conventional finance caused by various risks 
associated with Islamic finance instruments. This is implied by the positive relationship between risk and 
return. 
 
From an operational perspective, it could be said that the main types of Sukuk structures are theoretically 
straightforward; they may become complicated in practice compared to conventional bonds, as some financial 
institutions combine characteristics of two or more types of tools to form hybrid instruments. Nonetheless, the 
market practice of issuers is to promote Sukuk with similar features to those of conventional bonds to facilitate 
the progress of their recognition in both Islamic and conventional financial markets. Another critical 
differentiation factor between Sukuk and conventional bonds is that Sukuk returns are related to the profit/loss 
or revenues of a project. In contrast, conventional bonds represent pure debt obligations; Sukuk holders may 
be affected by asset related expenses, while asset related expenses do not affect conventional bond holders; 
Sukuk prices depend on the market value of the underlying asset, while conventional bonds depend solely on 
the creditworthiness of the issuer; selling Sukuk is principally the sale of a share of an asset, while selling 
bonds is principally the sale of debt. However, Sukuk and conventional bonds share some similarities such as 
rateability, credit enhancement and versatility (Alsaeed, 2012). 
 
Miller, Challoner, and Atta (2007) maintain that Sukuk are similar to conventional bonds in certain respects. 
However, they emphasise that in the case of Sukuk, returns are generated from the assets underlying the Sukuk, 
while conventional bond returns are based on the obligation of the issuer to par interest. Wilson (2008) explains 
that investors are more cautious when it comes to investing in Sukuk compared with conventional securities, 
because of the uncertainties arising from investment in a new asset class. Sukuk issuers therefore, tend to 
replicate some aspects of conventional securities. 
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Woodruff (2007) presents the difference between conventional bonds and Sukuk as follows: 
 The sale of financial instruments in the secondary market represents the sale of a debt obligation in the 
case of conventional bonds and the sale of a right of the use of an asset for Sukuk. 
 The second difference is the tax treatment, under several tax systems; Sukuk rental payments are not 
deductible before tax in the same way as conventional bonds interest payments. A Sukuk transaction is 
one whereby investors finance the purchase of an asset by means of profit- sharing financing. The payment 
to investors should come from after-tax profits.  
 Sukuk, like conventional bonds, are easily marketable and transferable in the secondary market. The 
secondary market for Sukuk is not as liquid as for conventional bonds because of the buy and hold 
strategies of many Sukuk investors and the limited supply of Sukuk relative to demand.  
 
Tariq (2015), considering the similarities and differences between Sukuk and conventional bonds, referred to 
the gap in the transition of Sukuk theory into practice. He commented that, in theory Sukuk are meant to be 
securitised representations of undivided shares in an underlying asset or service. In practice, however Tariq 
(2015), stated that many Sukuk prospectuses are drafted by lawyers with the aim of replicating conventional 
bond structures. Consequently, the over US$600 billion Sukuk certificates that have been issued in the global 
market can be considered as the Islamic equivalent of conventional bonds.  
 
Generally speaking, Sukuk are prepared in the same way as conventional asset-backed securities or covered 
bonds. The difference is that Sukuk, like any other Islamic financial instrument need to act in accordance with 
Shariah. Sukuk investors hold the ownership of the underlying asset via a special purpose vehicle or entity 
(SPV/SPE), in which they receive unsecured payments from direct investment in real, religiously-sanctioned 
economic activity (Wilson, 2004).  
 
This research attempts to consider Sukuk from the point of view of the measurement of financial risk, in order 
to understand further the similarities and conventional bonds. 
 
1.5 Overview of the development of the Sukuk market 
The Islamic financial market has grown significantly since its appearance in its modern form in the 1970s. The 
globalisation of financial markets has expanded the global platform of Sukuk to encompass banking, insurance 
and capital markets, extending the reach of Sukuk markets well beyond traditional Muslim jurisdictions, and 
into Europe, the US and the Asia Pacific region. 
 
The development of Sukuk with its associated types of structure has given rise to much discussion and debate 
among scholars of Islamic law. This was driven by the unique feature of Islamic debt compared to non-Islamic 
debt, namely, that Islamic debt offers a secure investment based on the principle of rent and profit sharing 
without a legalised interest system (Fauzi, Locke, Basyith and Idris, 2015). 
 
As far as Sukuk are concerned, it considered the fastest growing financial security in the market. In 2006 there 
were over US$41 billion in Sukuk issued. Governments, notably in the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) and 
Malaysia, have prepared several Sukuk offerings.  
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These sovereign Sukuk offerings include the Kingdom of Bahrain’s Sovereign Sukuk programme, started in 
2001, while the Qatar Global Sukuk raised US$700 million in 2003, and US$1.6 billion Sukuk are planned to 
be issued by Dubai’s Civil Aviation Authority. Moreover, Western governments have issued Sukuk, such as 
the German Government raising €100 million from both Middle Eastern and European investors. This German 
Sukuk was backed by real estate assets. In addition to the fact that many Sukuk are listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, the United Kingdom expanded its presence in the Islamic financial market through the issuance in 
2014 of a £200 million Sukuk.  
 
On the other hand, corporate Sukuk have expanded rapidly, reaching US$11.3 billion from US$5.7 billion over 
the period 2004-2005 and from US$11.3 billion to US$24.8 billion for the period 2005-2006 to reach nearly 
US$32 billion in 2007. Sukuk have been used in the USA, where oil and gas assets in the Gulf of Mexico were 
backed with a US$165.7 million Sukuk offering that closed in 2006 (Said, 2011). This implies that Sukuk 
issuance has several drivers. The figure below from the ISRA Sukuk report categorises those drivers; sustained 
global economic growth, sovereign liquidity needs (for continued infrastructure spending) and the 
attractiveness of cross-border destinations for fund raising and working capital and capex needs.  
Figure 5: Key drivers of Sukuk issuances 
 
Source: Global Sukuk Report Q1, 2015 
 
Sukuk change the expected capital gains from joint risk sharing between borrowers and lenders in Shariah 
compliant finance contracts, such as lending transactions by Sukuk investors with instalment payments and 
trust based investments in existing or future assets. Hence, Sukuk are used to finance the assets of one or a 
combination of three basic forms of Islamic finance (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2006). Total Sukuk outstanding 
globally exceeded US$90 billion in 2007 (Moody’s, 2008). Although in 2006 the financial market experienced 
a collapse, in 2007 the number of Sukuk transactions grew to 119, up from 109 in 2006, while the average 
transaction size rose to US$270 million in 2007 from US$175 million in 2006 (Said, 2011).  
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Thomson Reuters reported that the Sukuk market grew from US$6 billion to US$24 billion between 2004 and 
2007. However, in 2008, the Sukuk market shown a decline of about 30% due to uncertainty in the global 
capital markets. As market conditions in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis stabilised, the Sukuk 
market recovered during the second half of 2009. The graph below summarises Sukuk issuance over this period.  
Figure 6:  Sukuk issuance 2001 - 2009 
Source: Islamic Finance and Global Financial Stability report, IFSB, 2010 
 
Figure 7: Total global Sukuk issuance since Jan 2001 
 
Source: IIFM Newsletter, March, 2017 
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Figure 8: Total domsitc Sukuk issuance since Jan 2017 
 
Source: IIFM Newsletter, March, 2017 
 
Figure 9: Total International Sukuk issuance since Jan 2017 
 
Source: IIFM Newsletter, March, 2017 
 
The above updated figures are from the International Islamic Finance Market (IIFM) issued in March 2017. It 
shows that the Sukuk market has shown resilience and stability and a positive issuance trend over time.  It can 
be seen that Sukuk issuance was hit in 2008, caused by the global financial crisis, and recovered subsequently. 
 
Moreover, according to Zawya (2012) Sukuk issuance in the global market has rapidly improved. The graph 
below illustrates the Sukuk issuance improvement.  It can be seen that 2007 was the best year on record until 
2011. The market trend was negatively affected by the global financial crisis in 2008/2009. 
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Figure 10: Global Sukuk Issues (US$m) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Zawya Sukuk monitor, 2012 
The growth of the supply and demand of Sukuk has been phenomenal. Zawya (2015) predict that by 2020  
Soucre: Zawya, 2012 
 
Sukuk issuance will surpass $US200 billion with demand reaching almost a trillion. This is illustrated in the 
graph below. 
 
Figure 11: Sukuk demand and supply levels (2014 – 2020) 
 
Source: Zawya, Sukuk perceptions and forecast 2015 
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The Sukuk market emerged in the mid-1990s. It began in Malaysia with a variety of Sukuk structures issued 
such as Sukuk Mudharabaha in 1994, Sukuk Ijarah in 2001, Sukuk Musharakah in 2005 and exchangeable 
Sukuk in 2006. Malaysia has become the largest Sukuk market in terms of the outstanding size and number of 
Sukuk issues, estimated at US$47 billion in 2006. Sukuk accounted for 14% of Malaysian public sector bonds 
that were outstanding. Sukuk have represented about half of the total stock within Malaysian’s corporate bonds, 
estimated at US$32 billion (Said, 2011). In the Malaysian market a great variety of Sukuk structures have been 
used, ranging from Sukuk representing the payment obligations of deferred payment sales to more complicated 
trust certificates with exchangeable features. 
 
Sukuk have also been hosted by the Kingdom of Bahrain market. In 2002 it issued domestic sovereign fixed 
rate Ijarah and Salam Sukuk. Other structures too are issued in this market, including floating rate Ijarah 
Sukuk, as well as Sukuk based on Salam, Ijarah, Istisna, and Istisna combined with Ijarah, by corporate and 
sovereign issuers (LMC, 2008). 
 
According to Jobst (2009), the issuance of Sukuk weakened in the first half of 2008 and remained lower than 
the 2007 record. Sukuk volume dropped to US$15.2 billion in 2008, down by about 35% on an annualised 
basis. The issuance of conventional structured finance instruments collapsed to just under US$387 billion, 
down by about 80%. This study will examine Sukuk performance from a financial risk perspective in the Saudi 
Arabian and Malaysian Sukuk markets.  The Saudi Arabian market catapulted to second position, after 
Malaysia, in terms of global Sukuk issuances since 2012.  
 
It has been observed that Sukuk have different types of potential investors. Potential investors for Sukuk can 
be broadly categorised into six types, each with its own requirements and investment criteria. They are pension 
funds, Islamic banks, Shariah investment funds, Islamic insurance companies (Takaful), corporates and 
individuals (Sukuk report, Alawwal Capital, 2013). Recently, global players in the finance industry have 
become active participants in Sukuk markets, including international investment banks, Islamic banks and 
securities firms that have participated in the issuance of Sukuk. 
 
Product development and innovation will remain a key topic for research in Islamic finance for reasons related 
to risk management as well as increasing competitive advantage (Tariq, 2015, Ali, 2013). The analysis of 
Sukuk risk structures conducted in this study may have implications for Sukuk as a recommended Islamic 
financial instrument relevant for all categories of Sukuk investors and participants. 
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Figure 12: Types of investors in Sukuk markets 
 
 
Source: (Saudi Hollandi) Alawal Capital, 2013 
 
This research contributes in respect of gaining a better understanding of Sukuk risk performance by introducing 
structure risk factors into the measurement of risk. As Saudi Arabia and Malaysia are the main market players 
in Sukuk, these markets are major focus of this research. Further background on these markets is given in the 
following sections, and in Appendix B and C 
 
1.5.1 The Saudi Arabian Sukuk market 
 
Section 1.5.1 presents a brief overview of the Saudi Arabian market. Some extensive further background is 
presented in Appendix B. 
 
 
Islamic finance has penetrated the Gulf region (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and 
Bahrain). Islamic financial institutions have had strong performance over the past decades. Also, the financial 
crisis has further supported the growth of Islamic financial institutions and markets. Table 2 shows the 
comparison in terms of aggregate size and performance of Islamic banks and conventional banks in the Gulf 
region (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain). 
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Table 1: Comparative Profiles of Conventional and Islamic Banks in the Gulf Region 
 Conventional Banks Islamic Banks 
Assets (US$ billions) 1,135,669 232,189 
Profits (US$ billions) 22,008 7,666 
Asset growth 2007-2008 16.3% 38.2% 
Profits growth 2007-2008 -6.1% 20.1% 
Profits/Assets 1.9% 3.3% 
Source: Islamic Finance and Financial Stability Report, IFSB, 2008 
 
 
Ideally, the system which should be followed in Saudi Arabia is the Islamic finance system, because it is 
classified as an Islamic country. Al-Hassan, Khamis, and Oulidi (2010) investigated how it can be possible for 
both systems operate in the Saudi Arabian market (Islamic finance and conventional finance). The financial 
sector in this area is dominated by banks. In other words, non-bank financial institutions are found to be fewer 
than banks and do not compete head to head with banks in this field. They claimed that because of the massive 
production and export of oil from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, it can be said that the Saudi Arabian 
market shares with neighbouring countries the same economic principles, which means sharing the same 
strengths and vulnerabilities. The Saudi financial markets and economy were impacted by the 2008 global 
financial crisis, with indices falling by around 40% (Al-Hassan et al (2010), Woertz (2008), Gomel and Saidi 
(2010)). During the recent oil price falls during 2014 to 2016 the Saudi Arabian financial market has been 
negatively by the sharp falls in oil revenues.  
 
Obay and Kashani (2008) describe the financial sector’s main features. They note that its main feature is its 
focus on the narrow domestic market. Another factor is that the financial system is monitored by highly 
restrictive regulations from the government. Obviously, these regulations affect the operations of the Saudi 
banks, but at the same time they could help reduce involvement in highly risky investments. 
 
In terms of the Sukuk sector, the Saudi Arabian market in government bills and conventional bonds has become 
more complex in recent years, partly reflecting the growth of government debt and the consequent efforts to 
find more methods of funding it. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) handles these through its 
transactions with the commercial banks, with repos serving as their liquid assets. The average value of repos 
was SR1.8 billion and reverse repos SR3.2 billion in 2002, compared with averages of SR1.6 and SR1.0 billion 
respectively in 2000 (Wilson, 2008). Currently, the official repo rate is 2% and the reverse repo rate is 0.75% 
(www.sama.gov.sa dated 31st Dec 2016). In addition, recently the Saudi Arabian government raised USD$17.5 
billion in the biggest ever bond sale from an emerging-market nation as it sought to improve its finances, 
weakened the fall in the oil price. The Saudi Arabian government intends to issue sovereign Sukuk in future. 
Moreover, a huge development of corporate Sukuk was conducted after the establishment of the sovereign 
Sukuk.  The players competing in the market in terms of Sukuk issuers are Saudi Arabia Basic Industries 
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Corporation (SABIC), Saudi Electricity Company, Aramco Company and  Alawwal Bank. The trend towards 
Sukuk development in Saudi Arabia is continuing to improve. A comprehensive picture is provided in 
Appendix B.  
 
1.5.2 The Malaysian Sukuk market 
Section 1.5.2 presents a brief overview of the Malaysian Sukuk market. Some extensive further background is 
presented in Appendix C. 
 
According to Kettel (2013) Malaysia is the world’s core Islamic finance centre, although the richer Gulf States 
and Saudi Arabia have bigger Islamic banks and Indonesia the largest Muslim population. Malaysia also 
influences the global market for Sukuk. Kettel (2013) commented that leadership in financial services is not 
always an obvious one. Yet, in many ways the country is the world’s most important Islamic finance centre. 
The Muslim population is registered at 61.3% and over a 20% of the country’s banking system, by assets, is 
Shariah compliant.  
 
Malaysia’s global footprint is enhanced by being the home of certain global bodies of Islamic finance, such as 
the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), an international standard setting body which was established in 
2002. The work of the IFSB complements that of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions and the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors. In addition, Malaysia is the host country of the International Islamic Liquidity Management 
Corporation (IILM) which is an international institution established by central banks, monetary authorities and 
multilateral organisations to create and issue short-term Shariah compliant financial instruments to facilitate 
effective cross-border Islamic liquidity management. The IILM was established on 25 October 2010. The 
current shareholders are from the central banks and monetary agency of Indonesia, Kuwait, Luxembourg, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Qatar, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and the Islamic Development Bank.  
 
Hence, Malaysia is thriving on its vibrant and comprehensive Islamic financial services industry. Malaysia has 
continued to be the favoured domicile for Sukuk issuances globally, where 69% of the global Sukuk issuances 
originated from Malaysia in 2013 amounting to USD$82.4 billion (RM271 billion). In terms of currency, the 
ringgit also maintained its domination in 2013, with 67% of total Sukuk issuances worth UDS$89.4 billion. 
(Sukuk report, IIFM, 2014).  
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Figure 13: Global Sukuk issuance by domicile (2013) 
 
Source: Sukuk report. IIFM, 2014 
 
Figure 14: Global Sukuk issuance by currency (2013)  
 
 
Source: Sukuk report. IIFM, 2014 
 
The success story of Malaysia in the development of the Sukuk market reflects the strategic strong commitment 
of the government to develop a comprehensive Islamic financial system that will ultimately lead to Malaysia 
becoming the centre for Islamic finance globally.  
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Malaysia pioneered the development of the global Sukuk market with the launching of the world’s first 
sovereign five year global Sukuk worth US$600 million in 2002 (Kettel, 2013 and Sukuk report, IIFM, 2014). 
Having introduced the world’s first global sovereign Sukuk, Malaysia continued to facilitate the development 
on innovative Sukuk structures such as the exchangeable Sukuk Musharakah by Khazanah Nasional Berhad, 
the investment arm of the Malaysian Government. Since then, Malaysia had led the world in Sukuk issuances 
covering sovereign global, domestic and corporate issuances. Malaysia successfully issued its second sovereign 
global Sukuk Ijarah and third Wakalah global Sukuk in 2010 and 2011 respectively (Sukuk report, IIFM, 
2014). 
 
The progressive development of the Sukuk market in Malaysia over the years paved the way for Malaysia to 
emerge as a vibrant Sukuk centre, offering a complete platform for Sukuk activities through its issuance 
environment, policies for encouraging investment activities and comprehensive Islamic financial 
infrastructures. This has made the Malaysian Sukuk market uniquely attractive for global investors and players 
as a preferred Sukuk issuance and investment destination. A comprehensive picture is provided in appendix C.  
 
1.5.3 Comparison between the Saudi Arabian and Malaysian Sukuk markets  
Saudi Arabia and Malaysia are the main players in Islamic finance sector in the world. Many recent studies 
have selected Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries as case studies in order to examine the theory 
and practise of Islamic finance. It is important to address the similarities and differences between the Saudi 
Arabian and Malaysian markets. The differences are presented in four categories related to the Sukuk markets 
in both countries. These categories explain the differences in terms of the Shariah, legal issues, the market, 
trading and liquidity.  
1) Shariah interpretations under Sukuk securitisation   
The current practise of Islamic banking in Malaysia has been criticised as being insufficiently different from 
conventional banking. One of the main criticisms is the application of the Shariah based Bay-Al-Inah contract 
in creating a number is so-called Islamic financing products. Bay-Al-Inah is a sale contract with immediate 
repurchase (Kettel, 2013). This has been questioned by many Islamic finance academics, experts and 
commentators (Mohammad and Yousef, 2008, Ascarya and Yumanita, 2008, Hasan, 2010, Kettal, 2013). 
Although more than 70% of global Sukuk are issued in Malaysia an important Shariah related question 
concerns whether any investors, outside Malaysia, actually buy them.  
Bay-Al-Inah refers to sale and buys back agreement. It is a contract of sale where a person sells an asset on 
credit and then buys back at a lesser price for cash. Example: Mohammed asks a loan of £10 from Ahmed. 
Ahmed, instead of asking for interest on this loan applies a contrivance. He sells an asset to Mohammed for 
£12 on credit and then immediately after that he buys back from him the same asset for cash at £10.The buying 
back agreement allows the seller to assume ownership over the asset in order to protect against default without 
explicitly charging interest in the event of late payments or insolvency (Kettel, 2013). 
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Shariah schools conform to the Shariah law but each school has the right to have its own interpretations of the 
Shariah law within a certain rules and bounders (Kettel, 2013). These schools are referred to as the Islamic 
jurisprudence schools, and are discussed in greater detail escribed in Appendix D. By virtue of the differences 
between the schools, the undertaking of Islamic finance transactions is not a standard process throughout the 
Islamic world. This, in turn, means that a transaction such as Sukuk that may be deemed to be acceptable in 
one school, but could be rejected in the other view because of its perceived non-compliance with the rules of 
Shariah.  
The majority of scholars reject the concept of sale of debts, as it an application of interest (Riba) which is 
prohibited by Shariah law. Others such as the Shafi’i school of Sunni Islam have a different view, and accept 
the sale of debt in Bay-Al-Inah contracts. This view is adopted in the Malaysian Islamic financial markets, 
according to the Malaysian Securities Commission (2002). In contrast, it is not approved in the Saudi Arabian 
interpretation of Islamic finance, according to the Hanbali school. Furthermore, the prohibition on debt trading, 
including Bay-Al-Inah is considered in the AAOIFI Shariah standard 21 as a void contract. Mohammed and 
Yousef (2008) explained that Islamic judges are agreed in allowing the activity of selling debts to the debtor 
as, the debt can be delivered to the debtor and the prohibition on Gharar (uncertainly) is avoided. However, 
there are differences in opinion with regard to selling the debts to a third party. This illustrates the different 
interpretations of Shariah law in Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. Malaysia, which has the world’s largest Sukuk 
market, follows the Shafi’i school of Shariah law, and base their opinion on certain rulings which the scholars 
in Saudi Arabia, the heartland of Islamic finance following other schools, generally speaking, do not agree with 
(Ketell, 2013). In the author’s view, it could be said that debt trading is the same concept as in the conventional 
banking system, whereby money is an asset that can be bought and sold, while the Islamic finance theory 
emphasises that money is not an asset and should be, ideally a vehicle to be used as a medium for the exchange 
of real assets. However, the diversity of interpretation of Shariah may affect the determination of certain rulings 
on a special issue where one Islamic finance expert would accept a new product as being Shariah compliant 
while others would decide it to be non-compliant (McMillen, 2006). In fact, this is a critical dilemma that faces 
Islamic bankers in the current market, despite the fact that there have been several recorded attempts regarding 
the standardisation of the Shariah rules, especially in international trades which may involve non-Muslim 
counterparties. At the present time, the AAOIFI Shariah standards are often used as a benchmark for best 
practice.   
Most Shariah scholars in the Gulf region, including Saudi Arabia do not permit securitisation of debt trading 
in Sukuk. By contrast, in Malaysia the view is different. The securitisation of debt trading in Sukuk is permitted. 
For example, it is permissible to trade Sukuk Murabaha in Malaysia while in Saudi Arabia is not. The investors’ 
practise in Saudi is holding the Sukuk Murabaha till the redemption date due. This implies different risk 
profiles for the same Sukuk structures trading in different markets, according to the differences in the 
interpretations of the Shariah rules in these markets.  
2) Shariah governance  
The diversity of practices and models of Shariah governance systems is a current feature of Islamic finance. 
Hasan (2010) contributed with a study of regulatory frameworks of Shariah governance systems including 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. He illustrated different approaches to Shariah governance in respect of the 
regulatory framework. He observes that Malaysia follows a pro-active approach. Proponents of this model 
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argue for a regulatory-based approach in strengthening the Shariah governance framework. In Malaysia many 
laws have been passed and amended by the Malaysian parliament, including the Islamic Banking Act 1983, 
the Takaful Act 1984, the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1984 and the Securities Commission Act 
1993. The Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 confirms the status of the National Shariah Advisory Council 
(SAC) to be the sole authoritative body in Islamic finance. Furthermore, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) issued 
the Guidelines on the Governance of Shariah Committee for the Islamic Financial Institutions known as the 
BNM/GPS1. In addition, the Securities Commission of Malaysia issued the Registration of Shariah Advisers 
Guidelines 2009, setting out the criteria for the registration of a Shariah adviser in the capital market sector.  
 
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has adopted a passive approach to Shariah governance. The Saudi Authority 
Monetary Authority (SAMA) treats Islamic finance as being equal to its conventional counterparts. SAMA has 
yet to issue legislation pertaining to Islamic finance and guidelines on a Shariah governance system. There is 
no national Shariah advisory board or any institutions mandated to be the sole authoritative bodies in Islamic 
finance. The existing Shariah governance system as practiced by the Islamic financial system in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia is a product of self-initiative rather than regulatory requirement or regulator’s direction. Hassan 
(2010) advised that establishing a Shariah board at national level, providing legal provision on the final 
authority of the Shariah board’s rulings, allowing relevant experts to be appointed as the Shariah board 
members and issuing universal Shariah prudential standards is a proper solution to improve the Saudi Arabia 
model in Shariah governance. This solution has been adopted in other countries such Sudan and Pakistan as 
well as in Malaysia. Another solution may be to adopt the international Shariah standards issued by global 
bodies such AAOIFI and the International Islamic Fiqh Academy.  
. 
3) Sukuk markets 
 
According to Aljazirah Capital report (2010) the Saudi Arabian Sukuk market saw significant growth during 
the previous 5 year period, while still trailing Malaysia, the largest Sukuk market in the world, with Sukuk 
financing in Malaysia accounting for 5.3% of the total financing in the country compared to just 1.3% for Saudi 
Arabia.  In 2015, as a proportion of GDP, Malaysia’s Sukuk financing accounted for 7.0% compared with 6.0% 
in 2010, while the 2015 figure for Saudi Arabia’s is 1.3% and only 0.7% in 2010. This implies that Saudi 
Arabian Sukuk market still holds significant potential for development.  
 
 Figure 15: Sukuk financing as a % of GDP/Sukuk as a % of total financing 
 
Source: Aljazira Capital report, 2010 
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Moreover, in terms of lack of long term financing avenues, it notable that Saudi Arabia’s short-term bank 
lending accounted for approximately 58.0% of total bank lending during that period. There is great potential 
for the Sukuk market to emerge as alternative mode of long-term financing given that most Sukuk are issued 
for periods exceeding five years.   
Table 2: Comparison of Saudi and Malaysian Sukuk Markets  
 
Comparison Factor Saudi Arabia Malaysia 
Shariah schooling 
Hanbail, 
AAOIFI Shariah standard is not 
banding 
Shaifi, 
AAOIFI Shariah standard is 
not banding 
Shariah governance model Passive approach 
Pro-active approach 
Total value of Sukuk issuance USD$7.8 billion (2014) 
USD$20 billion (2014) 
Global % of Sukuk issuance 
market share  (2015) 
10% 
70% 
Size of outstanding Sukuk 
(2015) 
USD$51, 491 million  
(Q3 2015) 
 
USD$148,474 million 
(Q3 2015) 
Number of Sukuk issues 68 
1679 
Date of modern market 
emergence 
2009 
2002 
Sukuk issuance account 
compare to GDP rate 
1.3% 
7% 
Types of Sukuk structures most 
used 
Wakalah: 44% 
Hybrid: 23% 
Ijarah: 14% 
Murabahah: 12% 
Mudarabah: 6% 
Musharakah: 1% 
Murbahah: 76% 
Musharakah: 10% 
Wakalah: 9% 
Hybrid: 5% 
Sources: Moody’s, securities commissions Malaysia, Bursa Malaysia, Zawya, IFIS, Tadawul and 
developed by the author (2015) 
 
 
The comparison above shows that, although Malaysian Sukuk market currently occupies the leading role in the 
global Sukuk market and is seeking to maintain its position, the Saudi Arabian Sukuk market has the potential 
to develop quickly and to challenge Malaysia’s position. Both markets are in competition for the position of 
global Sukuk leadership. There are major differences between Malaysia’s market and Saudi Arabia’s market. 
The differing Shariah schools and interpretations play a crucial role in structuring the market positions. Clearly, 
the total value of Sukuk issuance in Malaysia currently outperforms the Saudi market. Of great interest is that, 
while the same Sukuk structures and terminologies are used in both markets, the different interpretations of the 
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Malaysian and Saudi Arabian Shariah schools means that the risk/return performance of the same structures 
may differ between these markets. For example, some Sukuk that are tradable in Malaysia are not tradable in 
Saudi Arabia, and hence bear greater liquidity risk in the Saudi market. The impact of Sukuk structure on 
Sukuk risk profiles is discussed in a number of studies, including Alsayed (2013), Abdul Jalil & Abdul Raham 
(2012), Saad & Mohamad (2012), Muhamed & Radzi (2011), Wilson (2008), Zaidi (2009) and Tariq and Dar 
(2007). Despite differing Shariah interpretations and different standards adopted, Sukuk investors are targeting 
Sukuk as attractive Shariah compliant instruments. This is evidenced by the rapid growth and investor demand 
for Sukuk in both markets. 
 
1.6 Issues surrounding Sukuk  
As an emerging financial instrument, many concerns surrounding Sukuk have arisen. Because Sukuk have only 
recently appeared this is a natural expectation. On the other hand it is important that these issues are addressed 
with more analysis and research.  
 
Since late 2007, the Sukuk market has been adversely affected by two major events (Weddernurn-Day, 2010). 
First was the announcement by AAOIFI on the permitted Sukuk structures that adversely affected scholars’ 
acceptance of certain types of Sukuk. Second, the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on sovereign Sukuk 
issuance that contributed to the fall in Sukuk issuance. 
 
In the literature it has been observed that many theoretical issues concerning Sukuk have not yet been resolved. 
Christophe, Turk-Ariss and Weill (2011) report that Sukuk as an instrument has issues not sorted out yet. The 
root of this issue is whether Sukuk really differ from conventional bonds. Miller et al. (2007) and Wilson 
(2008) argue that Sukuk returns are structured to replicate conventional bond characteristics, while others, such 
as Cakir and Raei (2007) take an opposite view, noting the empirical results showing that Sukuk are different 
from bonds because they present diversification benefits in terms of risk reduction when added to a portfolio 
of fixed income securities. Further, Wilson (2008) highlighted that Sukuk differ from conventional bonds in 
that Shariah issues in Sukuk play a crucial role because they can lead to default risk.  
 
Shariah concerns include the problems that may arise facing Sukuk issuance in secular jurisdictions. This 
occurs when the Sukuk contract chooses a governing law that does not incorporate any aspect of Shariah. In 
this case the parties involved in the transaction can choose to include additional clauses in the contract to take 
account of Shariah. Consequently, any breach of the contract can be punished by the courts, and a secular 
jurisdiction is thus able to take account of local law (Al Elsheikh and Tanega, 2011).  
 
In the case of Shamil Bank of Bahrain v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd (2004) the Court of Appeals noted that 
it was required to consider the commercial purposes under which a contract was written when interpreting it, 
despite the fact that the law governing the contract must be national law and that the courts would not rule on 
the principles of Shariah. More importantly, the ruling also stated that a contract must choose to abide by the 
laws of a specific country, and cannot be subject to Shariah alone. Note also that the parties must abide by 
national laws in addition to Shariah, and that in any situation where Shariah conflicts with the local law, 
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priority must be given to the latter. There may also be difficulties in specifying the exact principles that the 
parties must abide by, given the lack of any single compilation of Shariah principles (McMillen, 2007).  
 
In general, those issues may be categorised into three perspectives: Shariah issues, default risk and risk 
measurement within the context of Islamic finance theory. Thus, Sukuk require more research to be a reliable 
secured investment instrument.   
Figure 16: Sukuk issues categorisation  
 
1.7 Research statement  
The literature relating to Islamic debts has predominantly focused on the legal, theological and philosophical 
aspects of Islamic law and jurisprudence, on the basic concepts and principles, and the validity of how debts 
are conducted in Islamic finance within the general framework of Islamic debt (Mirakhor, 1996; Cakir, 2007; 
Dar and Tariq, 2007; Wilson, 2008; Ashhari, 2009; Somolo, 2009). So far, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, only a minimal amount of empirical research has been conducted looking at the relationship 
between Sukuk structure and financial performance. 
  
Considering the recently recorded defaults of some Sukuk securities, market players may need to consider the 
principle differences in Sukuk structuring. This is an important matter in order to reform the market and to 
analyse the implications of the different Sukuk structures in the event of restructuring during a default. 
Especially important is the debate between the asset-based and asset-backed nature of Sukuk, where it is likely 
to impact many restructuring issues in the market. As asset-based Sukuk essentially exposes investors to the 
credit risk of the originator, in that case the restructuring process is aligned with that of unsecured instruments. 
Moreover, the rapid expansion that has been witnessed on the Sukuk market against the complexity of Sukuk 
structuring leads to questions on how those structures affect Sukuk performance and reflect Sukuk growth. 
1.8 Research aims and objectives 
The research objectives are designed as follows:  
 To examine how Sukuk markets have developed and progressed. 
Sukuk Risk 
Measurement 
Default Risk 
Sukuk pricing
Shariah Issues
Substitution  
Sukuk assets
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 To evaluate the risk/expected return performance of Sukuk compared to their counterpart conventional 
bonds. 
 To identify the common Sukuk structures in the global Sukuk market.  
 To identify, measure and analyse the key financial Sukuk risks, including credit risk, maturity risk, 
investment rate risk, and structure risk. 
 In particular, to evaluate Sukuk structure risk as a risk factor in Sukuk pricing. 
 To demonstrate how the understanding of Sukuk risks, including Sukuk structure risks, may contribute to 
minimising Sukuk risk from the standpoint of issuers and investors. 
1.9 Research questions 
The research attempts to answer the following questions: 
 What are the key risk factors in pricing Sukuk? 
 What is the impact of Sukuk structure risk in Sukuk ricing?  
 How could a greater choice of Sukuk structures increase the validity and value of Sukuk? 
 On the basis of the unique, but still limited data set available for this study, what is the empirical evidence 
that the theoretically motivated risk factors identified in this study are actually priced in the market? 
 
1.10 Research methods  
This research follows the deductive method. However, difficulties are encountered when applying the 
deductive method to the study of Sukuk. Therefore, it can be said that, while the research follows the principles 
of the deductive method, the conclusions drawn from the study are less conclusive than they would be, for 
example in the exact sciences. 
 
1.10.1 Steps in applying the deductive method: 
1) Hypotheses concerning Sukuk are developed from two sources: 
a) The extensive review of the existing academic literature on Sukuk. 
b) The general background knowledge of the Sukuk markets studied. 
 
The hypotheses, therefore are essentially expectations of what we expect to find when we look at the data. 
 
The degree of confidence in these hypotheses or expectations is less than is usual in the study of conventional 
finance. This is because Sukuk markets have a very short history and are still very under-developed. For 
example, it might be hypothesised that, because Sukuk are asset-backed or asset-based they are safer than 
conventional bonds. In that case it would be hypothesised that the rate of return on Sukuk should be lower than 
that of conventional bonds, due to the lower level of risk. However, it can also be argued that the many 
uncertainties concerning Sukuk, such as whether a particular Sukuk issue is Shariah compliant or on the legal 
rights of investors in the case of default, may mean that Sukuk are actually more risky than conventional bonds. 
In that case the hypothesis would be that the rate of return on Sukuk would be higher than that of bonds. It is a 
matter of judgement which of these conflicting hypotheses is the most plausible. 
 
In the hypothesis development of this thesis the author applies his own judgement as to which hypotheses are 
the most plausible. Clearly, not all experts in Islamic finance will necessarily agree with these choices. 
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2) The second step in the deductive method is empirically testing the hypotheses. The data will either support 
the hypothesis (the hypothesis is corroborated) or the data will undermine the hypothesis (the hypothesis 
is refuted). 
 
Hypothesis testing in the social sciences is less clear cut than in the exact sciences. In particular, in the study 
of Sukuk “corroborated” means only that the hypothesis has obtained some degree of empirical support, while 
“refuted” means only that our confidence in the hypothesis has been weakened to some extent. 
 
The major problem in the second step of the deductive method as applied to Sukuk is that empirical data on 
Sukuk is very limited. The Idealratings back data used in this study is currently the most extensive data set 
available for Sukuk. However, it is still the case that the empirical testing is limited. The short history and 
limited number of trades in the Sukuk market means that the data required for rigorous empirical testing simply 
does not exist. 
 
3) The third step in the deductive approach is evaluating the hypotheses in the light of the results of the 
empirical tests. This leads to further hypothesis development, where new hypothesis are proposed or 
existing hypotheses revised. It may also lead to further research questions. 
 
4) Well-corroborated hypotheses may be applied in practice, and will be of value to many stakeholders, 
including investors, bankers, corporate and sovereign issuers, regulators and governments.  
 
While there are difficulties in applying the deductive method to the study of Sukuk, the principles underlying 
the deductive approach are sound.  
1.11 Research rationale and motivation 
There are several reasons for the remarkable growth of the Sukuk market, including: 
 Sukuk are Shariah compliant financing instruments preferred over conventional bonds by Muslim 
investors. 
 The huge wealth of Gulf countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, is producing a substantial demand for 
investment opportunities in instruments such as Sukuk. 
 Saudi sovereign and corporate entities are looking to diversify their financing options to minimise risk and 
satisfy their Muslim shareholders (Alsaaeed, 2012, Watheeqa, 2010). 
 Sukuk can offer long term financing solutions with attractive terms. 
 Sukuk are financing instruments securitised on tangible and intangible assets. 
 Sukuk have the potential to become liquid instruments due to their tradability. 
 Sukuk offer an alternative mode of financing to traditional bank financing and equity financing. 
 The global acceptance of Sukuk is attracting international financial institutions to the industry, adding 
value to the market through innovation (Alsaaeed, 2012). 
 
Research on Sukuk has attracted the attention of many academics, and the demand for Sukuk research from 
practitioners, scholars, regulators, governments and quasi-governmental bodies is immense and growing. 
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Indeed, the development of Islamic finance is regarded as one of the most significant developments in finance 
in recent decades.  
 
The rationale of this research is to add value to the Sukuk market by contributing to the understanding of the 
factors that determine Sukuk risk. A better understanding of Sukuk risk will help with developing and 
innovating long term types of Sukuk, with feasible financial features such as risk/return profiles that are 
attractive to both issuers and investors. With innovative structuring, competitive rules and regulations and the 
appropriate technical infrastructure, Sukuk could be a major driving force in the economic progress and 
development of Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries (Hassan and Mahlknecht, 2011). 
1.12 Research content and structure  
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 concludes the introduction. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the principles of Islamic finance in depth. The discussion includes, a comparison between 
Islamic finance and conventional finance, the principles of Islamic finance, the growth of Islamic finance 
around the world, risk management in Islamic finance, and how Islamic finance faced the recent finance crisis. 
The rationale for this chapter is to build on the introductory material in Chapter 1 to give a wider perspective 
on the subject. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the different kinds of Sukuk structures and mechanisms. Sukuk are more flexible than 
conventional bonds, in that there is great scope in Sukuk for innovative structures to meet the needs of issuers 
and investors. The different kinds of Sukuk structure are presented in detail in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses Sukuk risks. Sukuk risks can be classified in a number of different ways. These different 
classification schemes are discussed in this chapter. It is argued that Sukuk structure risk, a risk that has hitherto 
not been discussed much in the literature, is one of the main risk factors that should be taken into account when 
evaluating Sukuk risk.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses research methodology and expands on the discussion of research methods presented in 
Chapter 1. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the data used in this research study.  
 
Chapter 7 presents an empirical analysis that updates and extends the empirical analyses already undertaken 
on Sukuk. These studies are based on the analysis and comparison of Sukuk and conventional bond indices.  
 
Chapter 8 presents the empirical research using the unique Idealratings Sukuk referred to in Chapter 1 and 
presented in Chapter 6.  
 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. 
 
Further descriptive background material is contained in the Appendices.  
28 
 
Figure 17 shows the research design which have been developed as an achievement diagram of the study: 
Figure 17: Study design and achievement guideline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.13 Conclusion  
Despite Islamic financial growth and penetrating the global market, the majority of Islamic finance instruments 
have not developed and grown as fast as Sukuk. Sukuk are an innovative product with its own features, 
principles and methods that are different from conventional bonds. This chapter introduces, and presented an 
introduction and overview of Islamic finance, the meaning of Sukuk, how Sukuk differ from conventional 
bonds, some background on the Saudi Arabian and Malaysian markets, a statement of research aims, objectives 
and motivation and rationale, and the main research contribution of the thesis. The remaining chapters present 
the research topic in detail.  
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CHAPTER 2 
AN INSIGHT INTO THE ISLAMIC FINANCE SYSTEM 
2.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to present a comprehensive background to the Islamic finance system. This 
chapter extends the introduction to the general theory of Islamic finance presented in Chapter 1. It addresses 
the concept of Islamic finance, its features, market developments, common methods of Islamic financing and 
risk management in Islamic finance. 
2.2 Islamic finance concepts  
The first Islamic finance institutions in the modern era were Islamic banks, designed to comply with the ethical 
principles and provisions of Islamic law, which is known as Shariah. This law is derived from the Holy Quran 
and Sunna (the speech of Prophet Mohammed peace and blessings of Allah be upon him).  
 
Muslim and non-Muslim authors have considered the foundations of Islamic finance in depth (Hanif 2014, 
Wilson 2009, Gait and Worthington 2007, Metwally 2006, Iqbal and Molyneux 2005,Siddiqi 2004, Akacem 
and Gilliam 2002, Zaher and Hassan 2001, Lewis and Algaoud 2001,Al-Jarhi and Iqbal 2001, Warde 2000, El-
Gamal 2000, Dar and Presley 1999, Dumale and Sapcanin 1999, Abdul-Gafoor 1999, Moore 1997, Iqbal 1997, 
Haron 1995, Kahf and Khan 1993, Metwally 1993, Noorzoy 1982). Generally, Islamic finance builds on 
Islamic interpretations in respect of money. These interpretations can be summarised into two main ground 
rules: sharing of profit/loss and the prohibition of the collection (giving) and payment (charge) of interest 
(usury). By contrast, conventional finance is guided mainly by the rules of the capitalist financial system, which 
are based on the profit maximisation principle. In other words, Islamic finance is based on trade while 
conventional finance is based on debt. There is a fine line between these two counterpart systems.  
 
The role of Islamic financial institutions becomes problematic, given the prohibition on charging and receiving 
interest. What then, should be the role of Islamic finance in an interest-free financial system? The answer is 
that instead of engaging in interest-based transactions, Islamic providers of finance should invest in viable 
projects with reliable borrowers. If the project succeeds, the profits are shared; if it fails, losses are suffered.  
 
Fundamental to an understanding of Islamic finance is the Islamic theory of money. Money value in Islam has 
an exclusive frame of interpretations and originality different from other financial systems; it is the main driver 
of Islamic finance principles. 
 
2.3 Money in Islam  
Beyond the Islamic finance concept, it is interesting to address the money value theory in Islam because it is a 
fundamental driver in designing Islamic finance instruments. This explains why the Islamic finance system 
exists in the financial industry. Money is considered to be a vehicle, or value instrument bringing benefits for 
its holder in the context of exchanging values with others.   
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The debate surrounding the value of money is deeply entrenched in finance and Shariah scholars. Adebayo 
(2010) discussed the capitalist tendency of giving money the status of a commodity, where the interest rate is 
regarded as the price of this commodity. He considers money in Islam as a platform of exchange and a store of 
value and so as a representative of assets and not a genuine asset in itself. Consequently, money is means of 
securing economic satisfaction as it bears some, but not all qualities attributed to assets. Ayub (2007) discussed 
the money value in Islamic finance. He attributed it to the valuation of the credit period based on the value of 
the goods or their usufruct, and as being different from the conventional concepts of “opportunity cost” or 
“time value”. He discussed the Shariah scholars’ concerns of the credit price of a commodity as a replacement 
of money. In Islamic finance, the time valuation of money does not exist in the exchange of monetary values, 
loans or debts. However, it is possible only in business in the trade of goods and services. In addition, he stated 
the concept of time value of money in the context of the Shariah is also entrenched in the Shariah prohibitions 
on mutual exchanges of gold, silver or monetary values in the form of a defered sale. This is because a person 
may obtain the opportunity by using the currency which he has received but he has not given its counter value 
from which the other party could take a benefit. 
 
Therefore, since all goods possess the quality of depreciation by the lapse of time, money should therefore 
adopt this feature as well. Once this feature is imputed to it, as it should be, nobody would be interested in 
holding it back. It would be put back into circulation as soon as it was received, causing more demand on 
available products (that are bought and sold) which will further boost production to increase supply, leading to 
more employment and higher wages. Higher wages would cause higher demand and more supply. It is this way 
an act of unfairness to hoard money, believing that idle money should retain its purchasing power through the 
receipt of fixed interest payments.   
 
Ahmad and Hassan (2006) presented three reasons why money should not be considered to be a commodity. 
These are that: (i) money has no intrinsic value like a commodity. It can only be used to buy some goods or 
services, in contrast to a commodity which can be used directly without exchanging it for something else; (ii) 
commodities have different in qualities and features compared to money. Money has the sole quality that it is 
a measure of value or vehicle for trade and exchange. Hence, all money units are of the same grade and they 
are exactly equal in this respect; and (iii) money cannot be pin-pointed in a transaction of exchange as against 
selling and purchasing transactions which are effected on an identified commodity. In the Islamic theory of 
money value it would be wrong to exempt money from the law of depreciation or a store of value since 
money itself cannot perform any function; money only becomes useful when it is exchanged for a real asset 
or used to buy a service. 
 
As early as Fisher (1911) and later Ingham (2004) it was noted that in capitalist theory there is no difference 
between money and commodities as far as trade transactions are concerned. Both are treated on a par and can 
be sold at whatever price the parties agree on. For them selling £100 for £110 is the same as selling a box of 
potatoes costing £100 for £110. 
Asutay (2010) justified the Islamic theory of money by attributing to Islamic finance principles such as the 
importance of moral behaviour in the market place, whereby the market is a tool for producing economic 
outcomes compatible with social justice. This is in contrast with the rationalist, self-maximising and 
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productivity-oriented capitalist market economy. He explained that Islamic finance theory differs from the 
capitalist theory as money and commodities have different natures and considerations. For example, money 
has no intrinsic value but is only a store of value or a vehicle of exchange; it has no capacity to fulfilling human 
needs by itself, unless converted into commodities.  
Thus, a commodity can fulfil human needs directly, and can have different features while all money is the same 
in the sense that a new note of £50 is exactly equal in value and function to an old note of £50. Also, 
commodities are transacted or sold by pinpointing the commodity in question to given certain specifications. 
Furthermore, the growth and development of the Islamic finance system came from its theory towards the value 
of money and this appeared essentially as a product of its promotion of justice in its transactions (Adebayo, 
2010). Precisely, the principles of the Islamic finance system are focused on the benefit of society, and for the 
individuals or groups in that society. Justice has therefore been considered an actual instrument to achieve it. 
This implies the purpose of Islamic finance theory. It creates a challenge for Islamic finance institutions to 
apply best practices of those principles to Islamic finance products and instruments such as Sukuk.  
Therefore, in the Islamic finance context, money cannot be used to trade on itself, and when there is a need to 
exchange money in the case of borrowing or lending, the payment on both sides must be equal. In other words, 
money is treated as "potential" capital (Asutay, 2010). It is considered as actual capital when associated with 
other resources to enable a productive activity. Islam recognises the time value of money, but only when it acts 
as capital, not when it is "potential" capital. This explains the reason behind prohibited dealing with interest 
(Riba) in Islamic finance. Interest is used as a target in the conventional system but Islamic finance is designed 
to target profit from trade transactions. Profit against interest is the differential purpose of the two systems. In 
fact, the difference lies among the risk factor and gain factor; while parties share both risk and gain in trading. 
Risk lies solely on the borrower only in Riba operations [God has permitted sale (bai) and prohibited Riba] 
(2\275). Profit against interest summarises the different purposes of the two systems. The table below explains 
in more detail the comparison between interest and profit:  
Table 3: Difference between interest and profit 
Interest Profit 
Return on capital Return on a project 
Interest is guaranteed Risk of loss is involved 
Fixed return Variable return 
Return on deposit 
Return on joint ventures in a risk sharing 
relationship, provided they remain within the 
framework of Shariah permissible [Halal] activity 
and return is not unreasonably high. 
Interest is fixed at the time of contract and is not 
based on profit or loss 
Profit distribution is based on profits and profit 
shares are fixed at the time of contract 
The interest rate is based on the amount of money 
involved 
The rate of profit financing is based on the amount of 
profit obtained 
Payment of interest is fixed as promised without 
taking into account the profitability of the project 
managed by the other party 
Distribution of profit depends totally on the 
profitability of the project concerned. Should the 
project be non-profitable or incur losses, then the risk 
is borne by both parties 
The amount of interest paid does not increase 
even if the profit obtained is manifold 
Distribution of profit increases in accordance with 
the amount of profit  obtained 
Source: created by Asutay (2010) and developed by author (2016) 
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This shows that the root of Islamic finance theory concerns the concept of money and its treatment in Islamic 
theory. This is the answer to the question raised regarding the essential differences between the two counterpart 
financial systems.  
2.4 Features of the Islamic financial system  
Islamic finance implies a connection between investors, banks and traders through a risk sharing mechanism. 
This feature shows a major difference between the Islamic system and the conventional. The Islamic finance 
system is Islamic in that it is guided by Islamic law, which defines the rules and guidelines for the appropriate 
operational of the Islamic system. 
Akram, Rafique, and Alam (2011) discussed the Islamic finance features and summarised them into four 
categories as follows: 
 
1) Risk sharing 
2) Materiality 
3) No exploitation 
4) No financing for sinful activities.  
 
Thus, the risks are dispersed between all stakeholders of the investment deal, such as the investor or capital 
provider, the bank and client, and materiality means that a real transaction must exist and avoid exploitation 
for all parties. Also, financing sinful activities is clearly in contravention of the Islamic rules.  
 
In profit and loss sharing transactions (PLS), the profit and loss sharing ratio is pre-determined. Profit and loss 
sharing in Islamic banking may serve to eliminate inflation, unemployment and poverty.  
 
The figure below shows the connections between those features that should be adopted in all Islamic finance 
instrument e.g. Sukuk.  
Figure 18: Islamic finance features   
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These features of the Islamic finance system require a close link between financial and productive flows in the 
society. This connection helps to channel funds into real economic activities. This has the effect of protecting 
the Islamic financial system from risks associated with extreme financial leveraging and speculative activities. 
 
It is required for Shariah compliant instruments to reflect these features in reality. For example, consider Sukuk 
Murabahah, which is considered as a debt based certificate. It is a transaction whereby existing assets are 
purchased and then resold to the client with a mark-up. For example, a bank may purchase inventory assets on 
behalf of a firm and sell those assets to the firm, with immediate delivery, with payment in instalments with a 
mark-up over cost. Murabahah transactions are practised by Islamic financial institutions under such various 
names as: mark-up, cost plus financing, production support programmes, short-term financing or sale-purchase 
contract (Ahmad, 1993). 
 
The full picture of the financing methodology of Murabahah presents sharing risks between the buyer and 
purchaser. The transparency of Murabahah commodity finance is essential for it to be in compliance with the 
Shariah. This shows that Islamic finance supports the economy with productive demand to supply the bank’s 
client’s financial needs. The figure below illustrates this structure in simple context. On the other hand, 
Murabahah financing form can be observed that is similar to a conventional interest-based lending structure. 
However, a major difference exists between Murabahah and interest-based lending is that the mark-up in 
Murabahah is obtained towards work that incurs costs and efforts to provide the service. For example, in 
seeking and purchasing the required goods at the best price. The amount mark-up is not determined by the time 
period. Thus, if the client fails to make a deferred payment on time, the mark-up does not increase from the 
agreed price owing to delay. Also, the Islamic bank owns the commodity between the two sales; this implies 
that it carries the associated risks (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 1999). 
 
Profit and loss sharing (PLS) dominates the theoretical literature on Islamic finance in contrast to the extent to 
which it is applied in practice. Currently, Murabahah and other debt based products are dominant in Islamic 
finance. Murabahah represent around 80% of the Islamic finance market compared to 20% for PLS products 
(Dar and Presley, 2000). Debt based products such as Murabaha in some respects are close to conventional 
financing methods. One criticism of Islamic finance is that Islamic finance products tend to be created by 
adapting existing conventional products rather than developing entirely new Islamic products.  
 
Hanif & Iqbal, (2010) categorised Islamic modes of financing into two themes, Shariah compliant and Shariah 
based. The table below displays Islamic modes of financing under this classification.  
Table 4: Classification of Islamic modes of financing  
Shariah based  Shariah compliant  
Musharaka Murabaha 
Mudaraba Ijarah 
Diminishing Musharakah Bai Salam 
Muzara’a (Sharecropping) Bai Muajjal 
Musaqa (Irrigation) Istasna 
Mugharasa (Agriculture or Plantation) Wakala (Agency) 
Source: Hanif and Iqbal, (2010) and developed by Author (2016). 
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Hanif and Iqbal, (2010) explained Shariah compliant products as the modes of financing where the return to 
the financier is predetermined and fixed but within Shariah constraints. The financing methods harmonising 
the operations of Islamic finance with conventional finance include Murabaha (cost plus profit sale), Ijarah (a 
rental arrangement), Bai Salam (spot payment for future delivery), Bai Muajjal (sale on deferred payment), 
Istasna (order to manufacture) and Wakala (agency). They are all Shariah compliant products. On the other 
hand, Shariah based transactions are the financing modes incorporating the Shariah concept of profit and loss 
sharing. These contracts include Mudaraba (partnership of capital and skill), Musharaka (partnership in 
capital), Diminishing Musharaka (Islamic housing finance), Muzara’a (sharecropping), Musaqa (irrigation) 
and Mugharasa (agriculture). Under Shariah based profit and loss sharing modes of financing, returns to the 
financier are not fixed in advance. Rather it depends upon the outcome of the project. However, loss is to be 
shared according to capital contributions. 
 
It can be concluded that the major difference between conventional and Islamic financing lies in the Shariah 
based modes of financing (Hanif, 2011).  
 
Figure 19: Simple Murabaha Structure  
 
Source: Islamic finance board, 2015 
 
A fundamental feature of Islamic finance is the fact that Islamic finance is focussed on serving the financing 
needs of the real economy. This is due to the asset based nature of Islamic finance transactions. In conventional 
finance there are no restrictions on the purposes for which financing can be raised. For example, conventional 
finance allows borrowing for leveraged speculation in securities markets. This may assist in explaining the 
occurrence of bubbles and crashes in the stock market, for instance the crisis on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SSE) in August 2015 where the market index lost 1400 points within three days. Abdullah (2016) explained 
that the difference between the real economy in China and financial economy contributed effectively in this 
crisis, noting that GDP growth was recorded at the relatively low figure of 7.7% (www.world Bank.com, dated 
35 
 
31st Dec 2015) compared with a rise in the stock market of 150% during the year from June 2014 to June 2015, 
with the average PE ratio of 70:1 in contrast to a PE of 16:1 for the Dow Jones Stock index. This implies that 
applying the Shariah principles that financing should be asset based and anchored in the real economy may 
reduce the abuse of the stock market as a way of gambling, and move it towards its main purpose of providing 
finance to the real economy. 
 
Elfakhani and Hassan (2007) emphasise that Islamic finance structures are based on profit sharing partnership 
schemes. In addition, the most important element of the Shariah Law is forbidding dealing in three things: 
Riba (interest), Maysir (gambling and pure games of chance), and Gharar (selling something that is not owned 
or that cannot be described in accurate details such as the type, size, and amount).  
 
In this light, Asutay (2010) states the features of Islamic finance in terms of an actual moral, equitable 
distribution in resources and social fairness, with risk-sharing as a component of Islamic trade rather than the 
risk-transfer of conventional finance.  He discussed these features and categorised them into six elements as 
summarised below. In addition, the other features stated by other researchers such as Iqbal (1997), Elfakhani 
and Hassan (2007), Wilson (2007), and Akram et al. (2011) have been added on.  
 
Figure 20: List of Islamic finance features  
 
 
As far as the prohibition of interest is concerned in Islamic finance theory, questions arise concerning the 
justification of this prohibition. It is argued that prohibition of interest (Riba, Usury) provides for a stable and 
socially efficient economic environment. In addition, interest is unfair in that it affects borrowers and lenders 
alike. The borrower pays the interest and repays the capital as well as bearing any losses from the use of these 
funds. The lender may lose the value of capital when applying interest and encourage the borrower to defer the 
payment. On top of this, interest leads to money being made from money, an unacceptable practise in Islamic 
finance. In Islam, money is an exchange instrument that has no value in itself. The second feature is prohibition 
of fixed return. This is driven by Islamic finance rules that do not allow capital to gain a fixed return without 
Prohibition of interest (Riba, Usury) 
Prohibition of fixed return
Privilege of money value 
Profit Loss Sharing (PLS)
Participatory nature in financing methods 
Avoidance of Gharar 
Avoidance of Maysir (gambling, pure games of chance):
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carrying any risk. In addition, it is shared through an economic activity in the real economy rather than in the 
financial economy. Also, Islamic finance aims at productive economic activities or asset based financing over 
the debt based system. The third feature is the Islamic theory of money value. The wisdom behind it is that 
money does not have any inherent value in itself and therefore money cannot be created through the credit 
system. This reflects the value of money in Islam as well as bringing another rationale for the prohibition of 
interest. The fourth feature is profit and loss sharing (PLS). This shows the nature of the relationship between 
capital and work in the Islamic finance industry. In fact, this may be considered the best method of establishing 
justice between work effort and return, and between work effort and capital. The fifth feature is the 
participatory nature in financing methods. In fact, the participation methodology is reflected in PLS theory; 
Islamic financial instruments, capital and labour merge to establish a partnership. The sixth feature is avoidance 
of Gharar. This is considered a critical feature and means selling something that is not owned or that cannot 
be described in accurate details such as the type, size, and amount. Al-Dareer (1997, p7) defines Gharar in 
jurisprudential terms under three headings: 
 
‘‘First, Gharar applies exclusively to cases of doubtfulness or uncertainty, as in the case of not knowing 
whether something will take place or not. The definition by Ibn Abidin is a case in point: Gharar is 
uncertainty over the existence of the subject matter of a sale. A second view holds that Gharar applies 
only to the unknown, to the exclusion of the doubtful. This view is adopted by the Zahiri School. Thus, 
according to Ibn Hazm, Gharar in sales occurs when the purchaser does not know what he has bought 
and the seller does not know what he has sold. The third view is a combination of the two categories 
above; Gharar here covers both the unknown and the doubtful, as exemplified by the definition proposed 
by Al-Sarakhsy who states that Gharar obtains where consequences are concealed. This is the view 
favoured by most scholars’’. 
 
More simply, El-Gamal (2001, p5) defines Gharar as “… the sale of probable items whose existence or 
characteristics are not certain, due to the risky nature which makes the trade similar to gambling”. In other 
words, the Gharar is anything whose consequences are hidden. In finance, Gharar is exists in derivative 
transactions, such as forwards, futures and options, in short selling, and in speculation. In Islamic finance, 
most derivative contracts are not Shariah complaint contracts because of the structuring of ambiguity and 
uncertainty involved in the future delivery of the underlying asset. To explain further the concept of a purely 
speculative derivative, it is a type of contract where neither party is hedging a pre-existing risk and a contract 
that, in many ways, is tantamount to a gambling practice that, arguably, made a significant contribution to the 
recent financial crisis (Nicholas, 2012). However, there is a debate among Shariah scholars on the acceptability 
within Islamic law on the use of derivative contracts within Shariah constrains. The challenge here is how to 
structure the asset that underlies the contract without falling into the practice of Gharar. Current conventional 
derivative trading frequently involves leverage and resembles a gambling game (Maysir). Innovation is 
required to create a new class of derivatives contracts that adhere to Shariah rules, in particular to ensure that 
such contracts require delivery of the underlying real asset.  Conventional derivatives contracts are traded 
where the trader has no intention of taking delivery and is just speculating on future price movements. Also, 
conventional trading in derivatives is highly leveraged, and hence implicitly involves interest.  
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The seventh feature in Figure 3 is avoidance of Maysir (gambling, pure games of chance). The Maysir is a sort 
of gambling conducted on money using gaming instruments.  Al-Dareer (2012) argued that Maysir is 
considered a type of Gharar and is not a special class in its own right. The rationale behind the prohibition of 
Maysir is that gambling contains high risk in its transactions: some people win a large amount of money, but 
others suffer from a loss of money, and sometimes face bankruptcy. This leads to great financial and social 
problems. Also, those games of chance and gambling are unnecessary for society, because they cannot add any 
surplus to societal wealth.  
 
The IFSB explained the concepts of Islamic finance by creating the following model of the essential features 
of Islamic finance.  
Figure 21: Essential features of Islamic finance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IFSB, Islamic finance global financial stability, 2010 
 
The Islamic finance features are inherited from Shariah law and have been developed during the life of the 
Islamic finance industry. The Islamic financial services industry continues its double digit growth, led by Sukuk 
where new jurisdictions are entering the market and where continual innovation is taking place.  
 
2.5 Brief history of the Islamic finance system  
From a historical point of view, the main clients for Islamic finance are the Muslim people, which are estimated 
today at around 24% of the world’s population (See Appendix A: the Muslim world map). They are the major 
drivers for creating the growth of Islamic finance. In spite of this, the expansion of Islamic finance as an 
industry is quite modern. According to Iqbal and Molyneux (2005), the age of the modern Islamic finance 
Overarching Principles 
 Towards achieving the objectives of Shariah rules (Maqasid al-Shariah): 
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 High ethical values such as justice, fairness, trust, honesty and integrity 
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 Avoidance of interest-based transactions 
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 Avoidance of speculative transactions 
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 Entitlement of profit contingent upon risk 
taking 
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Embedded Governance Disclosure & Transparency 
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system is measured as being around 40 years. This explains the reason behind the need to develop Islamic 
finance. The figure below shows the history of Islamic finance and Islamic banking mentioned in previous 
research using Google software Ngram Viewer. It shows that Islamic finance has been highlighted from 1940 
and the research on it increased rapidly afterwards, especially after 1980 and 2000.  
 
Figure 22: Historical Record of Academic Research on Islamic Finance  
 
 
This indicates the important contribution of research to the development of Islamic finance. 
 
Islamic finance has experienced several essential moments in this history timeline. Iqbal and Molyneux (2005) 
state that the first individual attempt to introduce Islamic products, which attracted no interest, was in Egypt 
by Ahmed Alnajjar in the Egyptian town of Mit Ghamr in 1963, for the purpose of helping to reduce poverty. 
In 1972, the Mit Ghamr Savings project became part of Nasr Social Bank which, currently, is still in business 
in Egypt. Hanafy (2004) argued that the development toward introducing Islamic banking needed to have some 
attempts witnessed in the Middle East area. For instance, AlRajhi finance and Investment Company in Saudi 
Arabia started in 1958. The second development went from individual initiatives to group businesses 
establishing Islamic banks in the financial market. This began with the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia in 1973 and then with Dubia Islamic bank in 1975. After these attempts the expansion continued 
by establishing new Islamic banks in the Arabian Gulf region and the Islamic world followed later. Malaysia 
played a big role in the progress of developing Islamic banking in an Asian country. Azahari (2009) revealed 
that the first Islamic bank in Malaysia was established in 1982. This bank was called Bank Islam Malaysia, 
which was the result of persuading the prime minster about the necessity of Islamic banks in Malaysia to serve 
and offer Islamic compliant products for Muslim customers. The final and current movement is the innovation 
of Islamic finance instruments. For example, Sukuk, which arrived early in 2000 and are still developing to 
meet the liquidity management and investment opportunities in the Islamic finance market. The figure below 
presents the history timeline of the development of the Islamic financial system around the world.  
  
39 
 
Figure 23: Historical timeline of Islamic finance 
 
Source: Islamic finance breakfast briefing, 2012 
The figure below shows how Islamic banks were established historically.  
Figure 24: A brief historical tracking of the establishment of Islamic banks and institutions  
 
Source: KFH Research, 2013 
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2.6 Islamic finance market development  
It is difficult to obtain exact figures on the size of the Islamic financial sector. Without doubt, it is small in 
comparison to the conventional financial sector but it is experiencing strong growth. Iqbal and Mirakhor (1999) 
report that Islamic banks grew from an asset base of $5 billion in 1985 to a level of over $100 billion in the 
late nineties. 
The statistic for the Islamic finance industry’s growth shows a positive expansion in different aspects of the 
industry. Total assets increased from $1166bn in 2012 to $1267bn in 2013, representing 8.7% annual growth. 
However, the growth of 2012 has recorded a slowdown from 20.7% to 8.67% in 2013; the compound annual 
growth rate since 2006 was recorded as 16.02% (The Banker, 2015). This is considered a healthy performance 
overall. The figure below presents an overview.  
Figure 25: Historical view of the development of total asset value of Islamic finance market 
 
Source: The banker, 2013 and developed by author, 2015 
There many developments resulting from the entry of Islamic banks offering financial services to clients. This 
opens a competitive environment between Islamic banks and their counterpart conventional banks in terms of 
targeting customer satisfaction. The number of institutions reporting Shariah-complaint activities has grown 
to 349 institutions in 2013 from 307 institutions in 2012, equal to 13.68% growth in the new institutions (The 
banker, 2015). This shows how the financial markets respond to meeting the market needs.  
The main driver for the Islamic finance expansion is the huge demand by Muslim clients around the world. 
Moreover, the resilience of Islamic financial institutions during the recent financial crisis and its aftermath 
brought more attention to Shariah-compliant products by non-Muslim investors and users as well. This 
increases the profitability platform of the industry. The figures comprising the ranking show ongoing high 
growth around the world. In 2013, the total Shariah profits of standalone banks were recorded as $14.7bn and 
the average return on assets for standalone banks was 1.43% (the Banker, 2015).  
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It may be argued that the rapid growth of the Islamic finance industry is not always high quality in terms of 
profitability due to it not growing in line with assets. The aggregate return on assets (ROA) ratio for Islamic 
banks was 1.51% for the four years 2009 to 2012 inclusive. By contrast, the ROA on conventional banks was 
2.12% for the same period (The Banker, 20153). The figure below presents the ROA of a sample of Islamic 
finance markets. It includes Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia and Iran. 
Figure 26: Islamic Banks: Return on assets evolution 
 
Source: The Banker database: Maris Strategies, (2015) 
 
On the profitability side, the Islamic finance markets have recorded the profit ratio differently. While the profit 
ratio in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries is (27.73%) and Asia (19.24%), the profit has declined 
slightly (-3.42%) in Africa. However, the biggest decline was in Australia, Europe and America (-60.33%) 
(The Banker, 2015).  
Figure 27: Regional assets growth 
 
Source: The Banker database: Maris Strategies, (2015) 
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In order to achieve mature market growth, Islamic banks will need to innovate in three dimensions: products, 
services and internal process, which need to be streamlined. Increased profitability will be a direct result of the 
movement towards achieving improvements in these dimensions.  
The example of Sukuk shows the extent to which Islamic financial products have spread around the world. 
Sukuk are firmly entrenched in the global Islamic capital market due to the interest of investors. The global 
Sukuk market has seen substantial consolidation in the light of the 2008 global financial turmoil and credit 
crunch, specifically in the last 18 months after growing by around 48 per cent a year during the period 2003-
2007 (Zawya, 2014). The Sukuk market, however was not spared from the impact of the global credit crisis. 
Based on data from Zawya’s Sukuk Monitor for 1Q of 2009, global Sukuk issuance in 2008 dropped by 55 per 
cent to $15.4 billion from 2007. Issuance continued to decline, standing at $7.4 billion for H1 2009, 33 per 
cent less than H1 2008. However, generally Sukuk outperformed the benchmarks after the 2008 financial crisis. 
Its performance suffered again post-2012, a contributing factor being that investors’ risk appetite has increased 
and it has been recorded that more investors are relocating funds from Sukuk to equities (Zyawa, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 28: Sukuk Average growth rate 
 
Source: Zawya’s Sukuk Monitor, 2014 
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Figure 29: History timeline of global Sukuk issuance  
 
Source: Zawya’s Sukuk Monitor, 2014 
Overall, the Sukuk markets have reached new heights over the past few years, accompanied by a wider issuer 
base, more cross-border activity and more innovative issuances (Global Sukuk report, 2014) 
The expansion in the Sukuk market bridges the gap in liquidity management in the Islamic finance industry. 
Abdul-Rahman (1999) stated that the major problem facing the Islamic finance trade is a lack of Shariah 
complaint liquidity instruments and that this causes Islamic banks to not have enough liquidity to meet any 
mismatch of the term structure (maturity dates) of assets and liabilities. This implies the necessary position of 
the Sukuk market to be used as a liquidity platform to mobilise assets and trade. This underpins the contribution 
of this research into Sukuk, which, by enhancing the literature on the risks of Sukuk structures assists in the 
decision making of issuers and investors in Sukuk. 
 
2.7 Islamic finance common products 
Because of avoidance of Riba in Islam, Islamic banks have had to develop financial products which are not in 
conflict with the Shariah. The task has been achieved by creating a number of special financial products (Ali 
and Ali, 1994). Therefore, Islamic banks design financial products based on Shariah law and in line with the 
domestic regulator. However, the innovation in Islamic finance products has been a highly considered topic 
recently with different views on it. Ahcene and Lin (2012) argue that the innovation in Islamic finance products 
is considered an off track approach due to it following the steps of conventional finance products. Others such 
as Monzer (2006) disagreed with closing the door on innovation in Islamic finance. He contributes with a study 
on innovation and risk management in Islamic finance. The innovation in Islamic finance, in his study, must 
be restricted with the Islamic rules on finance. However, the Islamic finance expertise thinks out of the box to 
bring a new class of instruments to fill the needs of the Islamic finance money mobilisation. This means the 
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innovation in Islamic finance has a financial perspective not a Shariah perspective. It helps to create new 
methods of finance as some products in the market such as Sukuk are considered a new instrument.  
Islamic financing products may be classified into two branches, short term financing and long term financing 
products. Short-term products include equity mutual fund investments and real estate mutual fund investments 
(held over the short term). Long-term products are Sukuk and long term investment in real estate and stock 
portfolios. The substantial point is that these products are structured in accordance with the Shariah and should 
be applied in investment strategies that meet the Shariah conditions as well.  
 
Due to the complexity of Shariah contracts a study by Hussain, Shahmoradi, and Turk (2015) contributed by 
classifying Islamic finance products into three broad categories: 
 
 Debt-like financing structured as sales, which could be sales with mark up and deferred payments such as 
Murabaha or purchases with deferred delivery of the products such as Salam for basic products, Istisna’ 
for manufactured products, and leases such as Ijarah with different options to buy. Pure lending is allowed 
only when benevolent. 
 Profit-and-loss-sharing (PLS)-like financing of two kinds: (i) profit-sharing and loss-bearing such as 
Mudarabah whereby the financier (investor, bank) provides capital and the beneficiary provides labour 
and skills. Here profits are shared, but losses would be borne by the financier who does not have the right 
to interfere in the management of the financed operation, unless negligence, misconduct, or breach of 
contract can be proven; and (ii) pure profit-and loss-sharing such as Musharakah where the two parties 
have equity-like financing of the project and would share profits and losses; and 
 Services, such as safe-keeping contracts (Wadi’ah) as for current deposits, or agency contracts (Wakalah), 
which are also increasingly used for money market transactions. 
The most the common Shariah models for Islamic finance products in the global Islamic finance market are 
summarised below:  
Mudaraba (Participation or trust financing): is a partnership in profit whereby one party provides capital (rab 
al-maal) and the other party provides labour (mudarib) (AAOIFI, 2010). It involves two parties, the managing 
trustee (mudarib) and the beneficial owner (rab al-maal). Usually the investment account holders are the 
providers of funds, and the Islamic banks are the managing partner (mudarib). The Islamic financial institution 
may either put up all the funds itself or undertake responsibility for investing in them, or alternately it can 
provide funds to a customer who then acts as mudarib. The borrower retains a fixed percentage of profits, the 
Islamic financial institution’s reward is a fixed percentage in the balance of the revenue generated by the 
investments and the remainder goes to the investors.  
Musharaka (Equity Financing): AAOIFI (2010) defined it as an agreement between two or more parties to 
combine their assets, labour or liabilities for the purpose of making profits. It is quite similar to the Mudarabah 
contract. It involves financing through equity. Here the partners or shareholders for a project use their capital 
through a joint venture or limited partnership to generate a profit. Profits or losses will be split between the 
shareholders according to some agreed pre-calculation depending on the investment ratio. 
A modern application of Musharaka is diminishing Musharaka which is a form of partnership in which one of 
the partner’s promises to buy the equity share of the other partner gradually until the title of the equity is 
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completely transferred to him (AAOIFI, 2010). Its application is used more than the typical Musharaka model 
in the Islamic finance market, representing around 12% while the typical Musharaka is 1% in 2006 as shown 
in figure 9. Diminishing Musharaka is also used in Islamic mortgage financing in the residential housing 
market. 
Difference between Mudaraba and Musharaka contracts: In a Mudaraba contract, the managing agent 
(beneficiary or the borrower, called the Mudarib) does not have any financial participation. In a Musharaka 
contract, the agent is a financial partner along with the provider of funds (rab al-maal of Mudaraba contract), 
sharing the gain or loss at the pre-designated ratio which is likely to be higher than what he is likely to get in a 
Mudaraba contract. Thus, in Mudaraba, the agent acts as a working partner who does not bear any losses and 
simply manages the fund (the project in which the fund is invested), whereas in Musharaka, all the parties are 
shareholders in the venture. 
The Mudaraba and Musharaka transactions are often seen on the retail liability side of Islamic banks. The 
asset side whether retail or wholesale is quite risky. 
Murabaha (Cost-plus financing): This model is extensively used to facilitate trade financing activities of 
Islamic financial institutions. Murabaha is considered the most common such financial instrument of the 'mark-
up' structure. It is application usage was estimated at 40% of the global Islamic finance market size in 2006 as 
shown in Figure 13. AAOIFI (2010) defines Murabaha as a sale of an item by the institution to a customer (the 
purchase order) for a pre-agreed selling price which includes a per-agreed profit mark-up over its cost price, 
this having been specified in the customer’s promise to purchase.  
In a Murabaha transaction, the bank finances the purchase of an asset by buying it on behalf of its client. The 
bank then adds a "mark-up" in its sale price to its client who pays for it on a deferred basis. Islamic banks are 
supposed to take a genuine commercial risk between the purchase of the asset from the seller and the sale of 
the asset to the person requiring the goods. The bank stands in between the buyer and the supplier and is liable 
for a fall in the commodity. There is thus some form of guarantee with respect to the quality of the goods 
provided by the bank to the end user in the strict form of Murabaha. Title of the goods financed may pass to 
the bank's client at the outset or on deferred payment. From the perspective of modern finance, the Murabaha 
facility is equivalent to an asset-backed risky loan. If the capital markets are perfect and all agents in the 
economy have equal access to information, then competition between Islamic banks and conventional banks 
would result in Murabaha having the same expected return as that of conventional loans. 
Normally, a Murabaha transaction involves the financial institution granting the customer a Murabaha credit 
facility. In addition, Murabaha typically involves deferred payment terms, but such deferred payment is not 
one of the essential conditions of such a transaction (AAOIFI, 2010).  
Ijarah: It literally means “…to give something on rent” (Lewis and Algaoud 2001). The term Ijarah as used 
in this standard means leasing of property pursuant to a contract under which specified permissible benefits in 
the form of a usufruct is obtained for a specified period in return for a specified permissible consideration 
(AAOIFI, 2010).  
In Islamic finance, there are two forms of leasing: (1) direct Ijarah (Operating Lease) which involves leasing 
of machinery, equipment, buildings and other capital assets. The financier purchases the asset and leases it to 
the end-user for an agreed rental which may be fixed in advance or subject to occasional review by a mutually 
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accepted third party. In this Ijarah contract possession of asset should be transferred back to the owner after 
the contract matures. In other words, in pure Ijarah contracts, there is no option to transfer the ownership of 
the asset at maturity (Ariff and Safari, 2015) 
(2) Ijarah wa iqtina (Financial Lease) is the case of contract where the basic intention is transferring the 
ownership after completing the leasing period (Ariff and Safari, 2015). This is whereby an institution or 
individual customer requests the bank to purchase equipment with the intention of leasing it to the customer 
(Gait and Worthington, 2007). This is a leasing structure coupled with a right available to the lessee to purchase 
the asset at the end of the lease period. The lessee agrees to make payments into an Islamic investment account 
(with a right to all profits) to be used in or towards financing the ultimate purchase of the asset. It is most 
important to note that the lease contract is completely separate and independent from the contract of purchase 
of residuals, which has to be valued on a market-basis and cannot be fixed in advance.  
Furthermore, the purchase contract should be an optional, non-binding contract based on agreement between 
both parties at the end of the lease period because the quality and the market price of the asset at that time may 
are unclear (Chapra, 1998). One other approach is the case where the ownership is gradually transferred to the 
customer. This design as any payment made by the client for his finance lease instalments consider as a 
decreasing-value lease up to the completion of value of asset plus its rental value. By consequence, this received 
payment reduces the lessor’s share of ownership until the lessee becomes the owner (Metwally 2006). 
From the Shariah perspective, the Ijarah contract is permissible under the Shariah when it satisfies certain 
conditions. The fundamental requirement is that the lessor must be the real owner and in possession of the asset 
to be leased under contract. Thus, all risks and uncertainties associated to the asset obtained by the lessor only. 
This includes responsibility for damages, repairs, insurance, and depreciation of the asset (Khan and Bhatti, 
2008). 
This instrument has been widely used in a range of asset classes including ships, aircrafts, telecom equipment 
and power station turbines, etc (Iqbal, 1997, Warde, 2000). In fact, Ijarah has witnessed the most common 
structure usage in Sukuk issuance, especially for project finance (IIFM, 2010). 
Salam (Pre-paid Purchases):  
Salam is a form of advance payment or forward buying defined by Iqbal and Molyneux (2005) as follows: 
“Salam is a sale contract in which the price is paid in advance at the time of contracting against delivery of the 
purchased goods/services at a specified future date”. It is a short-term commodity finance contract in which 
the buyer (usually of agricultural or manufactured products) pays the seller the full negotiated price of a product 
that is promised for delivery at a later date. A Salam transaction is the purchase of a commodity for deferred 
delivery in exchange for immediate payment (AAOIFI, 2010).  
In the conventional financial system a forward contract is similar to a Salam contract. However, the distinction 
exists on the rate of return structure as a Salam contract is tied to each transaction rather than to a time 
dimension. Also, in a Salam contract structure the buyer pays the full amount in advance on condition of 
assurances as to the quality and quantity of the sold products as specified in the contract. The counter-party 
risk in Salam is one-sided as it lies with the buyer alone (Islamic bank) unlike the forward contracts which 
affect both parties. Therefore, it is expected that this risk will be priced accordingly. This is illustrated where 
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a bank pays for the manufacturer's goods at a discount rate before they have been delivered or even made. On 
the other hand, there is debate in the literature on whether the subject of a Salam transaction should be available 
in the market at the time of the contract or whether it is enough that the asset will be available at the date set in 
the contract for delivery. Also, conditions regarding the specification of a minimum time between the date of 
contract and delivery of assets is another issue of debate in the Salam literature. 
Istisna (Manufacturing contracts): The AAOIFI definition is “a contract of sale of specified items to be 
manufactured or constructed, with an obligation on the part of the manufacturer or builder (contractor) to 
deliver them to the customer upon completion” (AAOIFI, 2010). Istisna is a relatively new method in Islamic 
banking; Gait and Worthington (2007) defined it as “a manufacturing contract which allows one party to obtain 
industrial goods with either an upfront cash payment and deferred delivery or deferred payment and delivery”. 
El-Gamal (2000) described it as “a commission to manufacture that is usually used to cover work in progress 
in the manufacturing and building industries”. This model has the advantage that the cost price is prepaid or is 
deferred as instalments for product creation at a lower price than the cost of buying the completed product or 
building. In the context of Islamic banking, individuals or firms request a financing contract for the production 
goods, and the bank concludes an Istisna contract with a third party (the manufacturer) to produce and deliver 
the specific item under certain requirements (Lewis and Algaoud 2001). The differences between Istisna and 
Salam is that the Istisna’s subject is usually an item which demands manufacturing; the payment in Istisna 
could be a lump sum or instalments on a deferred basis, and the time of delivery in an Istisna contract may not 
be known (Iqbal and Molyneux 2005). 
Figure 30: Common Islamic financing methods in the global Islamic market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Islamic banking bulletin, State Bank of Pakistan, 2007 
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2.8 Islamic financing methodology  
Islamic finance has a unique methodology distinguishing it from other financial systems. In fact, this is the 
main difference between Islamic finance and other systems although there is a debate on how this methodology 
works to meet the competition in the finance industry.  
 
The prohibition on dealing with interest brings other ideas and alternative methods. However, Islamic finance 
designs its methodology under the concept of trade, requiring engagement with the real economy in its 
transactions. It is often claimed that the ideal mode of financing under the Islamic banking system is financing 
on the basis of profit and loss sharing (PLS) (Sangmi and Khaki, 2011).  
An Islamic bank would undertake Islamisation on traditional banking product to re-structure it to be in line to 
Shariah rules. 
 
2.8.1 Comparison between Islamic finance and conventional finance  
 
Based on the literature, the research in the Islamic finance industry tended to compare its financial instruments 
against conventional financial instruments. The major factors investigated suggested that Islamic finance was 
considered as an alternative investment; but the major question is how efficient they were regarding investment 
when compared to the conventional ones. Many studies have been conducted on this matter. This comparison 
helps to understand the Islamic finance methodology and recognise its identity in the financial context as a 
comparison method is the common way for consideration and recognition of differences. 
 
 
In effect, the Islamic financing functions are seen to be much like conventional ones. Investors and lenders 
have the right to a decent rate of return; it is just the how to generate the return that is an issue. Maximisation 
of the shareholders’ wealth as the sole objective of the firm is a critical difference between conventional and 
Islamic finance (Zaher and Hassan, 2001). 
 
 
Further differences between these two systems are discussed by Akkizidis and Khandelwal (2008). Obviously, 
the major difference highlighted is dealing with interest. The table below presents these differences:  
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Table5: Differences between conventional financing and Islamic Financing 
Conventional Finance Islamic Finance 
Primarily based on interest rate Interest is prohibited 
Facilitate financial activities Facilitate social, economic and financial activities 
Structured and formalised Unstructured and still informal in many ways 
Stress on financial efficiency Stress on social, ethical and financial efficiency 
Restricted moral dimension Strong moral dimension 
Highly systematised in terms of risk management, 
accounting, and other standards 
Standards for risk management, accounting and 
other activities are still developing 
Existing set of legislations to deal with legal issues Legal support still in development with several 
legal areas in doubt 
Highly developed banking and finance product 
market 
Developing banking and financial product market 
Existence of conventional money market Non-existence of significant Islamic money 
market 
Available inter-bank funds Non-availability of inter-bank funds 
Strong and developed secondary market for 
securities 
Non-existing secondary market for securities 
Existence of short-term money market Non-existence of short-term money market 
Sources: Akkizidis and Khandelwal, 2008. 
 
Furthermore, on the investment side, Islamic finance has its own investment strategy elements describing its 
features. This applies to every Islamic investment instrument including Sukuk.  
 
 
The figure below summarises the key differences between an Islamic investment and conventional investment.  
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Figure 31: Key difference between Islamic investment and conventional investment systems
 
Source:  Ernst & Young, the Islamic funds & investment Report, 2011 
 
In general, Islamic finance has much in common with Ethical finance theory. Both of them support the use of 
ethical and social criteria to select and manage investment portfolios. However, the Islamic finance 
methodology distinguishes itself by not dealing in the fixed income market and the receipt and payment of 
interest is not permitted. 
 
Many studies have argued that Sukuk are an alternative investment. However, the debate on whether Sukuk 
provides an efficient investment is still ongoing.  
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An ongoing debate is whether Sukuk really differ from conventional bonds. Usmani (2008) contributed a study 
on the nature of conventional fixed income securities from the Shariah perspective and illustrated the reason 
for their impermissibility. He then introduced Sukuk as an alternative and discussed the different types of 
Sukuk from the Bahrainian and Pakistani context. He concluded that Sukuk are a Shariah compliant investment 
instrument and that their growth would continue at a fast rate.   
 
While Miller, Challoner and Atta, (2007) and Wilson (2008) argue that Sukuk returns are structured to replicate 
conventional bond characteristics, others like Cakir and Raei (2007) take an opposite stance to show that Sukuk 
are different from bonds because they present diversification benefits in terms of risk reduction when added to 
a portfolio of fixed income securities. In addition, Wilson (2008) demonstrated that referring to Shariah issues 
on Sukuk plays a crucial role because it might lead Sukuk to default risk. Also, Wilson (2009) emphasised this 
further with an evaluative study of the development of Islamic finance in the GCC markets. He stated that 
Sukuk have been adopted in those markets and expanded rapidly, but that the major concerns on Sukuk 
applications in the GCC relate to Shariah-compliance issues. Shariah concerns are due to different Shariah 
schools and thinking adopted in the Islamic world. In this light Ahcene and Lin (2012) attempted to address 
the Shariah issues surrounding Sukuk. They argued that due to the present structuring of Sukuk, they tend to 
mimic the features of bonds. They concluded that as long as Sukuk continue to be seen as Islamic bonds and 
are not able to establish themselves as a new class of asset, there will be a never-ending process of sorting out 
new Shariah issues when innovations are worked to replicate bonds. 
 
In this regard, a study focussed on the risk management of Sukuk structures was written by Tariq and Dar 
(2007). They contributed to the Sukuk literature by introducing a type of derivative that can help in Sukuk risk 
management and compliance with Shariah Law. They argued that introducing embedded options can be part 
of Islamic finance contracts such as Ijarah, instalment sale and Salam contracts. Importantly, they stated that 
these options will not be a derivative as they cannot be detached and sold independently as an instrument. They 
also suggested that using a swap between floating rate Sukuk (FRS) and fixed rate zero coupon embedded in 
Sukuk (ZCES) has the opportunity to emerge. This might be done by making it Shariah compatible with some 
financial engineering.  As a result, Sukuk can become highly competitive in the market and more accessible to 
investors, hence enabling a greater variety of investment.  
 
A small number of studies were conducted on the effects that Sukuk impose on the performance of investment 
in different types of banks. Said (2011) provided a very interesting paper in which he investigated whether the 
use of Sukuk has impacted the performance of Islamic banks during the recent financial crisis. He focused on 
14 Islamic banks that used Sukuk as part of their investment operations. The study was divided into two stages; 
for the former one Said used financial ratios to measure the strength of financial liquidity, deployment, overall 
efficiency and profitability. In the latter stage, Said provided regression analysis to measure the sensitivity of 
using Sukuk in these banks to their performance during the financial crisis. He found that the Islamic banks 
have decreased in strength deployment, overall efficiency and profitability during 2008 compared to 2007, but 
that Sukuk have not impacted the performance of the sampled Islamic banks. The study showed that Islamic 
banks increase their use of Sukuk to provide liquidity and mobility for bank resources.   
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Majid, Shahimi and Abdullah, (2011) and Ahmad and Wahab (2012) discuss the issue of Sukuk default. Majid 
et al., (2011) investigated the implications of three defaults for the capital market. They selected the Malaysian 
capital market and three defaulted corporate Sukuk as case studies. In addition, they looked at the implication 
of Sukuk default on a country’s reputation, legal aspect and investor protection. The found that Sukuk did not 
pose a significant threat to the Malaysian local capital market but have an impact on the overall country 
reputation as a global Islamic finance centre. They also found that investors’ sentiment for Sukuk issuance had 
been severely damaged. In their conclusion, Ahmad and Wahab (2012) emphasised that estimating the Sukuk 
distance to default reflected the economic conditions of the real economy and the financial position of the 
borrowers.  
 
From a different platform of comparison, Godlewski, Turk-Arsis and Weill, (2011) plus Ariff and Safari (2012) 
reached a similar conclusion that Sukuk can be distinguished from bonds. However, Godlewski et al., (2011) 
viewed it from the market reaction perspective. They investigated the market’s reaction toward Sukuk issuance 
trying to illustrate an understanding of the investors’ behaviour in the Sukuk market. They used a market-based 
approach on Malaysian data. The approach they used is a standard market model to estimate abnormal returns 
around the event of issuing Sukuk and bonds. It reacts negatively to the issuance of Sukuk. They attributed 
their results to the idea that this negative reaction is due to the fact that low profit companies and financially 
weak companies are known to prefer Sukuk financing to bond financing. They note that the negative reaction 
towards Sukuk issuance affects the firm’s value in the short-term. Finally, the research noted the need to assess 
the long-term implications of Sukuk financing in economic development before considering large-scale 
adoption of Islamic finance instruments. In contrast, Ariff and Safari (2012) examined the differences between 
Sukuk and bonds by examining the presence of any causal relationship between the yield of Sukuk and bonds 
of the same return and rating. They concluded that there were no causal relationships. 
 
Alshhari, Chun and Nassir, (2009) conducted a research study that investigated the effect of Sukuk and bond 
announcements on shareholders’ wealth. They examined the Malaysian market from 2001 to 2006. They found 
that there is a wealth effect following the announcement of Sukuk issues, consistent with the findings of 
Godlewski et al., (2011) reported above. By contrast no wealth effect was detected on the bond announcements. 
 
2.9 Overview of risk management in Islamic finance 
Islamic financial markets have sometimes faced difficulties owing to the lack of adequate market-based 
government monetary policy instruments compatible with Shariah (Tariq and Dar, 2007). Al-Suwailem (2000) 
and El-Gamal (2000) examine the concept of uncertainty in the context of Islamic finance and its implications 
for the feasibility of Islamic risk management. Other studies have focused on risk management in Islamic 
finance. Al-Deehani, Karim and Murinde (1999) and Archer and Karim (2006) stressed the importance of 
Islamic risk mitigation factors in order to avoid default in financing. Also, they noted that in addition to the 
risk factors common to conventional and Islamic banks, the unique mix of risk factors may make Islamic banks 
more vulnerable than their conventional counterparts, owing in part to the inadequate financial infrastructure 
of Islamic banks, including missing instruments and markets, and a weak insolvency and creditor rights regime, 
factors that limit effective risk mitigation.  
53 
 
The Islamic banking system is based on risk-sharing, the owning and handling of physical goods, and 
involvement in the process of trading, leasing and construction contracts using various Islamic modes of 
business and finance. As such, Islam in general does not object to trade nor does it simply prohibit contracts 
just for the sake of it. Islam is against guarantees in trade but allows such protection that can act as mitigating 
factors. As the prophet, peace be upon him, said: “AlKharq bi Aldaman”, which means such a permissible risk 
can lead to a permissible profit when it seeks to ensure justice and fair play in all dealings to all parties. The 
objection is not against the concept of conventional finance but against certain weakness of conventional 
finance contracts, as explained earlier’ Gharar (uncertainty); Maisir (Gambling) and Riba (Usury). On the 
other hand, Zubair (2015) contributed with a study of risk sharing in Islamic finance. He argues that risk sharing 
is not basic to Islam. Islam approves profit-and-loss sharing; sharing of risk is a consequence of that, not its 
cause. He claimed that there is no such thing as a risk sharing contract per se in Islamic finance that, when 
entered, gives rise to profit-and-loss sharing. The study concludes that while there is a case for encouraging 
participatory finance in Islam, there is none for treating risk sharing as its inviolable principle. Risk sharing 
should be regarded as an aspect of Islamic finance contracts, not as contract in its own right.  
 
In this light, Sukuk represents the holders’ proportionate ownership in an undivided part of the underlying 
asset. All the rights and obligations to such an asset are assumed by the holder of a Sukuk Certificate, where 
for a definite period, the risk and return associated with the cash flows generated by that particular underlying 
asset belong to the Sukuk investors. Sukuk thus represents proportionate ownership in an asset and may be 
described as an Islamic bond which is asset backed thus differing from a Conventional bond (Lovells, 2007). 
 
Islamic finance is driven in its methodology by the rules of Shariah. However, from the writer’s point of view, 
the marketing of Islamic financial products should not be based on compliance with the Shariah alone. Using 
Shariah as a marketing vehicle and ignoring the quality of the financial services or products creates a gap 
between the product itself and the expectations of the investor or user of Islamic finance. As well, an institution 
marketing a product as Shariah compliant should ensure that such products are genuinely compliant. In 
particular, in regards to Sukuk, as an important innovative product, and in order to fulfil its potential, it is 
essential that compliance is ensured at every stage in the process of securitisation.   
 
2.10 Conclusion  
This chapter presented further details about the Islamic finance system, extending the introduction to the 
general theory of Islamic finance presented in Chapter 1. It addresses the principles and concepts of Islamic 
finance, market developments, the most common contracts used in Islamic financing, and risk management in 
Islamic finance. 
The main factor distinguishing the Islamic finance system is its finance methodology. This arises from the 
Islamic theory of money, which is considered to be a valuable instrument, benefitting its holder in the context 
of exchanging values with others. This implies the prohibition of dealing with interest in Islamic finance 
transactions. 
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A main trend in Islamic finance is the development of innovative Islamic finance instruments. The most 
common structures are Mudaraba, Musharaka, Ijarah, Murabaha, Salam and Istisna. Each of those structures 
has its own risk/return profile. This underscores risk management as an essential feature of Islamic finance.  
 
Against this background, this study contributes to the debate by examining the development and prospects for 
Islamic finance, with a special focus on Sukuk risk analysis as a common financial instrument in the global 
finance market.  
  
The following chapter investigates in further depth the structures and mechansisms of Sukuk. 
 
*** 
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CHAPTER 3 
EVALUATION OF SUKUK STRUCTURES AND MECHANISMS 
3.1 Introduction   
The Sukuk market has gone from strength to strength over the past few years and continues to move into new 
markets with strong innovation in terms of structures and instruments. This underlines the importance of 
critically assessing and analysing Sukuk structures, in order to provide a solid base in the field of study to 
support further analysis.  
This chapter builds on the material in the previous chapters by discussing the regulatory framework, the 
different classification schemes for Sukuk, Sukuk securitisation, and, for each of the main Sukuk structures, 
the definitions, key features, risk associations, structure diagrams, and some illustrative examples. 
 
3.2 Sukuk and scope of understanding 
Sukuk have featured in the global financial market scene since 2002, and there is a significant amount of 
literature that has discussed their concepts, features, and structures and investigated the differences from their 
conventional counterparts. Hence, as Sukuk and conventional bonds are both considered as long term financial 
instruments, it might be asked what is a conventional bond? It is a financial instrument based on debt where 
the party that issues the bond is called the issuer and the one that buys the bond the investor (Fabozzi, 2005, 
Abdul Rahman, 2008). The bond is issued in the form of a certificate with face value of a certain amount such 
as US$100 and can be sold at par, discount or premium (Abdul Jalil and Abdul Raham, 2012). The bond enjoys 
distinct features that make it a safer investment option for investors. Some basic features of a bond are the 
coupon or interest rate, which can be fixed or floating, and maturity date which can either be long-term, 
intermediate or short-term (Fabozzi, 2005). According to Fabozzi (2005), short-term tenure is between 1 and 
5 years, intermediate term is between 5 and 12 years and long term tenure is more than 12 years. The issuance 
of the bonds can be done in any currency and they are issued for financing certain projects, and for corporate 
and sovereign liability management. Usmani (2007) commented that the interest based system prevalent in the 
world today regularly issues conventional bonds that yield interest from capital intensive enterprises that bring 
great profits and regular revenues. In addition, he summarised that the holders of such certificates are more 
than lenders, in the sense that their earnings come from the interest on their loans in a percentage that accords 
with the price of interest in the marketplace. The profits of these enterprises after costs, including interest 
payments, return exclusively to the sponsors. According to Dualeh (1998), conventional bonds can be identified 
as a debt security, in which the authorised issuer owes the holders a debt and is obliged to repay the principal 
and interest (the coupon) at a later date and termed maturity. Thus, a bond is simply viewed as a loan in the 
form of security. The issuer of the bond is equivalent to the borrower, the bond holder is regarded as lender 
and the coupon represents the interest. In general, bonds are issued for a fixed term called the maturity. The 
aim of issuing bonds is basically financing long-term investment with external funds (Dualeh, 1998).  
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In contrast, the basic concept of Sukuk is that Sukuk holders are sharing in the profits of large enterprises on 
their revenues. This is because Sukuk are based on trade and the basis of their transaction is an underlying 
asset. 
Essentially, it is not a debt of the issuer but undivided ownership share in a specific asset or business venture. 
Appendix E illustrates further the comparison between Sukuk, conventional bonds and shares. 
 
According to AAOFI (2010), Investment Sukuk have been defined in Shariah Standard No.17 as: 
‘‘…certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in ownership of tangible assets, usufruct 
and services or in ownership of the asset of a particular project or special investment activity, however, 
this is true after receipt of the value of the Sukuk, the closing of subscription and the employment funds 
received for the purpose for which the Sukuk are issued’’ (AAOFI, 2010, p 307) 
 
In the same context, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) defines Sukuk as follows: 
 
‘‘ Sukūk  (plural of sakk), frequently referred to as ‘‘Islamic Bonds’’, are certificates each of which 
represents the holder’s proportional undivided ownership right in tangible assets, or pool of 
predominantly tangible assets, or a business venture’’ (IFSB standard 7, 2009, p3). 
 
Sukuk contribute to fill the gap in liquidity management mobilization, and to satisfy Muslim investors who are 
apprehensive about investing in conventional bonds due to many factors that prohibit Muslim investors from 
doing so. This prohibition includes such things as interest (Riba), uncertainly (Gharar) and transactions in 
unethical goods and services, making the contract impermissible for Muslims (Tariq, 2004).  
 
Admittedly, Sukuk have more restrictions than conventional bonds due to compliance with Shariah rules. In 
spite of that, Sukuk enjoy a lot benefits summarised by Usmani (2007) as follows:  
1) Sukuk are among the best ways of financing large project namely infrastructure projects that are beyond 
the ability of a single party to finance.  
2) Sukuk provide an ideal means for investors seeking to deploy streams of capital and who require, at the 
same time, the ability to liquidate their positions with ease whenever the need should arise. This is because 
it is envisioned that a secondary market for the trading of Sukuk will develop. Thus, whenever, investors 
require cash from their investments, or from a part of the same, it will be possible for them to sell their 
Sukuk holdings, or part thereof, and receive their value from their original investment plus earnings, if the 
enterprise is profitable, in cash. 
3) Sukuk represent an excellent way of obtaining liquidity for banks and Islamic financial institutions. When 
these are in need of disposing of excess liquidity they may purchase Sukuk; and when in need of liquidity, 
they may sell their Sukuk into the secondary market.  
4) Sukuk are a means for the equitable distribution of wealth as they allow all investors to benefit from the 
true profits resulting from the enterprise in equal shares. In this way, wealth may circulate on a broad scale 
without remaining the exclusive domain of a handful of wealthy persons. This is clearly among the most 
important of all the higher goals sought by an Islamic economic system. This is one of the greatest goals 
of an Islamic economy. 
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Thus, Sukuk represent a key financial instrument for diversifying resources and providing the necessary 
liquidity to institutions and governments that need long-term funding sources. Additionally, Sukuk develop the 
quality of the Islamic financial markets because they extend the part played by shares, and therefore provide 
additional investment and financing options. Hence, Sukuk bridge the gap in the financing of infrastructure 
projects, as an addition, or alternative to Treasury bills, bonds and public debt.  
 
Sukuk gain their features from the adoption of the principles of Islamic law, Shariah in all Sukuk functions 
and transactions. Afshar (2013) described these features as freedom from Shariah prohibitions, such as those 
involved with interest (Riba), Gharar and harmful activities e.g. beverages, pork, prohibited drugs, gambling, 
pornography and weapons.  
 
A core feature of Sukuk is that Sukuk are backed by real economy flows. 
 
Broadly, the Sukuk features have six categories, as shown in the figure below: 
 
Figure 32: Sukuk features  
 
 
These features are:  
1) Underlying asset backing. This essentially differentiates Sukuk from conventional bonds, and serves to 
achieve one of the core aims of Sukuk financing, namely, to secure the role of Islamic finance in servicing 
the financial needs of the real economy. 
2) Shariah compliance. This has made Sukuk widely accepted among Muslim investors around the world.  
3) Fixed term maturity. This estimates the expected return within a specific period, and is particularly suited 
for the role of Sukuk in project financing.  
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4) Type of return. Sukuk are classified as a long term investment with fixed return but due to their profit and 
loss sharing policy, they have flexible returns based on the profitability generated from the attached asset 
of the Sukuk. In addition, risk and return in Sukuk is customised based on Sukuk structures, since Sukuk 
have a different risk profile depending on their structures.  
5) Tradability. Sukuk trade throughout the secondary market like bonds. However, this depends on the type 
of Sukuk. Debt based type such as Sukuk Mubrabuah are required to satisfy particular conditions in Islamic 
Law in order to be tradable.    
6) Redemption and principal repayment. Sukuk have greater security in due to being attached to an asset.  
 
These illustrate shows Sukuk have become a competitive player in the global financial market. 
  
It is noticeable that the risk and return of Sukuk are associated with those of the underling assets, as the asset 
cash flows are passed to Sukuk holders (Afshar, 2013). Hence, the ratio of risk and return would be impacted 
by the underlying asset types, such as tangible or intangible, existing or with deferred delivery, usufruct or 
services.  
3.3 Sukuk regulations 
Regulation concerns the market organization, and every market needs to adopt regulation among its users in 
order to achieve maturity and professionalism. Islamic financial markets, like their conventional counterparts 
are subject to regulations from professional authorities (Ariff and Safari, 2015). Moreover, to be recognised as 
an Islamic transaction, Sukuk products must follow some extra procedures required by Islamic authorities 
(Iqbal and Mirakhor, 1999). These authorities include the Shariah supervisory board (SSB) of an Islamic bank. 
Shariah regulations governing Sukuk, like other Islamic finance and banking practices in general, are dictated 
from three sources; international organisations, local authorities, and in-house Shariah boards. 
 
Some major Islamic financial institutions have their own in-house Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB). This is 
common practice among Islamic investment companies and banks, and is required by AAOIFI standards. In 
the process of issuing Sukuk Shariah advisors should study proposed Sukuk structures, and suggest revisions 
in the light of relevant Shariah concepts, in order to achieve the required Shariah compliant financing 
instrument. Usually the SSB will work closely with the legal counsel of the issuer and the arranger (investment 
banker) to ensure that the legal documents are in line with Shariah requirements. Finally, they should issue a 
Shariah certificate (fatwa), which is an opinion that the Sukuk complies with the Shariah rules. 
 
The local Shariah authority governs the Islamic financial institutions within its jurisdiction. Some Islamic 
countries such as Malaysia have set up their own Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) at the national level, which 
oversees the consistent application across similar situations in financial interactions. These councils are usually 
part of the country’s securities commission or central bank. At the international level (the Organisation of 
Islamic Countries) there is a Shariah Council in Saudi Arabia. From the global perspective, there are a few 
international organisations that attempt to regulate and screen the conduct of Sukuk issuance and trade. Among 
these international organisations, AAOIFI, IFSB, and the IIFM are the most influential ones (DIFC, 2009). 
Although these organisations try to base their rulings on the Shariah, there are occasions when their guidelines 
on Sukuk differ from those of national authorities. Not being national bodies, these rules cannot be imposed, 
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so remain voluntary. Therefore, Siddiqui (2008) highlighted that more communication between these 
organisations will bridge the differences existing between certain Sukuk contracts.  
 
The decisions regarding the permissibility of each Sukuk contract, as mentioned above, is made by expert 
Muslim scholars who are appointed to the Shariah Board. The numbers of those experts is estimated to fall 
between 100 and 200, worldwide (Asad, 2008). This indicates the gap in the industry and the need to act 
towards training of expert Muslim scholars to sit on Shariah boards in Islamic financial institutions. To address 
this shortfall, some Islamic institutes such as International Shariah Research Academy for Islamic Finance 
(ISRA) and International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) are providing special programmes 
for training certified Shariah scholars. However, there are other institutions currently providing short-term 
courses on this topic. 
 
3.3.1 AAOIFI 
On their website, the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) 
introduces itself as "an Islamic international autonomous not-for-profit corporate body that prepares 
accounting, auditing, governance, ethics and Shariah standards for Islamic financial institutions and the 
industry". Professional qualification programmes (notably CIPA, the Shariah Adviser and Auditor CSAA, and 
the corporate compliance programme) are presented now by AAOIFI in its efforts to enhance the industry’s 
human resource base and governance structures. 
 
As an independent international organisation, AAOIFI is supported by institutional members (200 members 
from 40 countries, so far) including central banks, Islamic financial institutions, and other participants from 
the international Islamic banking and finance industry, worldwide. 
 
AAOIFI has gained support for the implementation of its standards, which are now adopted in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain, Dubai International Financial Centre, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Sudan and Syria. The relevant 
authorities in Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and South Africa have issued 
guidelines that are based on AAOIFI’s standards and pronouncements. It has reached a total of 88 standards 
issued: (a) 48 on Shariah, (b) 26 on accounting, (c) 5 auditing standards, (d) 7 on governance, and (e) 2 codes 
of ethics (www.AAOIFI.com, dated 31st Dec 2016). 
 
In May 2003, AAOIFI issued Shariah standard 17 titled “Investment Sukuk”. AAOIFI issued standards for 14 
different types of Sukuk, where some of these Sukuk are classified as tradable and others are classified as non-
tradable based on the type and characteristics of the issued Sukuk (AlBuolayan, 2006). AAOIFI and its Shariah 
Board chairman, Shaikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani, place special attention on Sukuk because it is one of the 
most favoured Islamic financing instruments and, due to the great flexibility of Sukuk, there is a possibility of 
variation in contract formation by practitioners (Ariff and Safari, 2015). As mentioned in Chapter one, Shaikh 
Usmani has provided some comments on the practice of Sukuk. For instance, he has highlighted that “… since 
Ijarah Sukuk represent the pro rata ownership of their holders in the tangible assets of the fund, and not the 
liquid amounts or debts, they are fully negotiable and can be sold and purchased in the secondary market. 
Anyone who purchases these Sukuk replaces the sellers in the pro rata ownership of the relevant assets and all 
the rights and obligations of the original subscriber are passed on to him. The price of these Sukuk will be 
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determined on the basis of market forces, and are normally based on their profitability” (Usmani, 2001, p5). 
However, his most cited and debated comment regarding Sukuk is his statement in November 2007 which 
declared that some 85 percent of outstanding Sukuk failthe Shariah-compliance test on the basis that they were 
‘asset-based’ rather than ‘asset-backed’ with the guaranteed return of the face value of the Sukuk on maturity 
and in the absence of a transfer in asset ownership to Sukuk holders (Usmani, 2007). After that, the juridical 
validity of Sukuk became suspect (Hasan, 2010, Alsayyed and Malik, 2010, Ariff and Safari, 2015).  
 
Ariff and Safari (2015) summarised Usmani’s reasons for such a declaration in brief and from three 
perspectives: 
• There have been cases where the assets in the Sukuk were the shares of companies that do not confer true 
ownership but which merely offer to Sukuk holders a right to returns. 
• Most Sukuk issued are identical to conventional bonds with regard to the distribution of profits from their 
projects at a fixed percentage bench-marked on interest rates. The legal presumption regarding Sukuk is that 
no fixed rate of profit or the refund of capital can be guaranteed. 
• Virtually all Sukuk issues guarantee the return of the principal to holders at maturity (just as in conventional 
bonds), through a binding promise from either the issuer or the manager to repurchase the assets at the face 
value regardless of their true or market value at maturity. 
 
Later, in February 2008, AAOIFI issued a guidance statement on accounting for investments (AAOIFI, 2008). 
Ariff and Safari (2015) summarised and highlighted the important issues raised in this guideline as follows:  
a) Sukuk issuances should be backed by real assets, the ownership of which must be legally transferred to 
Sukuk holders in order to be tradable. 
b) Sukuk must not represent receivables or debts, except in the case of a trading or financial entity selling all 
its assets or a portfolio with a standing financial obligation, in which, some debts owing by third parties, 
incidental to physical assets or usufruct, are unintentionally included. 
c) The manager of the Sukuk is prohibited from extending “loans” to make up for the shortfall in the return on 
the assets, whether acting as a mudarib (investment manager), or sharik (partner) or wakil (agent). 
d) Guarantees to repurchase the assets at nominal value upon maturity apart from Ijarah Sukuk structures are 
also prohibited. 
e) Closer scrutiny of documentation and subsequent execution of the transaction is required by Shariah 
Supervisory Board. 
 
In turn, Maurer (2010) examined this debatable problem and concluded that for some, Usmani’s opinion was 
a long overdue and much needed corrective to what they saw as the excesses of Sukuk issuances and structured 
financing vehicles that came very close to replicating conventional bonds. Ariff and Safari (2015) commented 
that is an overreaction and an unrealistic appraisal towards Sukuk in particular and for Islamic finance in 
general. This is because Islamic finance market is born on the interconnected and interdependent conventional 
finance global world and still under development. In fact, this implies an indicator towards the gap of 
understanding Sukuk structures between how Sukuk ideally should be in theory and the actual practice of 
Sukuk in the market. Correcting the Sukuk development path in the early stages helps in avoiding difficulties 
in it changing track or developing in the future. 
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3.3.2 IFSB 
The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), which is based in Kuala Lumpur, was established in 2002 and 
started operations in early 2003. It serves as an international standard-setting body of regulatory and 
supervisory agencies that have a vested interest in ensuring the soundness and stability of the Islamic financial 
services industry, which is defined broadly to include banking, capital market and insurance. In advancing this 
mission, the IFSB promotes the development of a prudent and transparent Islamic financial services industry 
through introducing new, or adapting existing, international standards consistent with Shariah principles and 
recommend them for adoption (www.ifsb.org, dated 31st Dec 2016). 
 
To this end, the work of the IFSB supports reconciliation with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions and the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors. Drafting of standards in IFSB is done on a task force working group method. The IFSB council 
appoints members of the technical committee who are responsible for advising the council on technical issues 
within its terms of reference. 
As far as Sukuk are concerned, the IFSB has issued three standards that affect the issuance, trade, or investment 
in Sukuk: 
• IFSB-1: Guiding principles of risk management for institutions (other than insurance institutions) offering 
only Islamic financial services, issued in December 2005. This guideline also includes the various risk elements 
affecting institutions offering investment certificates such as Sukuk and operational considerations regarding 
them. This guideline offers a general perspective toward risk sources and risk management and is not specific 
to Sukuk. 
• IFSB-2: Capital adequacy standard for institutions (other than insurance institutions) offering only Islamic 
financial services, issued in December 2005. This standard overviews various Islamic contracts (some of which 
are underlying contracts of Sukuk) and provides capital requirements for each.  
• IFSB-7: Capital adequacy requirements for Sukuk, securitisation and real estate investment, issued in January 
2009. The first part of this guideline investigates Sukuk and securitization, Sukuk structures, operational 
requirements pertaining to Sukuk, the treatment of regulatory capital for Sukuk and securitisation exposures, 
and the treatment of credit risk exposures of Sukuk. 
 
3.3.3 IIFM 
The International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), located in the Kingdom of Bahrain, is a global 
standardisation body for the Islamic capital and money market segment of the Islamic financial services 
industry. Its primary focus lies in the standardisation of Islamic products, documentation and related processes. 
The IIFM was founded with the collective efforts of the Central Bank of Bahrain, Bank Indonesia, the Central 
Bank of Sudan, the Labuan Financial Services Authority (Malaysia), Ministry of Finance (Brunei Darussalam) 
and the Islamic Development Bank (a multilateral institution based in Saudi Arabia). Besides the founding 
members, the IIFM is supported by its permanent members, namely the State Bank of Pakistan and the Dubai 
International Financial Centre Authority (UAE). IIFM is further supported by a number of regional and 
international financial institutions as well as other market participants as its members. IIFM activities are under 
supervision of its Shariah Advisory Panel, which currently has ten members. The focus of IIFM’s work is on 
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Islamic capital and money markets. Presently, IIFM has no specific standard or guideline pertaining to Sukuk. 
However, it has released two reports on Sukuk in 2010 and 2011. In these reports, IIFM investigated the current 
Sukuk market from an international as well as domestic perspective. It also investigated various international 
issues regarding Sukuk structures. Moreover, it has studied some Sukuk issues as a case study (www.iifm.net, 
dated 31st Dec 2016). 
 
3.3.4 IILM 
The International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation (the IILM) is an international institution 
established by central banks, monetary authorities and multilateral organisations to create and issue short-term 
Shariah-compliant financial instruments to facilitate effective cross-border Islamic liquidity management. By 
creating more liquid Shariah-compliant financial markets for institutions offering Islamic financial services 
(IIFS), the IILM aims to enhance cross-border investment flows, international linkages and financial stability. 
 
It was established on 25 October 2010 and the current shareholders are from the central banks and monetary 
agencies of Indonesia, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Qatar, Turkey, the United Arab 
Emirates and the Islamic Development Bank. The IILM is hosted by Malaysia and headquartered in Kuala 
Lumpur (www.iilm.edu, dated 31st Dec 2016).  
 
At present, the IILM has no specific standard or guideline pertaining to Sukuk. However, it has contributed 
heavily to facilitate the sharing of Sukuk structures by issuing several Sukuk that have enjoyed a wide 
acceptance among Shariah scholars.  
 
 
3.3.5 GBSA  
The Gulf Bond and Sukuk Association (GBSA) is the regional trade association representing the Arabian Gulf 
bond and Sukuk market. GBSA is involved in all major matters concerning the development of bond and Sukuk 
markets in the region. 
 
The Gulf Bond and Sukuk Association, based in Dubai promote international best practices adapted to the 
Arabian Gulf region. GBSA is the industry trade association that leads the development of the region’s fixed 
income capital market. Its mission is to increase market transparency and liquidity while strengthening the 
region’s voice in the global financial arena. GBSA mobilises market participants and connects the industry 
with the official international community. The main activities of GBSA are to assist in developing bond related 
legislation and regulation, to provide input to regulators, advise governments as issuers, set market practices 
and conventions and to raise awareness among the public about investing (www.gulfbondsukuk.com, dated 
31st Dec 2016). 
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Figure 33: Sukuk regulation connections  
 
 
 
 
3.4 Sukuk ratings  
A rating is an evaluation of a corporate or domestic or private placement security’s relative safety from an 
investment standpoint.   
 
In the context of conventional finance it is a measurement of financial solvency, adequate for the purpose of 
measuring the ability of an organisation to pay its financial obligations. In the context of conventional bonds it 
measures the issuer’s ability to repay the principal and make interest payments. A grade (the most controversial 
part of the rating process) is given to the conventional bond that indicates its credit quality. Private independent 
international rating companies such as Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, or domestic rating agencies 
like RAM and MARC of Malaysia, provide these evaluations of the issuer’s financial strength, or the ability 
to pay a bond’s principal and interest in a timely fashion. 
 
Bonds are rated, for example, from AAA or Aaa (the highest), to C or D, which represents a company that has 
already defaulted. Each rating company has its own definition and methodology for rating and its own set of 
rating ranges. 
 
The introduction of Sukuk ratings in the 1990s represents another critical milestone in the development of the 
Sukuk market. Conventional bond ratings are principally designed to arrive at a reasoned judgment on credit 
risk via a careful analysis of the critical issues surrounding a specific debt on the issuer (Mohd Asri, 2004). 
Sukuk Market 
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This debate has been illustrated by Slim and Nader (2013); the three main international agencies of rating 
(Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) consider Sukuk as similar to conventional bonds and not as a new 
class of financial instrument. These agencies have ignored the principal goal of Islamic investors that seek to 
invest in Sukuk that comply with Shariah. This may cause an inaccurate reading of Sukuk ratings in the market.  
 
In general, as Ariff and Safari (2015) mentioned, the rating agencies’ criteria for Sukuk ratings are the same as 
the criteria for corporate bond ratings. These criteria incorporate the issue structure (repayment schedule and 
debt types), business risk analysis, financial risk analysis, management, ownership and other qualitative factors 
(Mohd Asri, 2004). However, realising the uniqueness and different types of Sukuk, with the difference in risk 
groups within those Sukuk types, the rating methodology should be different to that of conventional bond 
ratings (Jalil, 2005). Rosly (2007) argued that Sukuk structures fall into two categories: 
 
• Asset-backed Sukuk, for which ratings are dependent on a risk analysis of the asset or enterprise underlying 
the Sukuk. However, investors hold rights to the underlying assets through SPV and not directly; hence, Sukuk 
performance is driven by assets and not linked to the originator. 
 
• Unsecured Sukuk, for which ratings are primarily dependent on the riskiness of the sponsor, originator, or 
the borrower. 
 
In 2002, the Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA) was jointly set up by the Central Bank of the Kingdom 
of Bahrain and the Islamic Development Bank together with other shareholders for the purpose of 
independently evaluating, analysing and rating Islamic banks and instruments. The creation of the IIRA was 
the first step in setting a benchmark for innovating, implementing and approving new Islamic investments in 
the regional Sukuk markets. However, it faced difficulties with the Shariah interpretations of Sukuk 
certificates. 
 
Ariff and Safari (2015) emphasised that risk elements affecting Sukuk should be thoroughly investigated by 
rating agencies like conventional bonds. Among risk elements, Rosly (2007) mentioned that credit risk is the 
most critical one. Other factors he highlighted are currency risk (for international issues), tax risk, and reserve 
funds. In contrast to highly sensitive conventional bonds, Sukuk are less sensitive to interest rates. To this end, 
this research work fills this gap with empirical analysis addressing the impact of different risk profiles of each 
Sukuk structure on financial performance. 
 
3.5 Sukuk types  
According to the IFSB guidelines (2005) no.2, Sukuk are ideally categorised as asset-based or equity-based 
instruments whereby the former offers predictable returns, such as in the case of Salam, Istisna and Ijarah 
whilst in the latter the return is derived from profit and loss sharing in joint venture business offering 
unpredictable returns, as in the case of Musharakah and Mudarabah contracts. 
Sukuk can also be categorized in terms of their legal structure or in terms of their Shariah classification. 
Figure 34: Sukuk types categorisation  
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3.5.1 First: Legal concepts of Sukuk structure 
Sukuk are designed to facilitate investment and trade, and hence it is necessary to investigate the legal concepts 
for structuring this trade. This is the debatable issue in the literature, and a cause of confusion in Sukuk 
securitisation. A better understanding of these legal aspects helps to identify the structure risk factors of Sukuk. 
Following the literature, Sukuk are classified into two classes, asset-backed and asset-based. The asset-backed 
Sukuk involve a true sale transaction, changing the ownership of the asset from the Sukuk issuer to the Sukuk 
holders and where the asset remains attached to the Sukuk transaction until the redemption date. Ideally, the 
profit generation mechanism results from the resource gains from the asset. This implies that the risk of the 
asset forms part of the Sukuk risk profile. By contrast, asset-based Sukuk do not transfer the ownership of the 
asset of the transaction from the issuer to the Sukuk holders. However, financial rights attached to the Sukuk 
are legal obligations of the Sukuk issuers. These legal rights are transferred to the Sukuk holders, and these 
legal rights (financial rights) of the asset underlying the transaction remain to the redemption date. Further 
explanations are presented in this section. 
The IFSB guideline no. 7, Capital Adequacy Requirements for Sukuk, Securitisation and Real Estate 
Investment (2009), distinguishes three types of Sukuk structures: Asset-backed Sukuk (ABS), asset-based 
Sukuk (pay through) and asset-based Sukuk (pass-through).  
Although they are very similar, they do have significant differences in terms of ownership, asset recourse to 
the investor and rating perspective (Muhamed and Radzi, 2011). Hence, ABS are asset-backed structures as 
assessed by a recognised external credit assessment institution (i.e. rating body). Based on this guideline there 
are two factors that constitute an ABS. Firstly, Sukuk holders face loss in the case of any impairment of the 
underlying asset. Secondly, the risk of an ABS is a function of the risk of the underlying asset. Sukuk holders 
derive their cash flows from the cash flows of the Sukuk’s underlying asset, and have recourse to the Sukuk 
asset, not the issuer, in case of default of the Sukuk issuer. True sale execution is another dimension of an ABS 
in which there is a real transfer of asset ownership from the originators to the Sukuk holders with the effect of 
releasing assets from the issuer’s balance sheet to investors (Ahmed, 2010). Therefore, ABS issuance must be 
backed by real assets that represent the Sukuk holders’ ownership interest as well as the risks attached to the 
Sukuk.  
In contrast, with asset-based Sukuk there is no true sale transaction taking place. Rather one sees just the 
transfer of financial rights to the asset, and the Sukuk income is derived from the financial rights to obligations 
Securitisation on legal 
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Securitisation on Shariah 
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attached to the debt (Aziz and Gintzburger, 2010). A sale transaction is absent since the Sukuk holders have 
recourse to the originator instead of to the underlying assets in the event of default. The Sukuk income is based 
on either pay-through or pass-through as defined in the IFSB-7 (2009) guidelines, in which the former 
constitutes recourse to the originator via a purchase undertaking whilst the latter constitutes recourse to the 
issuer via guarantee. Therefore, the risk and return of asset-based Sukuk are derived from the obligor instead 
of the Sukuk’s underlying assets, so that in case of default, investors have recourse to the obligor and do not 
have recourse to the asset. The risks are measured solely on the issuer or obligor’s creditworthiness to pay back 
the capital. Thus, it is not surprising that investors are mainly focused on sovereign/corporate credit quality 
and less concerned on the actual underlying asset performance when they buy sovereign Sukuk (Hales, 2005). 
In this regard, Sukuk holders are guaranteed to get the capital back in the event of bankruptcy. Furthermore, in 
asset-based Sukuk, the structures are merely fulfilling the form of a contract with much more complexity, 
which ultimately leads to an Islamic equivalent of an unsecured conventional bond (Howladar, 2009). Hence, 
Sukuk holders would only be able to dispose of the assets to the lessee and be treated as unsecured creditors 
(Haneef, 2009).  
Habib (2010) discussed how effective the difference was between asset-backed and asset-based on Sukuk 
structuring behaviour in the market. He commented that the Sukuk market is dominated overwhelmingly by 
the asset-based Sukuk. He referred to Dusuki and Mokhtar’s (2010) study where they found that only 11 out 
of a total of 560 Sukuk issues (or around 2 per cent of the total) qualify to be asset-backed as these fulfil the 
Shariah requirements of an actual sale of the underlying asset to the investors. Concerned about the incoherent 
practice in the market, the Shariah Board of AAOIFI issued a statement in February 2008 to stress that the sale 
of the assets to the Sukuk holders must be true with all associated rights and obligations of ownership and must 
be reflected in the accounting books. He emphasised that the dominance of asset-based Sukuk is sometimes 
blamed on the inconsistency of Islamic contracts with the prevailing non-Islamic legal framework and 
economic incentives of suppliers and demanders of Sukuk. The fact that some asset-backed Sukuk have been 
issued in Malaysia and the Gulf Cooperation Council region, and that these resemble the widely prevalent 
asset-based securities in conventional markets, indicate that the legal obstacles are not constraining factors. 
However, currently, the economic arguments of not using asset-backed Sukuk are also weak. On the supply 
side, the originators can get relatively higher ratings compared to their asset-based counterparts which can 
substantially reduce the cost of funds. For instance, Moody's rated the Tamweel's asset-backed Sukuk the 
maximum possible in the UAE of Aa2. An asset-based Sukuk by the same company was four notches below 
at A3 during 2009 (Howlader 2009). On the demand side, the asset-backed Sukuk provides a safer bankruptcy 
remote investment option to the investors (Habib, 2010).  
Yaakub, Syah, Mujani, Jussof, and Abdul-Hamid (2011) produced remarkable work on the interpolation of 
assets ownership classification of Sukuk. They noted that the first purely asset-backed Sukuk Ijarah came into 
practice in 2001 when the Government of Bahrain Kingdom issued US$250 million Sukuk Ijarah backed by 
US$250 of sovereign assets. The first asset-based Sukuk were issued by the Government of Malaysia in 2002 
through the issuance of the Malaysian global Sukuk totalling US$600 million. The ownership on the underlying 
asset was a beneficial ownership rather than legal ownership, through the Sukuk trustee (SPV) for the whole 
tenure of the Sukuk. The study was conducted on the analysis of the issue of asset ownership and the issue of 
the investors’ (Sukuk holders’) rights and protections. They found that asset-backed Sukuk Ijarah offer more 
67 
 
protection to Sukuk investors compared to asset-based Sukuk Ijarah. This means the study supports the 
noticeable gap between these two legal structures.  
  
To sum up, Muhamed and Radzi, (2011) summarised the differences between asset-back and asset-based 
Sukuk structures as shown below:   
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Table6: The main differences between asset-back and asset-based Sukuk legal structures. 
 Asset-based Sukuk Asset-backed Sukuk 
Ownership 
Only provides artificial ownership 
rights to the ‘‘usufruct’’ of certain 
physical underlying assets, relying 
instead on the obligor’s credit quality 
to ensure the Sukuk performance. 
An asset-backed Sukuk implies 
that ownership rights extend to the 
actual underlying assets such as 
physical real estate or 
rights/usufruct from particular 
intangible but valuable assets. 
Asset recourse to 
investor 
The recourse of the investor is to the 
creditworthiness of the ultimate 
obligor. 
Recourse of the investors is to the 
asset-issuing vehicle and the 
Sukuk investors bear any losses in 
case of impairment of the Sukuk. 
Rating 
Corporate rating methodology is used 
for asset-based Sukuk transaction. 
Here, a corporate obligor is the key 
driver affecting the credit risk of the 
Sukuk. 
Asset-backed rating methodology 
will be used for the asset-backed 
Sukuk transaction. Here, credit 
risk is determined solely by the 
performance of underlying assets. 
Source: Muhamed and Radzi, 2011 
Muhamed and Radzi (2011) commented that the differences between asset-backed and asset-based Sukuk 
structures appeared clear when the case of Sukuk default and liquidation arise. For example, a Sukuk Ijarah 
may be asset-based or asset-backed, yielding a wholly different risk profile to each in the event of a default 
and/or liquidation. This is due to the terms asset-based and asset-backed themselves. In their study about 
illustrating the difference between asset-backed Sukuk and asset-based Sukuk, they concluded that a default 
on asset-based Sukuk is the same to investors as a default on unsecured bonds. No recourse can be expected 
against any of the assets used in the Sukuk. On the other hand, asset-backed Sukuk may become more widely 
used as they would have the ability to take possession of the asset backing the Sukuk. However, this argument 
should not be construed as an attempt to discredit the use of asset-based Sukuk. Similar to conventional 
unsecured bonds, they are a useful way for companies to raise finance. Asset-based Sukuk may be more suitable 
where legal title to assets cannot be transferred to investors. The asset-based Sukuk is also more appropriate 
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when there are restrictions on foreign ownership of certain asset classes such as real property. In addition, 
asset-backed Sukuk may not be adequate in circumstances where the enforceability of assets may provide a 
challenge, such as sovereign owned assets.  
3.5.2 Second: Shariah concepts of Sukuk structure   
From a Shariah point of view, it is essential that Sukuk are backed by specific, tangible assets throughout the 
entire tenure and that Sukuk holders hold a proprietary interest in the assets which are being financed (Yean, 
2009). Therefore, to be consistent with Shariah principles the Sukuk risk and return situation should be 
influenced by the asset type and its characteristics. 
  
AAOFI standard 18 (2010) introduced 14 types of Sukuk. Those commonly exercised in the global market are 
the Ijarah Sukuk, Musharakah Sukuk, Murabaha Sukuk, Mudarabah Sukuk, Istisna Sukuk, and a combination 
of some of these types is feasible as well (Khalil, 2011).  
 
These 14 Sukuk types can be broadly classified into 4 groups: asset based, debt based, equity based and agency 
based. The table below illustrates these classifications:  
 
Table 7: Classification of types of Sukuk Shariah structures  
Asset Based - Ijarah with its types such as existing owned, existing leased and future assets. 
- Manfah (usufructs) with its types existing asset and future asset. 
Debt Based - Istisna 
- Salam 
- Murabahah 
Equity Based - Mudarabah 
- Mushararkah 
- Muzara’a (Sharecropping) 
- Musaqa (Irrigation) 
- Mugharasa (Agriculture or plantation) 
Agency Based - Wakala (Agency)  
Hybrid/mixed Sukuk - Consisting of two or more structures  
 
Source: Created by Fauz el at., (2015) and developed by author, (2016) 
 
Basically, these types categorise the Shariah contracts and financial structures as described earlier in Chapter 
2, but the important thing here is these contracts are considered from the financial perspective. Each of these 
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groups has different Shariah conditions and a different association with the underling asset (Ayub, 2007). The 
basic feature of asset-based Sukuk is that the asset, whether a tangible asset or usufruct, is associated with the 
Sukuk for the entire term of the Sukuk. 
 
The debt based Sukuk uses the asset as the base of a trade transaction in which payment for the sale amount to 
the Sukuk holders is deferred. So, the asset profile between asset based and debt based is different. 
 
Equity based Sukuk have the characteristic that the return to Sukuk holders is dependent on the continuing 
efforts of the Sukuk issuer, where the issuer provides a service using assets funded by the Sukuk. 
 
In an agency based Sukuk the issuer acts as an agent and holds the risk and return profile (Ayub, 2007). More 
details of those contracts will be discussed in the Sukuk structures section later in this chapter.  
 
3.5.3 Third: Classification based on Sukuk certificate types  
 
Another classification of Sukuk asset classes is based on the type of certificates that are issued by the Sukuk 
issuer. AAOIFI (2002) and Tariq and Dar (2007) listed Sukuk certificate types as follows: 
1. Pure Ijarah Sukuk 
These certificates are issued on stand-alone assets that are identified on the balance sheet. The assets can be a 
piece of land or fixed assets to be leased such as aircrafts and ships. The rental rates of returns on these Sukuk 
can either be fixed or floating depending on the particular originator. Different from other Ijarah types, in these 
certificates there is no option to transfer the ownership of the asset at maturity (Ariff and Safari, 2015). 
2. Hybrid/Pooled Sukuk 
The underlying pool of assets can consist of Istisna, Murabahah, and Ijarah receivables. Furthermore, having 
a portfolio of assets composed of different classes allows for a greater mobilisation of funds as previously 
inaccessible Murabahah and Istisna assets can comprise a portfolio. However, at least 51% of the pool must 
be consists of Ijarah assets. Since the Murabahah and Istisna receivables are part of the pool, the return on 
these certificates can only be a predetermined fixed rate of return. 
 
3. Variable Rate Redeemable Sukuk 
This type can be considered as an alternative to Sukuk because of their seniority to the issuer’s equity, their 
redeemable nature, and their relatively stable rate as compared to dividend payouts.  
Therefore, in some circumstances, implementing Sukuk by representing the full strength of an issuer’s balance 
sheet can prove beneficial. Several corporate entities refer to these Sukuk as Musharakah Term Finance 
Certificates (MTFCs). MTFCs have two main advantages. First, employing Musharakah returns is referred 
from the viewpoint of jurists; as such an arrangement would strengthen the paradigm of Islamic banking that 
considers partnership contracts as the embodiment of core ideals. Second, the floating rate of return on these 
certificates would not depend on benchmarking with market references such as LIBOR but would instead be 
contingent on the firm’s balance-sheet actualities. 
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4. Fixed-Rate Zero-Coupon Sukuk 
This type of certificate is not a tradable certificate because of the nature of the underlying pool of assets which 
has Shariah restrictions. The primary asset pools to be generated would be of a nature warranted by Istisna and 
installment purchase/sale contracts that would create debt obligations. 
 
5. Embedded Sukuk 
This certificate can be either zero-coupon, pure-Ijarah or hybrid, with the embedded option to convert into 
other forms depending on specified conditions. 
  
In conclusion, despite the difference between those Sukuk types the association between those types and 
sequences is noticeable. The connection between the above classifications begins with the legal concept then 
certificate type after that choosing a suitable Shariah concept in line with the legal concept and certificate to 
build the Sukuk structure. 
  
The figure below illustrates this connection: 
  
Figure 35: The connection between Sukuk types classification  
Legal Concept Type Certificate Type Shariah Concept Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Simply put, Sukuk securitisation involves three phases as illustrated below:  
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Figure 36: Illustration of the connection between Sukuk type classifications 
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3.6 Sukuk securitisation  
In a conventional framework, asset securitisation refers to “the process and the result of issuing certificates of 
ownership as a pledge against cash flow streams of diversified pool of assets (assets portfolio) to investors” 
(Jobst, 2007). Securitisation provides an alternative to intermediated debt finance, diversifying the sources of 
external financing. Central to asset securitisation is the evaluation of the risk of the securitised assets (Jobst, 
2006). True sale, bankruptcy remoteness, and enforceability of assets are essential prerequisites for asset 
securitisation. Since there are lower costs and risks arising from asset securitisation than contractual loan 
relationships, effective risk management and capital enhancement are to be significant advantages of asset 
securitisation, (Shaenker and Colletta, 1991; Dvorak, 2001). Asset securitisation is highly exposed to interest 
rate risks, since receivables associated with securitised assets are valued by interest rate discounting. Mortgage 
Backed Securities (MBS) is one example of an asset backed security, in which a pool of receivables of home 
buyers is securitised through intermediary institutions, such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac in the US, and 
Cagamas in Malaysia. The risks of asset securitisation can be commoditised in a way that the risks can be 
detached from the assets to trade the risks in the market through speculative derivatives instruments, such as a 
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) instrument. CDS transfers the risk of default from the fixed income security holder 
to the swap seller (Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh, 2005).   
To a certain extent, conventional asset securitisation is similar to Islamic securitisation. Both types of 
securitisation have similar prerequisites, processes, and advantages. Nevertheless, due to Shariah restrictions, 
Islamic securitisation has distinctive features that distinguish it from asset securitisation. AAOIFI (2003) 
defined Islamic securitisation in Standard 17 as “known in Arabic terminology as Taskeek (issues) and Tasneed 
(securities). Securitisation is a process of dividing ownership of tangible assets, usufruct or both into units of 
equal value and issuing securities as per their value”.  Hence, following the rules of Shariah, Islamic 
securitisation must be free from three prohibited practises, Riba, Gharar, and Maysir. Thus, anything leading 
to these practises is not tolerated, such as debt and financial assets trading, sinful activities, interest bearing 
collateral, and so forth. Islamic securitisation must involve the funding or the production of real assets rather 
than financial securities, and which cause irresponsible leverage as well as speculation through derivatives 
trading (Wilson, 2004). 
 
The first step in the issuance of Sukuk is the preparation of a detailed feasibility study. Second, setting up a 
general framework and organisational structure. Third, working out an appropriate Shariah structure. Fourth, 
arranging a lead manager to underwrite the Sukuk issue. Fifth, arranging the legal documentation around the 
agreed Shariah structure. Sixth, setting up a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to represent the investors. Finally, 
putting the Sukuk into circulation (LMC, 2008). Currently, most Sukuk structures have the originator seeking 
financing transfers of certain assets to a Special Purpose Vehicle (Ryan and Elmalki, 2010). Thus, the lifecycle 
of Sukuk securitisation can be illustrated as below: 
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Figure 37: Sukuk securitisation lifecycle  
 
 
 
The model of Sukuk securitisation is derived from the conventional securitisation process in which a SPV is 
set up to acquire assets and issue financial claims on the assets. These financial asset claims represent a 
proportional beneficial ownership to the Sukuk holders. The SPV plays a crucial role in the Sukuk life cycle.  
 
3.7 Sukuk structures  
Sukuk represent partial ownership in a debt, asset, equity or business while a conventional bond promises to 
repay the loan. As Sukuk are a Shariah compliant instrument, Sukuk are structured in such a way as to match 
the concept of the Shariah sale contract. The number of Sukuk structures so far has reached 14, as listed by 
AAOIFI Shariah standard 17 (2003). According to Saad and Mohamad (2012) the most common Sukuk 
exercised in the global Sukuk market are Sukuk Murabaha, Sukuk Ijarah, Sukuk Istina, Sukuk Musharakah, 
Sukuk Mudarabah and Sukuk Salam. Nader and Slim (2013) state that during the period from 1st January 2001 
to 31st December 2010 the most widely used Sukuk structures are Murabaha (cost plus sale), which represents 
30% of the global issuance in the domestic Sukuk market but only 2% in the international market (these Sukuk 
have no secondary market). Second are Musharakah Sukuk, financing a business activity on the basis of 
partnership contracts, which represent 26% of the domestic Sukuk market and 19% of the international Sukuk 
market. Third are Sukuk Ijarah, that represent ownership of equal shares in rental property or usufruct of the 
property. In the international Sukuk market and in the domestic Sukuk market, the Sukuk Ijarah represent 45% 
and 23%, respectively.  
Each of these structures will now be presented in five dimensions of explanation; the definition of the structure, 
its essential features, the structure diagram, the risks associated with the structure, and concluding with two 
examples of a Sukuk possessing the given structure, one example being an illustrative example constructed by 
the author and the second a real example from the Sukuk market. The following detailed discussion of Sukuk 
structures builds on the introduction to Sukuk structures presented in Chapter 2. 
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Shariah Structure 
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3.7.1 Sukuk Murabaha: 
 Definition:  
Murabaha is used mostly for short term financing (Abdul Rahman, 2008). In intermediated Murabaha 
financing an intermediary, typically a bank, buys a commodity with free and clear title, and according to a 
client request. The intermediary then sells the commodity to the client in a deferred sale via installments for a 
predetermined profit over the cost of the commodity. Thus, Murabaha is a purchase and sale contract for 
financing assets, whereby the cost and profit margin (mark-up) are made known and agreed by all parties 
involved. The settlement for the purchase can be either on a deferred lump sum or on an installment basis, as 
specified in the agreement (Saad and Mohamad, 2012). If the client wishes to liquidate the commodity they 
can sell it in the market to a third party. This is makes Murabaha different from traditional finance, as 
Murabaha is not an interest-based loan but a financial transaction involving an asset trade. 
In the securitization process Sukuk Murabaha certificates of equal value are issued for the purpose of financing 
the purchase of goods, so that the certificate holders become the owners of the Murabaha commodity (AAOIFI, 
2003). The investors buy the Sukuk certificates according to the purchase price agreed upon from the issuers 
through a trustee. Then, the trustee sells the Sukuk back to the issuers with the sale price which is the purchase 
price plus mark-up to be settled on a deferred payment basis (Abdul Jalil and Abdul Rahman, 2012).  
 Essential Features:  
Sukuk Murabaha have a debt based structure with the asset underlying Sukuk Murabaha playing a crucial role 
in the structure profile. This is because the issuer of the Sukuk is the seller of the Murabaha commodity, the 
subscribers are the buyers of the commodity and the realised funds are for the purchase of the commodity. The 
negotiability of these Sukuk or their trading in the secondary market is not permitted by Shariah, as the 
certificates represent a debt owing from the subsequent buyer of the commodity to the certificate-holders and 
such trading amounts to trading in debt on a deferred basis, which will result in Riba.  
 Structure Diagram 
Sukuk involve a Special Purpose Vehicle/Entity (SPV/SPE) to facilitate the relationship between the Sukuk 
issuers and Sukuk investors. The SPV is a subsidiary company with an asset/liability structure and legal status 
that makes its obligations secure even if the parent company goes bankrupt. With Sukuk that are based on the 
Murabaha contract, the SPV can use the investors’ capital to purchase an asset and sell it to the obligator on a 
cost-plus-profit-margin basis. The obligator (the buyer) makes deferred payments to the investors (the sellers). 
This setup is a fixed-income type of Sukuk, and the SPV facilitates the transaction between the Sukuk holders 
and the obligator. 
 
The Murabaha contract process begins with the obligator (who needs an asset but can’t pay for it right now) 
signing an agreement with the SPV to purchase the asset on a deferred-payment schedule. This agreement 
describes the cost-plus margin and deferred payments. 
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The Sukuk Murabaha structure is designed to sew different parties’ relationships to produce a completed 
financing product. According to Nisar (2010) and Nader and Slim (2012) the essential steps involved in the 
Murabaha structure are: 
➢ A master agreement is signed between the SPV and the borrower 
➢ The SPV issues Sukuk to the investors and receives Sukuk proceeds. 
➢ The SPV buys the commodity on a spot basis from the commodity supplier. 
➢ The SPV sells the commodity to the borrower at the spot price plus a profit margin, payable in instalments 
over an agreed period of time. 
➢ The borrower sells the commodity to the commodity buyer on spot basis. 
➢ The investors receive the final sale price and profits. 
Figure 38: Murabaha Sukuk structure  
 
Source: Dubai International Financial Centre Sukuk Guidebook, 2009 
 
 Risk Associations 
Sukuk have several risk factors, but some of those factors are specific to particular Sukuk structures. In respect 
of the Murabaha structure, Khan and Ahmed (2001), Sundararajan and Luca (2002) and Tariq and Dar (2007) 
discussed those risk factors associated only with this structure. The main Shariah issue concerning the 
Murabaha structure is that it should not be a tradable instrument, being debt based. This gives rise to liquidity 
risk. However, liquidity risk is somewhat mitigated since Murabaha financing is predominantly short term.  
Sukuk Murabaha are also exposed to credit risks. The rate of return, fixed for the maturity of the Sukuk, should 
be high enough to compensate investors for the risk exposures.  
 Example: 
A manufacturer wishes to buy £1,000,000 worth of wood but does not have sufficient funds. To raise these 
funds through Sukuk Murabaha, the manufacturer issues Sukuk, in a similar way to the issuance of 
conventional bond certificates. The investors set up an SPV as an entity facilitating the Murabaha financing 
structure. The SPV collects the investor’s capital to purchase wood worth £1,000,000 from the third party as a 
wood supplier in a spot sale transaction. After that, the manufacturer, as obligator approaches the SPV and 
signs an agreement to purchase the wood from the SPV at cost (£1,000,000) plus profit (maybe 20 percent of 
the contract amount, or £200,000). 
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The manufacturer is liable to pay the SPV £1,200,000 after the SPV delivers the goods. Both parties know the 
profit and the cost of the product at the outset; there is no financial uncertainty in the transaction. The £200,000 
profit together with the £1,000,000 principal is paid to the investors through periodic payments, the timing and 
amount of these payments as specified in the Murabaha contract.  
Example from Sukuk market:  
Table 8: Example of Murabaha Sukuk 
Sukuk 
name/Date: 
Vendome Sukuk, December 2013 
Issuer: Milestone Capital PCC acting in respect of the Issuing Cell 
Type of Sukuk 
structure: 
Sukuk Murabaha  
Amount:  EUR 9,878,000 (EUR 100,000 for each Sukuk Certificate) 
Term: 3 years 
Profit Rate: 8% per annum 
Profit 
Distribution: 
Quarterly payment of profit 
Sukuk Assets: Commodity Murabaha between the Issuer and Gatehouse Bank plc 
Security: A deed of shared security whereby Gatehouse Bank plc and the Issuer agree to share 
the proceeds of second ranking security granted to Gatehouse in relation to the 
Mezzanine Transaction which comprises a second ranking pledge over PropCo’s 
shares and a conditional assignment of PropCo’s rights under the Finance Lease. 
Repayment: Profit only, with bullet of principal upon maturity via sale of Property 
Ranking: Junior, behind the Finance Lease 
Listing: Application submitted for listing to the Channel Island Stock Exchange 
 
3.7.2 Sukuk Ijarah 
 
 Definition:  
Ijarah is a form of lease financing, on a particular asset and where, upon maturity the lessor sells the asset to 
the lessee upon completion of the lease payments. In Sukuk Ijarah, certificates of equal value are issued, 
representing a common share in the ownership of objects, usufructs or services in an investment project, and 
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that are tradable in the secondary market. The holders of Sukuk Ijarah, bear all the costs of maintenance of and 
damage to the property (AAOIFI, 2003). 
Abdul Jalil and Abdul Rahman (2012) explained the Sukuk Ijarah contract in terms of a trustee acting on behalf 
of the investors to purchase a leasable asset from the issuer. The trustee leases the asset back to the issuer based 
on the rental that has been agreed upon by both parties. The issuer issues Sukuk and pays the rental fee for a 
specific period of time. After reaching the maturity date, the issuer purchases the asset back based on what is 
left after deducting the rental fees. Usually Ijarah structures are used for medium to long-term financing 
(Zureena, 2008).  
 Essential Features:  
Sukuk Ijarah is considered to be a flexible structure, and can be used for multiple financing needs. Moreover, 
Sukuk Ijarah are completely negotiable and can therefore be traded in the secondary market, since these Sukuk 
certificates represent ownership in real assets. Consequently, many Sukuk issuers choose the Ijarah structure. 
Sukuk Ijarah are issued by corporates, governments, None Governmental Organisations (NGO) and other 
organisations (Niser, 2010). Ariff and Safari (2015) justified the tendency toward Ijarah Sukuk issuance, since 
it promises higher yields than in short term trade finance (Murabahah) and has a longer financing horizon, an 
important feature for business investments.  
 Structure Diagram 
According to Nisar (2010) and Nader and Slim (2012) the essential steps involved in the Ijarah structure can 
be summarised as follows: 
➢ The obligator sells certain assets to the SPV at an agreed pre-determined purchase price. 
➢ The SPV raises financing by issuing Sukuk certificates in an amount equal to the purchase price. 
➢ The funds raised are passed on to the obligator (as seller). 
➢ A lease agreement is signed between the SPV and the obligator for a fixed period of time, where the 
obligator leases back the assets as a lessee. 
➢ The SPV receives periodic rentals from the obligator. 
➢ These periodic payments are distributed among the investors i.e. to the Sukuk holders. 
➢ At maturity, or on a dissolution event, the SPV sells the assets back to the seller at a predetermined value. 
That value should be equal to any amount still owed under the terms of the Ijarah Sukuk. 
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Figure 39: Ijarah Sukuk structure  
 
Source: Dubai International Financial Centre Sukuk Guidebook, 2009 
 
 Risk Associations 
According to Khan and Ahmed (2001), Sundararajan and Luca (2002) and Tariq and Dar (2007) Sukuk Ijarah 
are exposed to different risks, depending on the choice of two different types of rates, fixed rate and floating 
rate. In respect of credit risk, default on rental payments is a serious concern, in particular with fixed rate Ijarah 
Sukuk. Ariff and Safari (2015) explain that Ijarah Sukuk are typically issued for periods longer than five years 
and can be considered as long-term debt certificates. The long maturity increases risk that the SPV will default. 
Typically, the investors receive a direct guarantee from the issuer of the SPV’s obligations (Wilson, 2008). 
This guarantee also includes the obligation by the issuer to repurchase the asset from the SPV at the end of the 
Ijarah contract at the original sale price. 
 
Wilson (2008) suggests that SPV does not have any of the risks associated with banks due to the SPV’s nature. 
This implies that the SPV is bankruptcy remote. If the issuer faces bankruptcy, the creditors to the issuer cannot 
claim the assets held by the SPV or otherwise interfere with the rights of the Sukuk-holders with respect to the 
underlying assets (Gurgey and Keki, 2008). As a result, the use of the SPV to facilitate the Ijarah structure is 
attractive to both issuers and investors, which justifies the relatively high legal establishment costs. 
 
Kamali (2007) observes that the fixed and predetermined nature of the rental cash flows reduces risk, because 
the Ijarah Sukuk holders receive a steady income, which is generally safer than the returns on common stocks. 
Against this, he notes the risks arising from general market conditions, price movements of real assets, ability 
of the lessee to pay the rental or instalments, and maintenance and insurance costs. Kamali (2007) concludes 
that, because of these risk factors, the expected return on some Ijarah Sukuk may not be precisely 
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predetermined and fixed. Thus, the fixed rental may only represent a maximum that is subject to some possible 
deductions (Ariff and Safari, 2015). 
The rate of return risk is considered to be high in fixed rate Ijarah Sukuk, as the rate remains fixed for the 
entire maturity of the issuance. In contrast, floating rate Ijarah Sukuk have lower exposure to this risk, as it 
exists only within the time of the floating period, which is normally six months. Sukuk Ijarah may be exposed 
to price risk, because of the impact of market risk on the prices of the underlying assets. Price risk, however, 
is typically managed by the guarantees noted above. Finally, there are risks related to the costs of repair and 
maintenance of the underlying assets.  
 
 Example: 
A manufacturer wants to buy a new factory costing £1,000,000 but does not have enough funds. To raise these 
funds through Sukuk Ijarah the manufacturer issues Sukuk certificates with a principal value of £1,000,000. 
Investors subscribe to the Sukuk certificates through an SPV that is set up by the Sukuk issuer (the 
manufacturer). The SPV purchases the factory using the funds from the selling party (the manufacturer) in a 
spot sale. The SPV then leases the factory to the manufacturer for total lease payments of, say £200,000. The 
lease agreement is for the same term as the maturity of the Sukuk. The amount of each rental is equal to the 
periodic distribution amount payable under the Sukuk at that time. This amount (£200,000) may be calculated 
by reference to a fixed rate or variable rate (e.g. LIBOR or EIBOR) depending on the denomination of the 
Sukuk issued and subject to mutual agreement of the parties in advance. The SPV pays each periodic 
distribution amount to the investors using the rental it has received from the lessee (£200,000 in total). Upon 
maturity, the SPV sells back the factory to the seller (manufacturer) at a value equal to the principal amount of 
the investors’ capital (£1,000,000). Moreover, during the period of the lease, the SPV as the owner of the 
factory appoints a service agent for the lease management of the factory. Finally, the SPV returns the sale value 
of the factory (£1,000,000) to the investors, which is in addition to the profit generated from the lease over the 
period of the Sukuk (£200,000).  
Example from the Sukuk market:  
Table 9: Example of Ijarah Sukuk 
Sukuk name/Date: Qatar Global Sukuk, October 2003 
Issuer: Qatar Global Sukuk QSC 
Type of Sukuk structure: Sukuk Ijarah and based on certain land parcels in Qatar 
Obligor State of Qatar (leassee of leased assets) 
Purpose of Offering Construction of Hamad Medical City 
Amount:  US$ 700 million  
Term: 7 years 
Expected Profit Rate: Semi-annual lease rentals (Libour + credit spread + amortisation 
payment) 
Security: Credit enhancers guaranteed by Qatar Government  
Redemption/ Principles repayment With rental payments (amortization with rental payments) 
Ranking: A+ (S&P) 
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3.7.3 Sukuk Istisna 
 Definition:  
Istisna financing is a contract of sale of specified items to be manufactured or constructed, with an obligation 
on the part of the manufacturer or builder (contractor) to deliver them to the customer upon completion 
(AAOIFI, 2010). Sukuk Istisna are certificates of equal value issued with the aim of mobilising funds to be 
employed for the production of goods so that the goods produced come to be owned by the certificate holders 
(AAOIFI, 2003). Saad and Mohamad (2012) clarified that the buyer will require a seller or contractor to deliver 
or construct the asset that will be completed in the future according to the specification given in the sale and 
purchase contract. In turn, both parties of the contract will decide on the sale and purchase prices as they wish 
and the settlement can be delayed or arranged based on the schedule of the work completed.   
 Essential Features:  
Sukuk Istisna is a debt based instrument, since the ownership is of a future asset that does not currently exist. 
It is mostly used in the construction industry, and is a structure especially suited for financing large 
infrastructure projects. The Sukuk holders own the asset and are entitled to the sale price of the Sukuk, or the 
sale price of the asset sold on the basis of a parallel Istisna, if any, explained as follows. The contractor in 
Sukuk Istisna is permitted to enter into a parallel Istisna contract with a subcontractor. Thus, a financial 
institution may undertake the construction of a facility for a deferred price, and sub-contract the actual 
construction to a specialised construction firm. 
 
 Shariah prohibits the sale of these debts Sukuk to a third party at any price other than their face value. Clearly 
such Sukuk cannot be traded in the secondary market. 
 
 Structure diagram 
According to Nisar (2010) and Nader and Slim (2012), the essential steps involved in Istisna structure are: 
➢ The SPV issues Sukuk certificates to raise funds for the project. 
➢ The Sukuk issue proceeds are used to pay the contractor/builder to build and deliver the future project. 
➢ Title to assets is transferred to the SPV. 
➢ The property/project is leased or sold to the end buyer. The end buyer pays monthly installments to the 
SPV. 
➢ The returns are distributed among the Sukuk holders. 
To illustrate the difference between a simple Istisna and a parallel Istisna, a simple Istisna is outlined in 
the following diagram. 
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Figure 40: Simple Istisna diagram. 
 
Source: Schoon, Islamic Banking and Finance, (2009) 
 
In the simple Istisna the buyer already has sufficient financing to purchase the project, and can deal directly 
with the seller (the manufacturer). Where the buyer does not have sufficient financing a parallel Istisna can 
be used, as in the following diagram. The parallel Istisna involves the customer (the buyer), an Islamic bank 
(the seller), and the manufacturer (the contractor). More complex parallel Istisnas will also involve the 
manufacturer entering into Istisnas with sub-contractors. 
 
Figure 41: Parallel Istisna diagram 
 
Source: Schoon, Islamic Banking and Finance, (2009) 
 
A more complete diagram of an example of an Istisna contract is shown in the diagram below.  
 
Figure 42: Istisna Sukuk structure  
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 Risk associations 
According to Kahn and Ahmed (2001), Sundararajan and Luca (2002) and Tariq and Dar (2007), the risk 
associated with Istisna Sukuk is similar to Murabaha Sukuk as both of them are classified as debt based Sukuk. 
Therefore, Istisna Sukuk face serious risk factors in terms of liquidity in so far as it is a non-tradable Sukuk. 
Also, it is exposed to a very high rate of return risk due to the fixed rate on the Sukuk remaining for the entire 
maturity of the issuance. In addition, Istisna Sukuk have higher exposure compared with Ijarah Sukuk because 
the asset is being developed over the period of the Sukuk maturity.  
 
  Example: 
 
A customer wants a manufacturer to construct a machine. The manufacturer requires £1,000,000 to finance the 
construction of the machine and to provide a reasonable profit margin. To raise the £1,000,000 through Sukuk 
Istisna the manufacturer issues Sukuk Istisna through the SPV to subscribe investors’ capital of £1,000,000. 
The SPV requests the manufacturer, on behalf of the customer to construct the machine, according to the 
precise specifications required by the customer and for future delivery. The SPV typically pays the price of the 
requested machine by way of staged payments against certain milestones to the manufacturer as consideration 
for the assets in an aggregate amount equal to the Principal Amount of £1,000,000. The SPV undertakes to sell 
the completed machine to the customer for £1,200,000. This amount reflects Sukuk’s profit which is equal to 
the Periodic Distribution Amount payable under the Sukuk at that time. Then SPV returns the principal amount 
£1,000,000 to investors in addition to the profits of £200,000. 
 
Example from the Sukuk market:  
Table 10: Example of Istisna Sukuk 
Sukuk name/Date: Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Trust Certificates, August 2003 
Issuer: Solidarity Turst services Limited (through ICD), Saudi Arabia 
Type of Sukuk structure: Balance sheet of IDB combined Ijarah, Istisna and Murabahah  
Obligor Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Saudi Arabia 
Purpose of Offering Financing other assets 
Amount:  US$ 400 million  
Term: 5 years 
Expected Profit Rate: Semi-annual lease rentals (Fixed 3.625%) 
Security: Credit enhancers by guaranteed by IDB  
Redemption/ Principles repayment Purchase of assets at maturity at sale price 
Ranking: AAA (S&P) 
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3.7.4 Sukuk Musharakah 
 
 Definition:  
Musharakah means partnership. Usmani (2007) states that Musharakah is a form of financing where a few 
partners enter into an agreement to form an enterprise in which all the partners share the profits or losses 
derived from the joint venture. Hence, the profits gained are distributed among investors based on an agreed 
profit sharing ratio. However, if the business suffers a loss, the losses will be borne by all the investors based 
on the ratio that they invest in (Tariq, 2004). AAOIFI Shariah standard 17 (2003) defines Sukuk Musharakah 
as certificates of equal value issued with the aim of using the mobilised funds for establishing a new project, 
developing an existing project or financing a business activity on the basis of any partnership contract so that 
the certificate holders become the owners of the project or the assets of the activity as per their respective 
shares, with the Musharakah certificates being managed on the basis of participation or Mudaraba or an 
investment agency. The investors will form an enterprise and buy the Sukuk from the issuers through a trustee. 
The management of the business will be done by the issuers and they will pay a management fee. The profit 
obtained from the joint venture will be distributed to the investors through the trustee (Abdul Jalial and Abdul 
Rahman, 2012). 
However, if the business suffers a loss, the issuers have to pay back the investors. Ahamed and Dzuljastri 
(2009) discuss a variation of Musharakah, namely, Musharakah Mutanaqish or diminishing Musharakah. The 
structure of Musharakah Mutanaqish is similar to Musharakah, but the periodic payment includes the profit 
plus cost of buying back the asset as opposed to Musharakah where the periodic payment is to pay only for the 
profit; but this payment will only be made if the business succeeds. Upon maturity, the asset will be fully paid 
and owned by the customer. Diminishing Musharakah is used in Islalmic mortgage financing. 
 Essential Features:  
Sukuk Musharakah are an option for mobilising the funds for establishing a new project or developing an 
existing one or financing a business activity on the basis of partnership contracts. The Sukuk holders become 
the owners of the project or the assets of the activity as per their respective shares. These Musharakah Sukuk 
can be treated as negotiable instruments and can be bought and sold in the secondary market. 
 Structure diagram 
According to Nisar (2010) and Nader and Slim (2012) the essential steps involved in Istisna structure are: 
➢ A corporate and the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) enter into a Musharakah arrangement for a fixed 
period and an agreed profit-sharing ratio. Also, the corporate undertakes to buy Musharakah shares of the 
SPV on a periodic basis. 
➢ The corporate (as Musharik) contributes land or other physical assets to the Musharakah. 
➢ The SPV (as Musharik) contributes cash i.e. the issue proceeds received from the investors to the 
Musharakah. 
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➢ The Musharakah appoints the corporate as an agent to develop the land (or other physical assets) with the 
cash injected into the Musharakah and sell/lease the developed assets on behalf of the Musharakah. 
➢ In return, the agent (i.e. the corporate) will get a fixed agency fee plus a variable incentive fee payable. 
➢ The profits are distributed to the Sukuk holders. 
➢ The corporate irrevocably undertakes to buy at a pre-agreed price the Musharakah shares of the SPV on 
say a semi-annual basis and at the end of the fixed period the SPV would no longer have any shares in the 
Musharakah.  
 
Figure 43: Musharakah Sukuk structure  
 
Source: Dubai International Financial Centre Sukuk Guidebook, 2009 
 
 Risk associations 
Khan and Ahmed (2001), Sundararajan and Luca (2002) and Tariq and Dar (2007) discussed the risk factors 
that have a direct link with the Musharakah structure. Kahn and Ahmed (2001) claimed that the Musharakah 
model has a high potential for default risk, given the credit risk of non-payment by the entrepreneur when it is 
due. This is because Sukuk Musharakah is equity based and adopts a profit and loss scheme. However, the 
Sukuk issuer could mitigate credit risk by relying on the strength of the entire balance sheet. In addition, the 
Musharakah Sukuk profile has exposure to rate of return risk, as as the rate is not indexed with a benchmark 
such as LIBOR. Nevertheless, this risk can be reduced by linking with some benchmark index.  
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 Example: 
 
This is an example of diminishing Musharakah. An airline charter company wishes to buy an aircraft for use 
in its ordinary course of business, costing £2,000,000. The company raises £1,000,000 of the purchase price 
by issuing Sukuk Musharakah. The company issues the Sukuk through setting up an SPV to subscribe 
investors’ capital of £1,000,000 for the Sukuk certificates. The SPV, in partnership with the 
company, purchases the airplane, for £2,000,000. The initial ownership of the SPV in the Musharakah is 50%. 
Over time the SPV sells its share of units in the Musharakah to its partner (the airline company) in a deferred 
payment schedule. The total payments by the company to the SPV total £1,200,000, comprising £200,000 
profit and £1,000,000 return of capital. The SPV pays each periodic distribution amount to the investors, 
passing on to the Sukuk holders the payments received by the sale of units to the company. 
 
Example from the Sukuk market:  
Table 11: Example of Musharakah Sukuk 
 
Sukuk name/Date: Wings-FZCO Sukuk, June 2005 
Issuer: Wings FZCO 
Type of Sukuk 
structure: 
Sukuk Musharakah 
Obligor Emirates Airlines 
Purpose of Offering Construction of Group Headquarters and Engineering Centre 
Amount:  USD$ 550 million  
Term: 7-year US Dollar Floating Rate Notes 
Expected Profit Rate: 1st coupon after year, thereafter semi-annually (0.75% above USD LIBOR 
rates) 
Security: Credit enhancers by the strength of Emirates and UAE 
Redemption/ Principles 
repayment 
Bullet payment at redemption 
Rating Listed with Luxemburg SE 
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3.7.5 Sukuk Mudarabah 
 
 Definition:  
Mudarabah is a partnership in profit whereby one party provides capital (Rab al-maal) and the other party 
provides labour (Mudarib) (AAOIFI, 2010). In the Sukuk context, certificates that represent projects or 
activities are managed on the basis of Mudarabah by appointing one of the partners or another person as the 
Mudarib (fund manager) for the management of the operation (AAOIFI, 2003). In Sukuk Mudarabah 
ownership of units of equal value in the Mudaraba equity are registered in the names of the Sukuk holders on 
the basis of undivided ownership of shares in the Mudarabah equity and its returns according to the percentage 
of ownership of shares. The owners of the Sukuk are the Rabbul-mal, and the entrepreneur or manager is the 
(Saad and Mohamad, 2012). The profit calculation is based on a pre-agreed ratio between the Sukuk parties. 
In the event of a business loss, the loss shall be borne solely by the provider of the capital (except in case of, 
for example, negligence on the part of the manager.  
 Essential Features:  
The flexibility of the investment platform of the Mudarabah financing model makes it an attractive option to 
use for encouraging public participation in big investment projects. Gait and Worthington (2007), Nisar (2010) 
and Saad and Mohamad (2012) stated several distinctive characteristics of Sukuk Mudarabah as summarised 
below:  
 
o The Manager/SPV who receives the fund collected from the subscribers to the Sukuk Mudarabah can also 
invest his own fund. He will earn a profit for his capital contribution in addition to his share in the profit as 
Mudarib. 
o Neither the prospectus nor the Sukuk Mudarabah should contain a guarantee from the issuer or the manager 
for the fund for the capital or a fixed profit, or a profit based on any percentage of the capital. Thus: 
▪ The prospectus or the Sukuk Mudarabah issued pursuant to it, may not stipulate payment of a specific 
amount to the Sukuk Mudarabah holder, 
▪ The profit is to be divided, as determined by applying the rules of Shariah; and 
▪ To ensure transparency the profit and loss account of the project must be published and distributed to 
the Sukuk Mudarabah holders. 
o It is Shariah permissible to create reserves for contingencies, such as loss of capital, by deducting from the 
profit. 
o The prospectus can also contain a promise made by a third party, totally unrelated to the parties to the 
contract, in terms of legal entity or financial status, to donate a specific sum, without any counter benefit, 
to meet losses in the given project, provided such commitment is independent of the Mudarabah contract. 
o On expiry of the specified time period of the subscription, the Sukuk holders are given the right to transfer 
the ownership by sale or trade in the securities market at their discretion. 
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 Structure diagram 
 
According to Nisar (2010) and Nader and Slim (2012) the essential steps involved in Mudarabah structure are:  
➢ The Mudarib enters into an agreement with the project owner for the construction/commissioning of a 
project. 
➢ The SPV issues Sukuk to raise funds. 
➢ The Mudarib collects regular profit payments and final capital proceeds from project for onward 
distribution to investors. 
➢ Upon completion, the Mudarib hands over the finished project to the owner. 
 
Figure 44: Mudarabah Sukuk structure  
 
Source: Dubai International Financial Centre Sukuk Guidebook, 2009 
 
 Risk associations 
As the Mudarabah financing model is considered part of the Musharakah financing model their risk profiles 
are similar. In both the Musharakah and Mudarabah contracts, the risk profiles of potential partners (Mudarib 
or Musharakah partner) are crucial considerations, and due diligence is required for evaluating the risk of such 
contracts (Febianto, 2012). Kahn and Ahmed (2001), Sundararajan and Luca (2002) and Tariq and Dar (2007) 
discuss the risks associated with the Mudarabah Sukuk structure. They found that the true risks borne by 
Mudarabah Sukuk holders can be made transparent by disclosing the definition of Mudarabah profits, the level 
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and variability of these profits and in the profit equalization reserves (PER), as well as policies used in 
establishing and implementing the PER in order to estimate its variance and its correlation with the asset 
returns. Mudarabah is exposed to a high rate of return risk especially when the rate is not indexed with a 
benchmark such as LIBOR. In addition, the rate of return risk in the banking book is likely to be much more 
important than market risk in the trading book. The rate of return gap and duration gap applied to the banking 
book would provide measures of exposure to change in the benchmark rate of return, and the impact of their 
change on the present value of Sukuk earnings (Sundararajan, 2007).  
 
 Example  
A manufacturer wishes to buy a new factory worth £1,000,000. To raise these funds through 
Sukuk Mudarabah the manufacturer issues Sukuk by setting up an SPV to subscribe investors’ capital of 
£1,000,000 for the Sukuk certificates. The SPV supplies the manufacturer with capital of £1,000,000 (as Rub 
al-maal, capital supplier, or sleeping partner) and the manufacturer provides the skills and work in operating 
the factory and selling the finished products from the factory to its customers. This agreement is set between 
the SPV (Rab al-Maal) as representing the Sukuk investors and the manufacturer (Mudarib, the active partner). 
In Sukuk terminology the manufacturer is the Originator. The SPV and Originator enter into 
the Mudarabah enterprise with the purpose of generating profits on the principal amount of £1,000,000. The 
profits generated by the Mudarabah enterprise, assumed to be £200,000 for example, are divided between the 
SPV (Rab al-Maal) and Originator, in accordance with the profit sharing ratios set out in 
the Mudarabah agreement. In turn, the SPV pays each periodic return to investors using the Mudarabah profits 
it has received under the Mudarabah agreement. Upon maturity, the manufacturer purchases the factory from 
the SPV at market value, or in the case of guarantees equal to the principal amount of subscribed Sukuk of 
£1,000,000. The SPV returns to investors the capital of £1,000,000 in addition to the distributed profits of 
£200,000.  
Example from the Sukuk market:  
Table 12: Example of Mudarabah Sukuk 
Sukuk name/Date: Sipchem Sukuk, July 2011 
Issuer: Saudi International Petrochemical Company 
Type of Sukuk 
structure: 
Sukuk Al-Mudarabah 
Obligor Saudi International Petrochemical Company 
Amount:   US$ 480 million  
Expected Profit Rate: Floating rate 3 month SIBOR + Margin of 1.75% 
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Security: The Issuer shall grant in favour of the Sukuk holders’ Agent (acting for and 
on behalf of the Sukuk holders) a first priority accounts pledge of all amounts 
standing to the credit of the Reserve Account (the Account Pledge 
Agreement). The Account Pledge Agreement will be the only security granted 
in respect of the Mudarabah Sukuk and the only account secured will be the 
Reserve Account. 
Redemption/ Principles 
repayment 
The Periodic Distribution Date falling on or nearest to 6 July,2016 or any date 
falling not more than two months before the maturity date in connection with 
any financing of the redemption of the Mudarabah Sukuk 
Rating Unrated 
 
3.7.6 Sukuk Salam  
 
 Definition:  
In Islamic finance a sale contract is valid under the Shariah rules if the object forming the subject matter of the 
sale is in existence and in the physical or constructive possession of the seller. This is based on the principle of 
prohibition of Gharar, or unnecessary uncertainty. However, the exceptions to this general position are sales 
effected by Salam contracts (and the Istisna contracts already discussed above).  
In its simplest form, a Salam contract involves the purchase of assets by one party from another party on 
immediate payment and deferred delivery terms (Sukuk Guidebook, 2009). In a Sukuk context, the concept of 
Sukuk Salam refers to a sale whereby the seller undertakes to supply a specific commodity to the buyer at a 
future date in return for an advanced price, paid in full on the spot. Hence, the price is cash, but the supply of 
the purchased good is deferred.  
In addition, AAOIFI (2003) determines Sukuk Salam as ‘‘certificates of equal value issued for the purpose of 
mobilising Salam capital so that the goods to be delivered on the basis of Salam come to be owned by the 
certificate holders’’. Thus, the Salam principle is an advance payment of the price for goods to be delivered at 
a certain time in the future. Sukuk Salam have some similarities with conventional forward contracts; the 
principal difference is that the buyer in Salam pays the entire amount in full at the time of initiating the contract.  
 
Salam-based securities may be created and sold by an SPV under which the funds mobilised from investors 
are paid as an advance to the company SPV in return for a promise to deliver a commodity at a future date. 
The SPV can also appoint an agent to market the promised quantity at the time of delivery perhaps at a higher 
price. The difference between the purchase price and the sale price is the profit of the SPV and hence to the 
holders of the Sukuk (Nisar, 2010).  
 
Sukuk Salam have particular Shariah requirements, such as full payment by the buyer at the time of effecting 
the sale, the standardised nature of underlying asset, a sufficiently clear, accurate and complete statement  of 
the quantity, quality, date and place of delivery of the asset, and the restriction that the purchased goods are 
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not re-sold before actual possession at maturity. Such transactions amount to the selling of debt (AAOIFI, 
Standard 10, 2002). This constraint makes Salam instruments illiquid and hence less attractive to investors. An 
investor will buy a Salam certificate if he expects the price of the underlying commodity to be higher on the 
maturity date. 
 Essential Features:  
According to AAOIFI Shariah standard 10 (2002) and Alsaeed (2012), Sukuk Salam are debt based 
instruments, and hence are non-tradable as they are considered to be a receivable. On the other hand, risk of 
Sukuk Salam can be mitigated by selling the underlying asset of the Salam contract by another Salam contract 
to the first contract. Therefore, the parties involved in Sukuk Salam are the issuer who sells the Salam asset, 
the subscribers are the buyers of that asset, the mobilised funds are the purchase price of the asset, and the 
Salam capital and certificate holders are entitled to the Salam asset, or the price of selling the asset on a parallel 
Salam basis.  
 
 Structure diagram: 
 
According to Nisar (2010) and Nader and Slim (2012) the essential steps involved in the Salam structure are:  
➢ The SPV signs an undertaking with an obligator to source both commodities and buyers. The obligator 
contracts to buy, on behalf of the end-Sukuk holders, the commodity and then to sell it for the profit of the 
Sukuk holders. 
➢ Salam Sukuk are issued to investors and the SPV receives the Sukuk proceeds. 
➢ The Salam proceeds are passed onto the obligator who sells the commodity on a forward basis. 
➢ The SPV receives the commodities from the obligator. 
➢ The obligator, on behalf of Sukuk holders, sells the commodities for a profit. 
➢ The Sukuk holders receive the commodity sale proceeds. 
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Figure 45: Salam Sukuk Structure  
 
Source: Dubai International Financial Centre Sukuk Guidebook, 2009 
 
 Risk associations: 
Kahn and Ahmed (2001), Sundararajan and Luca (2002) and Tariq and Dar (2007) discussed the risk factors 
that have a direct link with the Salam structure. Generally speaking, Salam has a distinctive risk class because 
Salam has a fixed rate and non-tradable features. Therefore, Salam are exposed the credit risk which takes the 
form of settlement of payment risk arising when one party in a deal pays money (Kahn and Ahmed, 2001). 
Because of the Shariah condition on the prohibition of trading Salam Sukuk, there is a serious level of exposure 
to liquidity risk. This results in Salam Sukuk being exposed to serious price risk. However, through parallel 
contracts in Salam, these risks can be overcome (Tariq and Dar, 2007).  
 Example: 
On November 1st a car dealer in Saudi Arabia has a wealthy client who wishes to purchase 2 customised luxury 
cars for £1,200,000 for delivery on 31st December. The car dealer requires £1,000,000 (£700,000 for the 
purchase of the cars from the manufacturer and £300,000 profit). To raise the £1,000,000 through 
Sukuk Salam the company issues Sukuk by setting up an SPV to subscribe investors’ capital of £1,000,000 for 
the Sukuk certificates. The company undertakes to supply the cars to the SPV on 31st December, in return for 
£1,000,000 paid on 1st November by the SPV. Also, on 1st November the SPV sells the cars through a parallel 
contract of Salam to deliver the cars to the wealthy client, also for delivery on 31st December, for payment of 
£1,200,000 in two equal instalments of £600,000, both instalments due before the delivery date. The 2 
instalments of £600,000 are passed to the Sukuk holders’, giving the Sukuk holders a profit of £200,000 on 
their invested capital of £1,000,000. This illustrates the defining feature of the Salam contract of payment in 
advance for future delivery of a commodity. 
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Example from Sukuk market: 
Table 13: Example of Salam Sukuk 
Sukuk name/Date: Al Salaam Sukuk, issuance number#153, January 2014 
Issuer: Central Bank of Bahrain, Kingdom of Bahrain 
Type of Sukuk 
structure: 
Sukuk Al-Salam 
Obligor Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain 
Amount:  Bahraini Dinar (BHD) 36 million  
Term: 91 days  
Expected Profit Rate: 1.00%, equivalent to 1.00% for the previous issue. 
Security: Credit enhancers guaranteed by Qatar Government 
Redemption/ Principles 
repayment 
Return will be on monthly basis and the Sukuk redemption at maturity date 
which is on 23 April 2014 
Rating Unrated 
 
 
3.9 Evaluation of Sukuk Structures  
From the above background, it is observed that each Sukuk structure has a distinctive risk profile influenced 
by the Shariah conditions behind the concept of the financing structure as well as the type of certificate. 
Therefore, the risks that Sukuk encounter vary according to the structure of the Sukuk; the risks of Sukuk 
Murabahah, which has a fixed return, differ from those of Sukuk Musharakah; the risks of Sukuk Istisna differ 
from those of Sukuk Ijarah; and so on. It is important to state that these risks also vary depending on the 
underlying assets of these Sukuk, be they fixed or movable assets, utilities or services (Alsharq Alawsat, 2008). 
A few studies have been conducted on Sukuk analysis. One of these studies, conducted by Abdul Jalil and 
Abdul Raham (2012) concerned a comparative analysis between two Sukuk structures in terms of long term 
tenure. They determined that the amount of profit gained from the Musharakah Mutanagisah structure using a 
coupon rate of 4.5 %, priced at par and tenure of five years was greater than the Ijarah structure where the 
price is at a discount. In addition, they computed and compared the profits obtained from Sukuk investment in 
Ijarah and Musharakah Mutanagisah for a 3.5% coupon rate and priced at par for Sukuk with tenure of 12.5, 
15, 17.5 and 19 years. By applying relevant models for profit calculation, taking into account the Ijarah and 
Musharahkah Mutanaqish principles, they conclude that Sukuk Ijarah returns compare favourably with Sukuk 
Musharahkah Mutanaqish, regardless of the number of years of the Sukuk, so long as it is a long term tenure. 
Tariq and Dar (2007) and Zaidi (2009) discussed Sukuk structures and investigated the risk associated with 
Sukuk structures. Zaidi (2009) concludes that the risk of Sukuk is broader than the risk of conventional bonds 
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due to Sukuk inheriting risk factors over and above credit risk, inlcuding market risk, Shariah risk, risks 
associated with the assets underlying Sukuk, and regulatory risk. Tariq and Dar (2007) discuss the Shariah 
compliant framework applying to Sukuk structures in order to contribute to risk mitigation. Wilson (2008) 
addresses the criticisms of Sukuk Ijarah related to linking distributions to LIBOR rates. He examines 
innovations in the structuring of Sukuk securities and the potential for novel structures based on Musharakah 
or a hybrid of different Sukuk structures. Wilson proposes adopting alternative benchmarks to LIBOR, such as 
benchmarks based on macroeconomic indicators of real economic activity, for example, GDP growth in the 
case of sovereign Sukuk and of company financial performance in the case of corporate Sukuk. However, GDP 
indicators may help in the case of Sukuk based on debt and for asset-based and asset-backed Sukuk, but perhaps 
not for Sukuk based on equity. This is because the former Sukuk rely on the economic environment of the 
Sukuk issuer and the assets attached to the Sukuk, while the performance of Sukuk based on equity are affected 
by the competence and efforts of the Sukuk parties such as the Mudarb (entrepreneur or manager). Saad and 
Mohamad (2012) analysed the performance of Sukuk structures in the Malaysian market over the period 2005 
to 2010. They used a multivariate regression model to investigate the relationship between Sukuk yield and 
Sukuk structures. They conclude that there is a statistically significant relationship among variables. Most of 
the listed Sukuk are based on debt (68%) as compared to other Sukuk structures, and the majority come from 
the infrastructure and utilities sector (53%). Muhamed and Radzi (2011) identified the implications for Sukuk 
investors between choosing an asset based or asset backed structure, focusing on the Sukuk Ijarah structure as 
a case study. A default on asset based Sukuk is the same to investors as a default on unsecured bonds. No 
recourse can be expected against any of the assets used in the Sukuk. On the other hand, asset backed Sukuk 
may become more widely used as investors would have the right to take possession of the assets backing the 
Sukuk. They conclude that asset based Sukuk may be more suitable where legal title to assets cannot be 
transferred to investors. The asset based Sukuk is more appropriate when there are restrictions on foreign 
ownership of certain asset classes such as property asset. In addition, asset backed Sukuk may not be adequate 
in circumstances where the enforceability of assets may provide a challenge, such as sovereign owned assets. 
Referring to the nature of Sukuk structures from the Shariah perspective, it is seen that the evolution of 
structures such as Sukuk Ijarah has been instrumental in increasing Sukuk issue size for issuers. Structures 
such as agency Sukuk (Wakalah) have allowed issuers to maximize the use of limited tangibles in an issuance 
and, thus, allowed them to issue a larger quantity than if they had used an Ijarah structure. As an example of 
such innovations, issuers such as Ooredoo have used assets such as airtime minutes via a Manfah (usufructs) 
structure under the Ijarah concept (Zawya, 2014).  
A summary of Sukuk securitisation mechanisms has been provided by Alsaeed (2012). He evaluated the 
mechanisms for structuring Sukuk and affirmed that Sukuk are based on the following basic principles: first, 
transparency of privileges and unambiguous responsibilities for stakeholders. Second, the return on Sukuk 
funds must originate from the purpose of their issuance. Third, Sukuk must be backed by genuine underlying 
assets. Finally, Sukuk structures can only achieve their benefits if they are issued and traded on a large scale. 
According to Moody’s (2007, 2008), the major drawback is that Sukuk are usually held till maturity and an 
active secondary market has yet to develop.  
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3.10 Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the regulatory framework, the various classification schemes for Sukuk, Sukuk 
securisation, and, for each of the main Sukuk structures, the definitions, key features, risk associations, 
structure diagrams, and some illustrative examples. 
There are many different Sukuk structures. Sukuk are a very flexible form of financing, and within these main 
structures there are many variations and innovations. Furthermore, these structures can be combined in a variety 
of innovative ways. This great flexibility allows Sukuk to meet the needs of issuers and investors. The 
complications arising from having many different types of Sukuk structure have not slowed down the 
expansion and growth of the Sukuk market. However, each different Sukuk structure has its own nature and 
risk exposures, and further evaluation of Sukuk structures is required in order to support the further growth of 
the market. This chapter facilitates this study by a detailed discussion of Sukuk structures and securitization 
mechanisms. 
The next chapter investigates further Sukuk structure risk, the risks that are associated with the different kinds 
of Sukuk structure. 
 
 
*** 
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CHAPTER 4 
SUKUK STRUCTURE RISK  
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter is based on a paper that has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Islamic Accounting 
and Business Research under the title “Understanding and Evaluation of Risk in Sukuk Structures” (2016, 
vol:8, iss:4). 
 
The chapter moves from the general to the specific. First, risk is discussed from a general, non-formal, and 
philosophical perspective. Next considered is risk from the perspective of conventional modern finance. The 
discussion then moves to a discussion of risk in Islamic finance, then to the consideration of Sukuk risk, and 
finally to Sukuk structure risk. 
 
Later, this analysis of Sukuk risk, and of Sukuk structure risk in particular, will be applied in the development 
of hypotheses on Sukuk risk/return profiles that will be tested using empirical data. 
. 
4.2 Risk  
The Oxford English dictionary (2008, p342) describes risk as ‘‘hazard, a chance of bad consequences, loss or 
exposure to mischance’’. Alexander, Frey and Emberchts (2005, p17) extend the risk definition to the finance 
context by stating that “risk is the quantifiable likelihood of loss or less than expected return”.  
 
Risk has a critical meaning. It has been addressed in different subjects in business, with different meanings and 
with different methods of risk management. For instance, in Project Management, risk is considered as 
uncertain events that, when occurring will have an effect on the achievement of a project’s objectives. It 
consists of a combination of the probability of a perceived threat or opportunity occurring, and the magnitude 
of its impact on objectives (PRINC2 Manual Book, 2009).  
 
While a variety of definitions of the term risk have been suggested. Under a holistic view, risk is open for 
interpretation and applied in various ways by different group of people (Bracken, Bremmer, and Gordon, 2008). 
Other approaches to risk are more specific, as in the definition first suggested by Adams (1995), who saw it as 
the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a stated period of time, or results from a particular 
challenge.  
 
There is common acceptance that risk is associated with uncertainty and that it comes with consequences 
(Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2007). According to Hillson and Murray-Webster (2007), there are two extreme 
schools of thoughts on the concept of risk and uncertainty, with one suggesting that universe by nature is 
uncertain and that prediction is a futile exercise. The other school suggests that advancement in technology and 
knowledge enables one to predict the future more accurately, thereby removing uncertainty. Hillson and 
Murray-Webster (2007) suggest that the concept of uncertainty relies on two key points namely: 
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Variability: a situation where the outcome of a measured factor can be within a given range. It can also be 
referred as objective uncertainty as suggested by theory of individual choice under uncertainty (Machina, 
2004). 
 
Ambiguity: a situation where the outcome can either happen or not or where something totally different may 
happen in future. In the theory of individual choice under uncertainty, this is also known as subjective 
uncertainty (Machina, 2004). 
 
 
The introduction of the concept of perceptions of risk brings attitude into the picture. Attitude drives the way 
in which risk is managed by organisations and individuals (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2007). It is important 
to note here that attitude refers to actions of individuals or groups driven by perception of a certain situation. 
 
Risk management is then viewed as a set of activities carried, out by individuals, groups or organisations using 
management policies and practices, based on these perceptions and attitudes (Bracken, Bremmer, and Gordon, 
2008). Risk management can be defined as those steps involving in defining, identifying, analysing, processing, 
evaluating and communicating risk (Chapman, 2003). 
 
The human factor plays a key role in risk management. Risk management cannot be completely undertaken by 
machines or robots alone, as risk management requires human judgement (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2007). 
Qualitative risk assessment considers the probability and the impact on the objectives in both positive and 
negative aspects using human perception. On the other hand, quantitative risk analysis focuses on the 
application of mathematical models to identify, measure and manage risk (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2007). 
 
From the standpoint of finance, beginning from the work of Markowitz in the 1950s, financial risk management 
has led to development of highly sophisticated applications using various statistical and probability models 
(Thomas, 2000). For example, in advanced economies like the US and the UK, individuals are credit scored to 
assess the risk involved in lending. Banks, retailers, and other lending institutions use credit scores, given on 
basis of historical records leading to estimates of the probability of default, and to the acceptance or rejection 
of lending requests (Sager, 2010). Vast databases, recording many millions of such transactions are stored for 
future analysis. These records help the banks to assign customer credit ratings. The process of credit scoring 
introduces a bias against people with bad credit scores, who then stand no chance of gaining access to lending 
(Thomas, 2000). 
 
Furthermore, banks have now extended credit analysis to include behavioural scoring.  Theoretical models, 
supported by statistical analysis have shown that economic conditions alter customer behaviour (Thomas, 
2000). Probability theory can be reliably applied when background economic conditions remain the same. 
Behavioural scoring allows the extension of the probability models to take into account the impact of a 
changing economic environment on customer behavior (Sager, 2010). 
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In the context of Sukuk and conventional bonds, Fabozzi and Dattatreya (2005) demonstrate the return on a 
fixed income security, over the period from the day it is purchased to the day it is sold, can be divided into two 
parts: (1) the market value of the security when it is eventually sold and (2) the cash flows received from the 
security over the time period that it is held, plus any additional income from reinvestment of the cash flow. 
Several environmental factors affect one or both of these two parts. They define the risk of the security as a 
measure of the impact of these environmental factors on the security’s return. Sundararajan (2007) commented 
that, with respect to Sukuk, effective risk management must recognize that, in addition to the risks common to 
Sukuk and conventional bonds, there is a specific mix of risk factors particular to Islamic financial contracts. 
 
These issues of risk management and disclosure are central to the New Basel Capital Accord (Base III), which 
will start to be implemented in March 2018, for both conventional and Islamic banks.  
 
4.3 Philosophy of risk  
According to Hansson and Howard (2010) the role of philosophy in the development of the risk sciences has 
been rather limited. He regards this as unfortunate, as he believes there are many problems in the analysis and 
management of risk which philosophers can contribute to solving. Several of the central terms, including the 
term ‘risk” itself, are still in need of clarification. There is also a need to identify and understand implicit or 
“hidden” value assumptions in what are, allegedly, value-free risk assessments. 
 
Risk management is designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity and allow it to manage risks 
within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of the targeted organisation 
or business objectives. Historically, modern risk research originated in studies from the 1960s and 1970s that 
had a strong focus on chemical risks and on the risks associated with nuclear energy. This research drew on 
expertise in such fields as toxicology, epidemiology, radiation biology and nuclear engineering. It is still the 
case that most applications of risk management require specialised knowledge in one, or in several related 
disciplines. Medical expertise is required for the study of risks from diseases, engineering expertise in studies 
of technological failures, etc. Several disciplines have supplied overarching approaches to risk, which may be 
transferred to the analysis of risk in many other and diverse fields. Statistics, epidemiology, economics, 
psychology, anthropology and sociology are among the disciplines that have developed general approaches to 
risk. Hansson (2012) in his study outlines eight perspectives in the philosophy of risk. In the following he gives 
examples of particular issues arising from within each of these perspectives:  
 Epistemology: issues and problems of trust in expertise and the division of epistemological labour.  
 Decision theory: the decision maker’s degree of control over risks is often problematic and difficult to 
model. 
 Philosophy of probability: posterior revisions of risk estimates pose a challenge to the standard model of 
probabilistic reasoning.  
 Philosophy of science: issues of risk give us reason to investigate what influence the practical uses of 
knowledge can legitimately have on the scientific process.  
 Philosophy of technology: the nature of safety engineering principles and their relationship to risk 
assessment need to be investigate. 
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 Ethics: the most pressing problem is how standard ethical theories can be extended or adjusted to cope 
with the ethics of risk taking. 
 Philosophy of economics: the comparison and aggregation of risks falling to different persons give rise to 
new foundational problems for the theory of welfare.  
 Political philosophy: issues such as trust and consent that have been discussed in connection with risk give 
us a reason to reconsider central issues in the theory of democracy.  
 
Sagar (2010) attributes the risk concept to probability theory. Probability theory has evolved over the ages, 
ever since Galileo introduced it as part of his observations on dice games (Webb, 1996). Primarily considered 
as a branch of mathematics, probability theory aims at studying and explaining the patterns arising from random 
experiments, which can be executed repeatedly and where the outcome is uncertain (Gut, 2005). 
 
There are currently a number different accounts of the meaning of probability. In the frequency interpretation 
probability is explained in terms of the long run frequency of an event in a long series of repeated experiments. 
In the axiomatic approach a probability is anything that satisfies the formal rules of a particular probability 
calculus. In the Bayesian interpretation probability is explained in terms the degrees of belief of rational agents, 
where these degrees of belief can be inferred from observations of agents’ choices. There is dispute, and some 
confusion over whether these “Bayesian probabilities” should be regarded as measures of the psychological 
states of the agents, or whether they are measures of probabilities in some objective sense, i.e. whether Bayesian 
probabilities are “subjective” or “objective”. Within each of the frequency, axiomatic and Bayesian accounts 
of probability there is a variety of different interpretations (Ben-Haim, 2004). There is as yet no consensus as 
to what is the correct philosophical approach to probability, and there is still much debate on what is the correct 
resolution of these foundational issues (Cheeseman, 1985).  
 
Probability is often contrasted with uncertainty. To talk of probability indicates that at least some quantifiable 
information about future potential outcomes can be obtained from a study of the patterns in past historical data. 
Uncertainty concerns situations where no such quantifiable analysis is possible, and where it is more a matter 
of personal judgement. The importance of judgement is well supported by the approach taken by many 
Keynesians, who claim that there are many situations where real uncertainty exists and where no amount of 
statistical analysis can provide accurate indicators for future (Davidson, 1991). 
 
4.3.1 Risk in conventional finance  
 
In conventional finance risk is usually measured as the standard deviation of returns (Doff, 2008). The basic 
portfolio model was developed by Harry Markowitz (1952, 1959), who presented precise calculations for the 
expected rate of return and risk (the standard deviation of returns), both for individual assets and for portfolios 
of assets (Reilly and Brown, 2012). These are summarised as follows: 
 
a) The calculation of the expected rate of return of an asset requires first an estimate of the probability 
distribution of returns. These probability estimates are obtained from the historical record of past returns 
modified by the future expectations of an investor. The expected rate of return of an asset is defined formally 
as follows:  
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The expected return of asset A =  E(RA) = (P1)(R1) + (P2)(R2) +……+ (Pn)(Rn), where R1,…, Rn are the n possible 
returns on asset A and where, for each i = 1,…, n, Pi is the probability of return Ri, Thus, the expected return is 
the mean return, the weighted average of the returns where the weights are the probabilities.  
 
b) The risk of an asset, according to the Markowitz (1959) model, is the dispersion of possible returns, where 
dispersion is measured by the statistical concept of standard deviation. The variance of returns can also be used, 
though the standard deviation is used more commonly. Most investors wants to quantify this dispersion using 
statistical techniques. The formula for variance is defined as follows:  
 
The standard deviation of returns on asset A, σA, =  [(P1)( E(RA) - R1)2 + (P2)( E(RA) - R2)2 +……+ (Pn)(E(RA) 
- Rn)2]1/2 where E(RA) is the expected return defined above, R1,…, Rn are the n possible returns on asset A and 
where, for each i = 1,…, n, Pi is the probability of return Ri, The variance is the square of the standard 
deviation. 
Under Markowitz theory (1959), the major sources of uncertainty or risk include: business risk, financial risk, 
liquidity risk, exchange rate risk and political risk: 
1) Business risk is the uncertainty caused by the firm characteristics specific to the nature of the firm’s business.  
2) Financial risk is the uncertainty introduced by the firm’s capital structure. For example, financial risk 
increases with leverage.  
3) Liquidity risk is the uncertainty introduced by the secondary market for the firm’s securities. The more 
difficult it is to liquidate the security; the greater is the liquidity risk.  
4) Exchange rate risk is the uncertainty of returns introduced when the currency denomination of the investor 
differs from the currency in which the security is denominated.  
5) Political risk or "country risk" is the uncertainty of returns caused by the probability of an adverse change 
in the political or economic environment of a country.  
 
The total risk of an asset (measured by the standard deviation of returns) is made up of two components, 
systematic risk and non-systematic risk (Reilly & Brown, 2012): 
 
a) Systematic risk, also called "market risk" or “non-diversifiable risk”, is that caused by market wide risks, 
such as volatility of the money supply or interest rates, oil price changes, government policies, natural disasters 
and financial crises, which cannot be hedged by diversification.  
 
b) Non-systematic risk, "non-market risk" or “diversifiable risk”, is the risk specific to the firm, industry, or 
geographical location, which can be hedged by diversification. These risks include such things as unqualified 
staff, bad management conditions, and threats from competitors.  
 
According to the classification of total risk into systematic and non-systematic risk, Alsayed (2013) redefined 
the sources of risk discussed earlier; systematic risk includes exchange rate risk and political risk, while, non-
systematic risk includes business risk, financial risk and liquidity risk. 
 
Risk management in finance depends on two main strategies, diversification and hedging which are:  
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1) Diversification  
Diversification is the spreading of wealth over a variety of investment opportunities to reduce risk by dividing 
investments across many relatively low-correlated assets, companies, industries, and countries. The effect of 
reducing risk by including a large number of investments in a portfolio is called diversification.  
 
Because of diversification, the standard deviation of the returns of a portfolio is less than the average of the 
standard deviation of the returns of each of the individual investments. The diversification gains achieved by 
adding more investments will depend on the degree of correlation among the investments. The degree of 
correlation is measured by using the correlation coefficient. When the investor combines stocks that are not 
perfectly positively correlated with each other portfolio risk is reduced. The greater the negative correlation 
the greater the reduction in risk achieved by adding it to the portfolio.  
 
The purpose of diversification is to reduce the standard deviation of the total portfolio by increasing the number 
of securities included in the portfolio (Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 2005). Evans and Archer (1968) and Tole 
(1982) compute the standard deviation for portfolios of increasing size up to 20 stocks. The results indicate 
that the major benefits of diversification are achieved with about 90% of the maximum benefit of diversification 
obtained in portfolios of 12 to 18 stocks. Figure (1) shows this result. 
 
Figure 46: The effect of diversification on total risk 
 
Source: Gitman, 2009. 
As indicated by Figure (1), unsystematic risk can be minimised by increasing the number of stocks (or assets) 
included in the portfolio, which maximise the benefits from diversification. Systematic risk cannot be reduced 
by diversification, because this risk is caused by economic and political factors or by natural phenomena which 
affect all stocks.  
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Systematic risk can be measured using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The CAPM defines non-
diversifiable risk to be the non-diversifiable portion of the total risk. This measure of non-diversifiable risk is 
called the Beta coefficient, and it calculates the security’s systematic risk compared to that of the market 
portfolio. 
.  
The systematic risk of an individual asset is derived from the following a regression model: 
  
Ri = αi + βi Rm + ε 
 
Where Ri is the return on asset i, Rm is the return of market portfolio and the slop of this line is the coefficient 
beta βi  (Reilly and Brown, 2012). Beta is a measure of systematic risk. It measures the sensitivity of a stock’s 
returns to changes in returns on the market portfolio.  
 
2) Hedging  
Normally a hedge consists of taking an offsetting position in a related security, such as a futures contract, for 
example, where a diversifiable portfolio of stocks can be hedged by taking a short position in a stock index 
futures. Falls (gains) in the portfolio are offset by gains (losses) on the futures position, thus volatility (Reilly 
and Brown, 2012).  
 
Hedges can be constructed from many types of financial instruments, including bonds or Sukuk, stocks, 
forward contracts, swaps, options and futures contracts. 
 
Hedging works as purchase of a risky asset to reduce the risk portfolio. The negative correlation between hedge 
asset and the initial portfolio turns the volatility of the hedge asset into a risk reducing feature. When a hedge 
asset is perfectly negatively correlated with initial portfolio, it serves as a perfect hedge and works like an 
insurance contract on the portfolio (Bodie el at., 2005). 
 
The risk management techniques of diversification of conventional finance are applicable to risk management 
in Islamic finance  
 
4.4 Risk in Islamic finance theory  
In the Islamic financial system risk is an essential element of profit making. Risk forms the basis of profit in 
that both profits and losses are shared in a joint enterprise. Just as profit is the lifeblood of the Islamic economic 
system, so too is the assumption of risk. Any commercial partnership in which the profits are shared between 
partners and not the risk is not a valid Islamic commercial transaction. Both profits and risks are shared in trade 
concept.  
Islam does not object to trade, nor does it simply prohibit contracts just for the sake of it. However, Islam is 
against guarantees in trade, as the Prophet Mohammed peace be upon him said: “al-kharaj bil-Dhaman”, which 
bases the entitlement to revenue on a corresponding liability for bearing losses. In Shariah it is prohibited for 
an individual or institution to earn a profit without shouldering a liability. For example, the capital provider in 
Mudaraba-like transactions is entitled to profit because all operational losses (those not caused by negligence 
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or misconduct on the part of Mudarib) will be debited from his capital (Al maal). On the other hand, a lender 
in Qard, or risk-free loan, cannot take any compensation or reward from a borrower, as his loaned money is 
not subject to operational risks (the borrower is obliged to return the loan principal in full at the specified 
payback time). 
Iqbal (1997), Wilson (2008), Elfakhani and Hassan (2005), Asutay (2010) and Akram, Rafique, and Alam 
(2011) have all emphasised that Islamic finance structures essentially associate profit with risk. Risk is a 
component of trade, and shapes the behavioural norms of individuals in operationalising the system. Islamic 
finance adopts the risk sharing model in some products which shows the nature of the relationship between 
capital and work. Products such as equity based structures like Mudaraba and Musharakah may be considered 
one of the best methods in establishing justice between work effort and return, and between work effort and 
capital. Indeed, the participatory nature in Islamic financing methods is reflected in the profit and loss sharing 
theory. In Islamic financial instruments, capital and labour merge to establish a partnership. The requirement 
for risk sharing is an essential feature of the risk management framework for Islamic finance introduced in 
Junaid and Azhar (2010), namely, that: 
a) Transactions should be backed by real assets.  
b) Ownership of assets should be genuine, i.e. legal ownership should reflect the underlying economic reality.  
c) Risk depends on real asset values.  
d) Transactions should be free of Riba and Gharar.  
e) Real investment is permitted, while speculation is forbidden.  
f) Fixed, or guaranteed, rates of return are not permitted.  
While risk cannot be avoided in Islamic finance, Islam permits, and recommends, taking prudent precautions 
to mitigate risks. In particular, it is permitted to make the mitigation of risks one of the key aims in the design 
of Islamic financial instruments. Risk management is a fundamental issue in Islamic finance, since Islamic 
financing is based on trade, with all of its attendant risks, while conventional financing is based on debt. Risk 
is associated with all Islamic financial instruments, including Sukuk. In this regard issuers and investors view 
Sukuk with great interest. For issuers, including government agencies, multinational corporations, and 
development institutions, Sukuk help with meeting funding requirements for large infrastructure projects and 
business expansion. From the investor’s perspective Sukuk can reduce investment risks. The value of Sukuk is 
largely stable, as it is asset backed or at least asset based, the investment time horizon of Sukuk is fixed, further 
reducing the risk profile, and Sukuk also help investors to reduce risk through portfolio diversification. Given 
these benefits to both issuers and investors, the high historical rates of growth of the Sukuk market are expected 
to continue for the foreseeable future.  
Despite this bright picture, Sukuk as Islamic investment instruments, and the Islamic finance industry in 
general, faces several unique risks. Since Islamic financial institutions do not provide a guaranteed return in 
exchange for customers’ deposits or investments, investors may move their money to other financial 
institutions should the returns not match their expectations. Thus, Islamic financial institutions face liquidity 
risk, with the possibility of customers withdrawing funds too quickly. To add to this, the financial institution 
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may also be required to pay returns to fund providers even if the underlying assets do not earn profits. These 
risks may, to some extent, be managed through the establishment of a liquid inter-bank market. 
Partnership financing modes are recommended as forms of risk management in Islamic finance. The financier 
provides equity capital and shares in the risks and rewards of the venture. The capital structure of partnership 
may itself act as its own risk management mechanism, since the partnership structure encourages the partners 
themselves to make the required efforts to identify, measure, and manage the risks. It is notable that the 
catastrophic failures of risk management of the Wall Street investment banks, culminating in the financial crisis 
of 2008, resulted at least in part from the abandonment of the partnership structure in favour of the corporate 
structure, which broke the mechanism for sharing risks and rewards that existed in the investment banking 
partnerships. The social and community ties so central to the Islamic way of life are also a means of risk 
management for individuals, households and businesses. The risk management mechanism in Islamic finance 
is based upon strong social relationships as a means of accessing help. The risk management of physical assets 
in Islamic finance, particularly for businesses, revolves around a combination of savings and physical risk 
management. Retirement benefits too are a combination of communal risk sharing and savings. 
In contrast to conventional investors, Islamic investors also consider the ethical aspects of their investment, 
and the types of economic activities in which they invest (Erol, Kaynak and Radi, 1990). For example, Archer 
and Abdel Karim (2006) point out that while the insights of conventional financial theory apply to Islamic 
investment, the restrictions which apply to the Islamic investor make investment at Islamic banks different 
from investment at conventional banks in several important respects:  
1. In Islam, an investor must pay off his debts, and his death cannot cancel these debts. Since the full 
repayment of debts is a duty, limited liability arrangements are restricted by the Shariah, and are 
sometimes even considered to be unacceptable in Islamic culture.  
2. A Muslim society would impose relatively little tax upon profits. This would facilitate re-investment of 
profits, although there are Islamic rules about how this should be done in a partnership.  
3. Overall, an Islamic investor must avoid Riba in any form (given, charging and receiving).  
In addition, Islamic investors must also avoid forbidden economic activities which include producing or dealing 
in alcohol or drugs, unless needed for medical purposes (Segrado, 2005). These ethical requirements impose 
further dimensions of risk in Islamic finance that are generally not present in conventional finance. This opens 
the door to identifying the risks inherent in Islamic finance, and in particular those risk factors to which Sukuk 
are exposed.  
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4.5 Risks associated with Sukuk 
 
The previous discussion in this thesis has indicated some, but not all ways, in which Sukuk may be less risky 
than their conventional counterparts. However, it is also the case that Sukuk are exposed to many dimensions 
of risk that do not arise with conventional bonds. According to the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), Sukuk Investment Standard (17) there are 14 types of Shariah 
structures in Sukuk securitisation, and each of those structures follows a different type of sale contract that 
underlies the Sukuk securitisation. This raises the question of how to identify, evaluate and measure the risks 
of Sukuk, and develop methods for how to manage these risks. Research has seen the emergence of a number 
of risk models and risk management methods for quantifying and monitoring risk (Rosman, 2009). Such 
methods significantly augment perspectives on risks and the ability to control them. The following discussion 
develops a holistic picture of the risk of Sukuk, and discusses risk classification schemes based on extending 
and adapting certain risk classification schemes used in conventional finance. 
4.5.1 Shariah compliance risks 
Shariah compliance risk is the risk arising from the failure of an Islamic financial instrument or contract to 
comply with the Shariah. These include the risk that already existing financial instruments and contracts may 
subsequently be declared to be Shariah non-compliant. Recent research focuses on Shariah compliance risks 
include Rosly and Sanusi (1999), Al-Amine (2008) and McMillen (2016) with critical evaluation of Shariah 
compliance risk interpretations among Shariah schools. For example, the application of bay al-inah 
(purchasing on credit) and bay al-dayn (sale of debt) contracts for Sukuk issuance in Malaysia, and criticism 
of the interest rate benchmarking and guarantee features in Sukuk operations, and Usmani (2008), with 
criticism of the current Sukuk mechanisms on asset ownership, guarantee, and Sukuk pricing benchmarks. 
More recently, Dusuki and Mokhtar (2010) criticise asset ownership in current Sukuk mechanisms, and Al-
Jarhi and Abozaid (2010) discuss Shariah issues in current Sukuk structures in a paper presented to the OIC 
fiqh academy conference. 
Alsayed (2013), however, emphasises that Sukuk currently operate within an interest based financial system, 
and consequently that risk management in Sukuk is very complicated and difficult within the boundaries 
specified by the Shariah. She argues that scholars should therefore allow for some flexibility in structuring 
Sukuk. 
Shariah compliance risk is of fundamental importance in Islamic finance. Concern over the possible Shariah 
non-compliance of Islamic financial securities is widespread, and the issues are currently far from being 
resolved. 
4.5.2 Regulatory and supervisory frameworks  
Sukuk researchers have highlighted various risks underlying the structures of Sukuk, including Khan and Habib 
(2001), Jobst (2007), Tariq and Dar (2007), Jabeen and Javed (2007), Sundararajan (2007), Wilson (2009), 
Nanaeva (2010), Said (2011), Majid, Shahimi and Abdullah (2011), Alsaeed (2012), Noor and Shahimi (2013), 
and Alsayed (2013). Hence, this alerts both Sukuk issuers and investors to understand the comprehensive 
picture of Sukuk risk-based supervision needed for Islamic investment, supported by a clear strategy to build 
up risk management processes at the individual institutional level, and robust legal, governance and market 
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infrastructure at the national and global levels (Sundararajan, 2007).  In recognition of this need, the 
international community has established the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), headquartered in Kuala 
Lumpur, to foster good regulatory and supervisory practices, to help develop uniform prudential standards and 
support good practise in risk management (IFSB, 2002). 
The IFSB has advanced the work on the capital adequacy framework and risk management in Islamic finance 
institutions, through the issuance of consultative papers on these topics in 2005. This built a road map of risk 
management paths customisable with Islamic finance principles. In fact, the effective supervision of Islamic 
banks requires that the three pillars framework of Basel III and the language of risks it introduces be adapted 
appropriately to its operational characteristics. Such adoption of Basel III would require a medium-term effort 
involving; i) Strengthening the existing supervisory framework to achieve full compliance with Basel Core 
Principles of Banking Supervision. (ii) Developing appropriate risk measurement and disclosure procedures 
supported by systematic efforts to build up databases needed for risk measurement; (iii) In parallel, building 
up the core elements of financial infrastructure and risk management instruments to support sound development 
of Islamic finance (Sundararajan, 2007).  This will set the stage for adopting more advanced capital 
measurement approaches as envisaged in Basel III, but tailored to the specific operational characteristics of 
Islamic finance, including the role of investment instruments such as Sukuk. 
4.5.3 The conventional risk classification approach   
Risks associated with Islamic finance instruments, including Sukuk, can be categorised by adapting the risk 
classification procedures applied in conventional finance. El-Hawary, Grais and Iqbal (2004) contributed to 
this approach with a study presenting a basic view of each Islamic finance instrument’s risk profile.  The figure 
below shows this classification. 
Figure 47: Risk profile of Islamic finance instruments 
 
Source: El-Hawary et al., (2004) 
 
Figure 43 above classifies the risks typically faced in the Islamic banks applicable to its investment instruments, 
including Sukuk. The overview of the profile of operating risks in Islamic finance shows risks grouped into 
five broad categories: transaction, business, treasury, governance and systemic risks (El-Hawary et al., 2004). 
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While these categories are also applicable to non-Islamic finance, specific risks within them are more relevant 
to Islamic finance, and the nature of contracts it uses. However, the nature of differences between Islamic 
finance instruments requires assigning a precise risk profile to each Islamic finance instrument in order to gain 
a more accurate reading of the risk exposure of these instruments. 
 
4.5.4 The stakeholder risk classification approach   
It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the nature of different features of investment instruments 
according to inherited features of Shariah principles. In the Sukuk context, IFSB Standard 7 of (2005) 
emphasises that Islamic finance institutions may act in various capacities in a Sukuk securitisation. Its exposure 
to risks may be similar to that of conventional bond securitisation. However, Shariah rules and principles may 
add an extra dimension to the existing risk exposures and may have a material effect on the risk profile of 
Sukuk holders. This implies differences between Sukuk and bonds.  
As well as the fact that the risk profile of Sukuk is unique, recognition of Sukuk risks is quite complex due to 
the innovation of Sukuk structures. Tariq and Dar (2007) presented risk characteristics of each type of Sukuk 
structure from a certificate type perspective by linking them with the Shariah structures underlying the Sukuk 
type. There were eight risk factors presenting the relationship of those risks and types of Sukuk: credit risk, 
rate of return risk, foreign exchange risk, price risk, liquidity risk, business risk, Shariah compliance risk and 
infrastructure rigidities. In addition, IFSB Standard 7 (2005) recognised a Sukuk structure risk profile based 
on the Sukuk stakeholder’s perspective. The standard listed five stakeholders of Sukuk who are exposed the 
risk of Sukuk. Those are originator, servicer, issuer, SPV and holder (investor). Categorising Sukuk risk based 
on the Sukuk stakeholder perspectives provides an easier way to track those risks. Also, this helps to present a 
comprehensive picture of the risks associated with Sukuk securitisation. Figure 44 below illustrates those risks 
discussed in the previous research. 
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Figure 48: Risk Exposure to Sukuk Stakeholders  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Created by IFSB standard 7 (2005) and developed by Author (2015) 
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It is noticeable that the greater complexity of Sukuk, as a securitisation mechanism, when compared to bonds 
is reflected in the “horizontal” risk structure for Sukuk in Figure 44 compared to the “vertical” risk for 
conventional bonds in Figure 45.  
 
In fact, the stakeholder approach provides a valuable framework for understanding and interpreting the risks 
associated with Sukuk. The advantages of the stakeholder risk classification for Sukuk can be seen by 
comparing it with the risk classification scheme for conventional bonds of Fabozzi and Dattatreya (2005). In 
the conventional classification bond risks are classified by cash flow risks and market value risks. The 
conventional bond risk classification is less informative than the stakeholder model in linking the various 
Sukuk risks with the factors causing those risks. The figure below shows the conventional bond classification 
in a simple context.  
 
Figure 49: Bond risks scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Created by Fabozzi & Dattatreya (2005) and developed by Author (2015) 
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4.6 Comparison of conventional bond risks and Sukuk risks  
 
This section pursues in further detail the similarities and differences between conventional bond risks and 
Sukuk risks.  
4.6.1 Interest rate risk vs rate of return risk 
 
Rate of return risk for Sukuk is similar to the interest rate of conventional bond, in particular because most of 
the recent Sukuk issues have a fixed coupon payment. Hence, when the market interest rate rises the Sukuk 
value drops. The same is applicable for the risk of reinvestment. Fixed-income Sukuk bear this risk similarly 
to conventional debt certificates. However, if Sukuk were to strictly follow the Shariah compliant methodology 
they should ideally not be affected by interest rate risk. The Zurich based investment bank Credit Suisse 
believes investment in Islamic finance and banking products are not exposed to interest rate risk since Islam 
prohibits charging interest, and Sukuk securities should not be affected by the credit crisis in the international 
finance and banking industry (Farook, 2009). The Sukuk rate of return should not be treated as an interest rate, 
since Sukuk returns should be calculated from real profits from the underlying assets; interest rate risk should 
be significantly reduced or even avoided. 
 
This point was addressed in famous fatwa issued by Usmani (2008). Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani, 
Chairman of the Shariah Council of AAOIFI, is a leading scholar in the area of Islamic Finance. His recent 
criticism of modern Sukuk issuance provoked confusion and instability in the Islamic capital market. 
According to this prominent scholar, most of Sukuk issuances resemble conventional bonds to the extent that 
they do not comply with Shariah rulings and cannot be considered as Islamic instruments. 
 
Conventional bondholders receive regular interest payments on their investments, which is determined as a 
percentage of the principal amount. According to Usmani (2008) Sukuk structures cannot use fixed interest 
rates or a market index, such as LIBOR, as a return for the initial Sukuk investment. Rather, Sukuk payments 
should reflect actual returns of underlying assets. Therefore, when issuing Sukuk, the manager can only 
announce expected returns on the project as well as the ratio of distribution of returns between Sukuk holders 
and managers of Sukuk. However, in practice most Sukuk issues promise returns equal to the market interest 
rate in order to attract investors. 
A problem can arise when the actual returns on the project exceed the promised returns. Hassan Hussein (2008) 
mentions that in the case that actual returns exceed the expected returns, the manager can get a higher 
percentage of profits as a bonus for better performance. Usmani (2008) argues that such incentives should work 
only when the actual returns exceed the expected return on the project. However, in actual practice it is the 
difference between actual project returns and the market interest rate, which in no way reflects the performance 
of the manager. Thus, if the current market interest rate is low, the managers may receive premiums even if 
they underperform. Again, in order to prevent such kinds of “false incentives”, Sukuk should promise returns 
based on actual expected performance of the underlying asset and not on the market interest rate. The other 
solution to this problem, as proposed by Usmani (2008), is to distribute any surplus among Sukuk holders. 
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It is understandable that estimating the returns from the underlying asset, as required by Shariah, may be 
complicated and inaccurate at the stage of Sukuk issuance. This reinforces the importance of having the 
feasibility study of Sukuk issuance properly addressed in the Sukuk securitisation process. It should be done 
professionally and comprehensively, taking into account market conditions and expected risks. Again, some 
Shariah scholars argue that the manager is fully responsible for any failure of the proposed project, while others 
highlight the responsibility of the manager only for initial capital invested by the Sukuk holders. 
 
Extensive usage of conventional benchmarks, such as LIBOR increases Sukuk exposure to the benchmark risk. 
Market interest rates or a market index, such as LIBOR can be used as a benchmark while preparing the 
feasibility study or calculating rental fees. On the other hand, according to Hassan Hussein (2008) and many 
other scholars, a proper Islamic index should be developed in future as a benchmark for Islamic financial 
institutions. Others, such Wilson (2009) propose to use GDP growth rate for the sovereign issues, since most 
sovereign receipts and expenditures are linked to GDP. Inflation-adjusted indexes would help to maintain the 
real value of investments and their returns. In this debate, AAOIFI has addressed this point in Shariah standard 
22, by stating that using a non-Islamic index only for measuring performance is not in conflict with Shariah 
rules.  
 
 
The rate of return risk is dependent on the Sukuk structure.  Fixed rates of return are applicable to debt based 
structures, such Murabaha, Salam and Istisnas Sukuk. Floating rates are applicable to floating rate Ijarah 
Sukuk and to equity based structures such Musharakah and Mudarabah.  
 
4.6.2 Credit risk (risk of default) 
 
Credit risk is the risk that is associated with the chance that an asset or loan may become valueless due to a 
default or delay in payment. Chopra and Khan (2000), Khan and Ahmed (2001), El-Hawary et al. (2004) and 
Said (2011) recognise a variety of credit risks that are specific to Sukuk. Dar and Tariq (2007) explained default 
risk in the case of non-payment of the rental on Ijarah contracts. In the event of coupon non-payment the 
certificate holder can exercise the right to cancel the agreement and force the issuer to buy back the assets that 
underlie the issued Sukuk. If the originator fails to pay the principal amount at the maturity of the lease term 
the Sukuk holder has the right to take legal action against the originator. The Sukuk holders may also have the 
right to sell or foreclose on the underlying assets (IFSB, 2005).   
 
Due to fact that Shariah prohibits debt trading, any rescheduling of debt for a higher mark-up is forbidden in 
Sukuk. This prohibition makes the risk of default higher for Sukuk compared to conventional bonds, since 
Sukuk issuers would be more inclined to default (Dar and Tariq 2007). 
 
While a conventional bond represents a debt obligation, Sukuk is a certificate of ownership, so in the case of 
default Sukuk holders have a limited ability to retrieve their initial investment. The managers of Sukuk bear 
responsibility for any Sukuk default only within the limits of their control and capabilities. Therefore, in a case 
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of default due to external factors, such as force majeur or a global financial crisis, all losses under Sukuk, 
excluding such returns as are secured under the Sukuk holders’ ownership rights in the underlying assets, will 
be borne by the Sukuk holders. However, these losses are not borne in issues of Sukuk which do not provide 
for legal ownership of the underlying assets but rather a right of return (which are not Shariah-compliant 
according to Usmani (2008)). In the same way, some types of hybrid Sukuk can be non-compliant with Shariah 
due to the presence of debt-based instruments within their structure. 
 
Thus, with regard to the risk of default, it is important to discuss the question of guarantees of return of the 
principal amount. Prior to the AAOIFI statement (2008), Sukuk managers were promising to buy back 
underlying assets at a price equal to the face value of the Sukuk. Such guarantees are often given by 
governments, as third parties. Some scholars think that such purchase undertakings can be permissible, and 
until recently Sukuk Mudarabah and Musharakah were issued using this kind of guarantee. According to 
Usmani (2008) any guarantee of the principal amount is unlawful in Shariah, whether the originator of Sukuk 
acts as Mudarib (manager of the capital), Wakalah (agent) or partner. The AAOIFI statement has classified 
such guarantees as non-compliant with Shariah. Under the new statement, underlying Sukuk assets should be 
bought at the end of the Sukuk’s life, either by the third party, or by the manager of the Sukuk at the market 
value of the underlying asset. Thus, Sukuk holders bear market risk when the underlying assets can be sold 
only at prices lower than their initial investment values. This means that, in the absence of guarantees, asset 
backed Sukuk should bear lower risk than asset based Sukuk.  
 
Since there is no possibility of reliably defining the terminal market value of the underlying assets at the time 
of Sukuk issuance, a set of procedures to define its fair market value should be agreed upon. The parties should 
also clarify the ways of defining the market value as well as procedures and valuation techniques. According 
to Hassan Hussein (2008) Sukuk managers can pay the difference between the face value and market value of 
the underlying asset if the loss occurred due to the manager’s poor performance. 
 
Credit risk increases default risk, and fixed rate Sukuk structures, such as the debt based Sukuk Murabarah 
and Salam, face greater credit risk than floating rate and equity based structures, such as floating rate Ijarah 
Sukuk, and greater liquidity risk since due the prohibition on the tradability of debt (Slim and Nader, 2012).  
 
Credit risk assessment is complicated by the absence of proper international ratings for most Sukuk issues. 
Conventional bonds need to be rated by one of the major international rating agencies in order to obtain access 
to the financial markets. According to the Ernst &Young report (2009) only half of all Sukuk issues have been 
rated. Malaysian regulations require rating of new issues by local agencies, while most GCC issues remain 
unrated. Because of this, most of the recent issues were sovereign. The government guarantee was used to 
substitute for the lack of rating. These sovereign guarantees explain the large size of recent issues in spite of 
the absence of the issues’ ratings. 
 
A major problem with the rating of Sukuk is the absence of Islamic rating agencies. Today Sukuk issues are 
rated by conventional rating agencies using conventional rating methodologies. This is done in spite of the fact 
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that the rating agencies are aware of the differences in structures between conventional and Islamic bonds (Al-
Amine 2008). This can result in incorrect rating results. For example, when rating Sukuk, the rating agency 
evaluates the guarantor’s credibility, rather than the risk of underlying asset (Al-Amine 2008). In the light of 
recent AAOIFI statements relating to guarantees of Sukuk, such ratings can be highly inappropriate. An 
organisation that deals with Islamic ratings - Islamic International Rating Agency, is established in Bahrain. It 
rates both credit risks and Shariah compliance of Sukuk. At this stage, both investors and regulators should 
coordinate their efforts to enforce the use of Islamic ratings as a necessary pre-requisite for Sukuk issuance. 
 
4.6.3 Foreign exchange (FX) risk 
 
Foreign exchange rate risk is applicable to Sukuk with an underlying asset denominated in one currency and 
Sukuk certificates issued in another currency. As suggested by Dar and Tariq (2007) in this case exchange-rate 
fluctuations can lead to a loss by the investor or issuer. Since Sukuk have become an international financial 
instrument it is difficult to avoid this type of risk. In some issues, like the Islamic Development Bank (Saudi 
Arabia) Sukuk issue, the originator can guarantee investors protection from foreign exchange risk (Dar and 
Tariq, 2007). The originator of Sukuk can avoid this risk by using several currencies in their issues. Dar and 
Tariq (2007) discuss an example of a Chinese Sukuk issue, where one part of the Sukuk was issued in US 
dollars and the remainder in Euro. They concluded that the challenge for Sukuk issuing corporates and 
sovereigns is to devise an effective exchange risk management strategy compliant with Shariah principles. 
 
One should also be mentioned that Sukuk can be used as an instrument to manage foreign exchange risk. Sukuk 
help to diversify investment portfolios of Islamic financial institutions and can be used by foreign investors as 
a hedging instrument to manage exchange rate risk when issued in a domestic currency. 
 
4.6.4 Shariah compliance risk 
Shariah compliance risk is a risk applicable only to Islamic instruments. Dar and Tariq (2007) define Shariah 
compliance risk as the risk of loss of asset value due to Sukuk non-compliance with Shariah principles. It is 
the responsibility of Shariah supervisory boards to ensure compliance with Islamic rulings when approving 
each issue of Sukuk. This type of risk became very important in the light of recent criticism by some Shariah 
scholars about the non-Islamic nature of most of issued Sukuk. The consequences of issuing financial 
instruments non-compliant with Shariah can be very damaging to the reputation of the issuer and may require 
extensive efforts to re-gain investors’ confidence. 
 
It is also worth mentioning that some Shariah scholars impede the development of the Sukuk market. One of 
the problems with Shariah boards, as mentioned by Usmani (2008), is the fact that some scholars are active 
only at the first stage of the Sukuk structuring process. They issue fatwa on the permissibility of the issue in 
respect of the proposed structure of the Sukuk, but ignore the remaining stages of the Sukuk issuance and 
management. According to new AAOIFI standards (2008), Shariah boards should be active during all stages 
of the Sukuk operation, ensuring Shariah compliance throughout the entire life span of the Sukuk. 
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Taking into account the fast growing Sukuk market, Shariah scholars are often not prompt enough with their 
comments on new Islamic products. Some Sukuk issues do not get appropriate attention from the OIC Fiqh 
Academy and AAOIFI. Here appears the situation when products are circulated in the market without proper 
Shariah approval. However, later some scholars start to criticize the issue, provoking uncertainty and confusion 
among investors and damaging the general image of Islamic finance. This was the situation with Sheikh Taqi 
Usmani’s comments on the Shariah compliance of modern Sukuk issues (2008). His comments, as well as the 
AAOIFI standard (2008) destabilized the Sukuk market, including investors and issuers. They were one of the 
reasons behind the subsequent slowdown of Sukuk issuance. 
 
As explained earlier in Chapter 2 the Shariah law is based on the Quran and Sunnah. However, not all situations 
are covered in these sources, and hence some fatwas are built on ijtihad  (personal reasoning). Thus, many 
scholars’ comments are based on their personal abilities to generalise a situation and draw a conclusion. As a 
result, conclusions differ significantly from one Shariah board to another. Here we can also add the 
discrepancies between different schools of Islamic thought, resulting in approval of some Islamic products in 
one part of the world and rejecting them elsewhere. This problem is particularly important in case of global 
issues of Sukuk, when the capital market products should have access to the international markets. According 
to many finance experts, including Al-Amine (2008), the only way to resolve this problem is to promote further 
cooperation between such international organizations as AAOIFI and OIC Fiqh Academy. The rapidly growing 
Islamic financial market requires convergence of opinion and rulings among Shariah scholars. 
 
Moreover, there are no established standards in appointing members of Shariah boards, though AAOIFI 
standard (2006) no. 29 states the stipulations and ethics of fatwa in the institutional framework. There is a 
limited number of experts familiar both with Shariah ruling and financial principles, leading to an awkward 
situation where a scholar may sit in on the Shariah boards of several Islamic financial institutions. In April 
2010, the General Council for Islamic Banks and Financial Institution (CIBAFI) in affiliation with the BDO 
consultancy published research based on analysis of more than 621 Shariah scholars in 478 Islamic financial 
companies from 40 countries. According to this document, the top 10 Shariah scholars occupy 67% of all 
chairmanship positions, while the top 2 scholars hold 21 chairmanship positions each; Sheikh Nedham Yacoubi 
holds 78 positions in various Shariah boards. The reputation of some Shariah boards has been damaged by the 
ease with which they can change their fatwas. As one of the bankers mentioned to the press, they develop a 
conventional product and keep applying for the approval to different Shariah boards. Sooner or later they can 
find a board that issues the necessary fatwa and the product can then be distributed as Islamic (Foster, 2009). 
The most creative scholars are the ones in the most demand. In this context, Dr Mohd Daud Bakar wrote his 
book “Shariah Minds” (2016) summarising his experience in Islamic finance in his role of Shariah scholar 
over more than 40 years. He proposes applying screening and ratings to Shariah scholars in order to achieve 
accountability and convergence of standards in the work of Shariah scholars in Islamic financial institutions.  
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4.6.5 Liquidity risk 
 
Liquidity risk is vital for Islamic finance in general and Sukuk in particular. Islamic finance institutions have 
limited instruments to manage their liquidity, due to Shariah restrictions on the trading of debt and other 
securities. Short-term interbank lending as well as last resort lending from the central bank are not available 
for Islamic banks due to the prohibition of Riba. While Malaysia has developed inter-bank lending based on 
profit-and-loss sharing, all other countries have no such instrument. 
 
Conventional bond markets, while more liquid than Sukuk market, are still considered to be far less liquid than 
equity markets. Most of the trading in the bond market is done “over-the-counter” rather than on organised 
exchanges. While traditional financial institutions have various instruments to manage their liquidity, Sukuk 
remain one of the very few options available to Islamic financial institutions. Thus, the development of an 
appropriate secondary market is crucial for Sukuk more than for conventional bonds. First of all, achieving 
progress in developing the secondary market is highly dependent on the development of the primary market. 
High demand for Sukuk should meet appropriate supply. According to Saidi, Scacciavillani, and Prasad (2009), 
in order to develop a liquid secondary market, governments should be more active in issuing Sukuk with issues 
representing a variety of maturity, types and risk profiles. The government of Bahrain, which has issued one, 
three and six-month maturity Sukuk, presented a good initiative in this field. Similar initiatives from other 
governments may stimulate development of the secondary market. Governments should also provide 
appropriate regulatory standards for transparent and sound secondary market with easy access for any potential 
investor. 
 
On September 2009 only 14% of the total issuance of Sukuk was listed on exchanges (Ernst &Young analysis 
2009). The amount of Sukuk actually traded is even lower, due to the preference of Sukuk holders to keep 
papers until maturity. Some Shariah scholars do not approve trading of debt on the secondary market at a price 
different from its face value. Moreover, some modes of Sukuk issuance, such as debt based Sukuk like Sukuk 
Istisna’a, are forbidden from trading on the secondary market due to their debt-based nature. These are the 
main factors behind the slow development of a Sukuk secondary market. Currently the Indonesian stock 
exchange holds the largest number of listed Sukuk issues; Nasdaq Dubai holds the biggest value of Sukuk 
listings; Dubai and London are competing to become centers of Islamic finance. Development of local and 
international financial markets in the Middle East and South-East Asia can promote further growth of Sukuk 
secondary markets. The introduction of the Islamic Dow Jones Index can also be considered as a positive sign. 
 
Most Sukuk issues have a short-term maturity, while Islamic financial institutions are in great need of long-
term investment instruments. There is a serious mismatch between long-term loans, provided by Islamic banks, 
and their short-term assets, mainly through deposits.  
 
The same can be said of the growing market of Islamic insurance, Takaful, which also requires long-term 
investments. Sukuk with longer maturity can help resolve this problem. One of the reasons behind prevalence 
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of short-term Sukuk issues is the relatively new nature of Islamic banks. Most Islamic financial institutions 
have been established during the last few years. They are relatively small and cannot support large, long-term 
Sukuk. The process can change, as the banks grow stronger and more experienced. 
 
One proposed solution is standardisation of Sukuk. The competition between conventional and Islamic banks 
has segmented the market and delayed the development of robust liquidity. Islamic banks need to practise 
greater cooperation with one another and with their conventional banking counterparts.  
 
In August 2013, the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation, an international institution 
established by central banks, monetary authorities and multilateral organisations, launched the US$490 million 
inaugural Sukuk. This was done to raise liquidity in Shariah compliant markets for Islamic finance institutions, 
which in turn would drive international investment flows, trade and financial stability. Such efforts have helped 
Islamic finance to capture a share in the global financial system through offering Shariah compliant products 
and services, helping the industry to evolve as a more sustainable and equitable alternative to conventional 
finance.  
 
4.6.6 Asset related risks 
 
Ideally Sukuk should be backed by tangible assets, but there are some difficulties in identifying the appropriate 
underlying assets. The assets should meet Shariah requirements and be able to provide attractive returns. These 
principles can be difficult to apply in non-Muslim societies, where differentiation between Haram (forbidden 
by Shariah rules) and Halal (permissible by Shariah rules) activities is often misunderstood and more complex 
than in countries with established Shariah principles. Until recently, the main underlying asset used for Sukuk 
issuance was a real estate, but recent developments in the real estate market made such assets very unstable for 
the underlying. Other types of underlying can be commodities or movable assets, e.g. aircraft and ships. As 
mentioned by Al-Amine (2008), the number of assets that can be used as underlying is limited, and the issuer 
of Sukuk must wait until maturity in order to use the same underlying asset for a new issue. In order to manage 
this problem, some innovative structures were implemented for the recent issues of Ijarah Sukuk. Under the 
new structure the originator of Sukuk, while being a lessee of an asset, has an option to substitute part or the 
entire pool of assets with other assets of similar value. This will allow the originator to reduce asset related risk 
and obtain additional resources by selling substitute assets, and use resources for the next phase of the project. 
 
There is the risk of loss of an asset, which is minimal in the case of Sukuk Ijarah, but can be significant in the 
case of construction, as appeared during the last real estate market crisis. Dar and Traiq (2007) commented that 
the Sukuk issuer has to buy back the underlying assets from the certificate holder. The principal amount paid 
may not be equivalent to the Sukuk issuance amount; consequently, there is the risk that the assets may not be 
fully compensated for. This means that the risk factor here is dependent on the Sukuk structure, whereby the 
holders of the Sukuk bear any losses in case of the impairment of the underlying assets, in the absence of 
negligence of the lessee (IFSB, 2005). 
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4.6.7 Legislative risk 
 
According to the Zawya report (2009) one of the problems facing the Sukuk market is the absence of a proper 
legislative base, especially for cases of possible default. Therefore, Sukuk, as a Shariah compliant instrument, 
have to exist under non-Shariah compliant legislation. Hence, legal procedures following possible cases of 
default can be very confusing. The problem is how to document Sukuk-related contracts so that they do not 
contradict both Shariah rulings as well as governing laws. Currently, most of the issues prefer to use 
Commonwealth law as a basis of Sukuk contracts. There are two main reasons behind this choice: 
Commonwealth law is more established than the local legislation in many countries and rating agencies prefer 
using it as a governing law (Al-Amine 2008). Thus, in order to obtain a higher rating, Sukuk issuers choose 
Commonwealth law as a basis for their documentation. Usually the contract states that the agreement is 
governed under the Commonwealth law as long as it does not contradict Shariah rulings. However, in case of 
disputes, parties should apply to the conventional court, which is not familiar with Shariah principles and 
cannot judge adequately. The bankruptcy of East Cameron Gaz Company, which issued Sukuk in 2006, had 
failed in the Louisiana court. The court struggled to define the rights of the Sukuk holders and the question of 
assets’ sale (O’Neill 2009). 
 
There are two important cases concerning this particular risk in the Murabahah financing contract, these being 
Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd v Symphony Gems NV and others (2002) and Shamil 
Bank of Bahrain v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd and others (2004). The main problem addressed in these cases 
is in determining the governing Shariah principles in the absence of standard interpretations of those principles, 
which opens doors for dispute. 
 
According to Al-Amine (2008), solutions for the problem can be achieved through standardisation of Islamic 
financial contracts. In the long run, proper internationally recognized Islamic commercial law should be created 
and implemented both at the local as well international levels. Along with the development of the Sukuk market 
there will be further cases of default and/or disputes. Hence, more precedents would be created and the more 
advanced legislative rulings and procedures would become. 
 
Sukuk, being a Shariah-compliant instrument, have to operate not only in the conventional legislative system, 
but also within conventional regulatory and financial systems. According to a survey conducted by a Task 
Group in 2006, most market professionals believe that Islamic financial institutions can exist in conventional 
markets. In reality, there are great differences between Islamic and conventional systems, as covered in Chapter 
two. Such differences can only add to the instability of the Sukuk market and increase its riskiness. Therefore, 
governments should introduce additional regulations in order to provide an adequate base for Islamic financial 
institutions. Malaysia, which has developed regulations for Islamic financial institutions, can be used as a 
benchmark. 
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4.6.8 Regulatory risk 
 
Lack of standardised regulations governing Islamic finance is a major impediment to further development of 
the whole market, including Sukuk. Several international institutions have been established to produce 
standards and regulations, including AAOIFI and IFSB. AAOIFI was registered in Bahrain in March 1991. Its 
objective is to prepare accounting, auditing and governmental standards for successful functioning of Islamic 
financial institutions. The IFSB was established in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in November 2002 with the 
purpose of developing international prudential and supervisory standards for Islamic financial institutions. 
 
Some market commentators mentioned that standardisation may also have its negative consequences. 
According to the authors of the recent DIFC Sukuk guide, AAOIFI statement on modern Sukuk issuance (2008) 
had a dramatic effect on the development of Islamic bonds. AAOIFI’s statement was issued in February 2008 
following the criticism of Sukuk issuance by Sheikh Usmani (2008). 
 
The statement is based on 6 principles. It discusses Sukuk tradability, responsibilities of Sukuk managers, 
reserve accounts and their permissibility, purchase of assets under Musharakah, Mudarabah and Wakalah 
structures, duties of Shariah scholars. Investors should be the legal holders of an underlying asset and not 
holders of a nominal security. Investors cannot be guaranteed the principal amount of Sukuk by promises to 
buy back the underlying asset at its face value. The asset can be bought back but only at its current market 
price; thus the face value of Sukuk should not be secured. Investors cannot be offered a loan when earnings 
from an underlying asset fall below expected value. Issuers can create special reserve accounts to cover such 
unexpected falls. The responsibility of Shariah scholars should not be limited to issuing fatwa at the initial 
stage of structuring the Sukuk but should also include proper supervision of all stages of Sukuk issuance. All 
these requirements increase the initial expenses for Sukuk issuance and make the process more complicated. 
According to the DIFC Sukuk guide, during 2008, the share of Musharakah and Mudarabah structured Sukuk 
in the total issue reduced by 83% and 68%, respectively. It claims that the AAOIFI statement was the main 
reason behind these changes. 
 
Another crucial aspect of regulation and standardisation is the importance of cooperation among different 
regulatory bodies. Although the creation of proper Islamic financial regulatory bodies in every country with 
functioning Islamic finance institutions (like in the case of Malaysia) may be problematic, there is a need to 
establish a dedicated department within existing government structures. Moreover, once the international 
standards relating to Islamic finance are properly developed, regulation at the local level will be much easier. 
 
Furthermore, standardisation of the regulations governing Islamic finance is necessary to ensure the 
globalisation of Islamic finance. Although regional standardisation bodies exist, adherence to their standards 
varies from country to country and region to region. For example, in Iran and Sudan all the banks are following 
the Shariah board set by the central bank of the country. In fact, it is a matter of serious concern that there is 
no authoritative global body to regulate and promote Islamic finance. Disagreement and diverse interpretation 
over what is Shariah complaint and what is not continue to pose problems in establishing the necessary 
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regulations for the industry to develop globally accepted products. The existing bodies so far need global 
recognition for the adoption and enforcement of issued standards by Islamic financial institutions, regardless 
of which country they operate in.  
 
There is also some criticism of standardisation, which argues that it is an unrealistic goal given the fragmented 
nature of Islamic finance. However, there remains a need for balanced, globally accepted regulations that do 
not impede growth or permit misuse.  
 
4.6.9 Staff related risks 
 
There is a serious lack of specialists in the area of Islamic finance. Since Sukuk circulate in conventional 
markets, such specialists should have a dual expertise in conventional instruments as well as basic Shariah 
rulings. There a view that since Islamic principles are very transparent and easy to understand, experts with 
knowledge of traditional markets can be educated into Islamic finance experts. So far, according to the Ernst 
&Young report (2009), eight out of the top ten Sukuk arrangers were conventional banks or Islamic branches 
of conventional banks. This fact can be explained by the bigger size of conventional banks, their greater market 
experience and professional staff. All these factors help to build the reputation of a financial institution. Islamic 
banks need further development both in terms of their asset size as well as in terms of education of their 
employees. According to the Ernst &Young report only one Islamic bank can compete with the well-
established conventional banks. 
 
4.7 The Sukuk structure risk classification approach 
 
A main aim of this study is to investigate Sukuk risk through an examination of financial risk among Sukuk 
structures. 
4.7.1 Risk underlying Sukuk structures  
Referring to previous studies conducted on risks of Sukuk structures such as Fabozzi (2000), Usmani (2008), 
Tariq and Dar (2007), Abdul Rahman (2008), Abdul Jalil and Abdul Raham (2012), Alsaeed (2012), Noor and 
Shahimi (2013), and Alsyed (2013), there is necessary room for gathering those risks and listing them for every 
structure of Sukuk. Sukuk structures can be classified in different categories, such as debt based, equity based, 
asset based, and agency based as well as a hybrid group which combines two or more structures within a single 
Sukuk certificate. For examples, debt based Sukuk such as Murabahah and Istisna’a, equity based such as 
Musharakah and Mudarabah, asset based such as Ijarah and Manfah (usufructs), and agency based such as 
Wakala structure.  
This classification might provide a better reading of risks underlying Sukuk structures to track risks and 
estimate the reward measurement of each structure. In addition, this matrix, sourced from the past research in 
this field, helps Sukuk research analysts to figure out the comparison and differences as well as to help bridge 
the research gap in Sukuk risk analysis. The matrix below summarises the risks attached with each Sukuk 
structure. In addition, this below matrix help later in the research analysis stage to figure out the comparison 
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and differences. Also, the table should be regarded as summarising a set of hypotheses on the expected signs, 
sizes and statistical significance of the coefficients to be obtained from the proposed multiple regression 
analysis. 
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Table14: Sukuk Structures Risks Matrix  
Risk 
Factors  
Sukuk Structures types 
Asset Based Debt Based Equity Based Agency Based 
Applicable 
Scale 
of level 
Risk 
Recognition 
Applicable 
Scale of 
level 
Risk 
Recognition 
Applicable 
Scale 
of level 
Risk 
Recognition 
Applicable 
Scale 
of level 
Risk 
Recognition 
Credit Risk 
Yes. In 
particular, 
on rent 
payment, 
fixed rate 
More 
serious 
Medium Yes 
Most 
serious  
High Yes 
Less 
serious  
Low Yes 
Less 
serious 
Low 
Rate of 
return 
(Interest 
rate risk) 
Yes 
More 
serious 
Medium Yes 
Most 
serious 
High Yes 
Less 
serious 
Low Yes 
Less 
serious 
Low 
FX risk 
If all other conditions are similar. FX risk will be the same for all types of Sukuk structure. However, those Sukuk that are liquid or relatively short term in nature 
will be less exposed. The composition of assets in the pool will also contribute to the FX risk in different ways.  
Price risk 
Yes 
Most 
serious 
High Yes 
Most 
serious 
High Yes 
Less 
serious 
Low Yes  
More 
serious 
Medium 
Liquidity 
risk 
Yes 
More 
serious 
Medium Yes 
Most 
serious 
High Yes 
More 
serious 
Medium Yes 
More 
serious 
Medium 
Asset 
related risks 
 
Yes 
Most 
serious 
High 
No, there 
is no asset 
attached  
- - Yes 
Less 
serious 
Low Yes 
More 
serious 
Medium 
Overall  
Risk rating  
        
High = Red, Medium = Yellow, Low = Green (These rating hypotheses are obtained by analysing and extending the results of the previous research studies discussed in 
this thesis) 
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4.7.2 Evaluation of risk profiles underlying Sukuk structures  
Figure 50: Risk roots in Sukuk structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Created by Webb, P. (1996), Reilly & Brown (2012) and developed by Author (2015) 
 
Risk management of Sukuk structures is a relatively a new subject (Alsayed, 2013). Against the earlier 
discussion, it has been noticeable from Table 14 and Figure 46 that each Sukuk structure has a distinctive risk 
profile influenced by the Shariah conditions behind the concept of the financing structure as well as the type 
of certificate. Therefore, the risks that Sukuk encounter vary according to the structure of the Sukuk. For 
example, the risks of Sukuk Murabahah, which has a fixed return, differ from those of Sukuk Musharakah; 
the risks of Sukuk Istisna differ from those of Sukuk Ijarah; and so on. It is important to state that these risks 
also vary depending on the underlying assets of these Sukuk, be they fixed or movable assets, utilities or 
services.  
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4.7.3 Empirical studies on Sukuk structure risks  
A few studies have been conducted on Sukuk structure analysis. One of these studies conducted by Abdul Jalil 
and Abdul Raham (2012) was about a comparison analysis between two Sukuk structures in terms of long term 
tenure. They determine that the amount of profit gained from the Musharakah Mutanagisah structure using a 
coupon rate of 4.5 %, priced at par with a tenure of five years was greater than the Ijarah structure where the 
price is at a discount. In addition, they computed and compared the profits obtained from Sukuk investment in 
Ijarah and Musharakah Mutanagisah for a 3.5% coupon rate and price at par for a Sukuk with tenure of 12.5, 
15, 17.5 and 19 years. They applied these two models for computing the profit. These models are based on 
Ijarah and Musharahkah Mutanaqish principles. They found that Sukuk investment using the Ijarah principle 
is a better investment compared with the Musharahkah Mutanaqish principle, regardless of the number of years 
of the Sukuk, as long as it is a long term tenure. 
Tariq and Dar (2007) and Zaidi (2009) discussed the Sukuk structures and both investigated the risk associated. 
Zaidi (2009) concluded that the risk of Sukuk is broader than the risk of conventional bonds, due to Sukuk 
being burdened with additional risk factors, including Sukuk specific market risks, Shariah risk, regulatory 
risks, and risk factors associated with the assets underlying Sukuk. Tariq and Dar (2007) provided a Shariah 
compliant framework applying to Sukuk structures in order to contribute to risk mitigation.  
Wilson (2008) addresses the criticisms of Sukuk Ijarah related to linking distribution to LIBOR. He examines 
innovations in the structuring of Sukuk securities and the potential for novel structures based on Musharakah 
or a hybrid of different Sukuk structures. Wilson (2008) also proposes adopting alternative benchmarks to 
LIBOR based on macroeconomic indicators of real activity such as GDP growth for sovereign Sukuk, and of 
company financial performance in the case of corporate Sukuk. However, GDP indicators may help in the case 
of Sukuk based on debt or assets, though not for Sukuk based on equity, because the former Sukuk rely on the 
economic environment, the context of the Sukuk issuer, and the assets attached to the Sukuk, while Sukuk 
based on equity are more affected by the efforts of Sukuk parties such as the Mudarb (entrepreneur manager) 
who plays a crucial role in driving Sukuk Mudaraba among its risk exposures.  
Saad and Mohamad (2012) analysed Sukuk structure performance in the Malaysian market from 2005 till 2010. 
They used a multivariate regression model for the analysis to investigate the relationship between Sukuk yield 
and Sukuk structures. They concluded that there is a statistically significant relationship among variables. Most 
of the listed Sukuk are based on debt (68%), and the majority come from the infrastructure and utilities sectors 
(53%). 
Muhamed and Radzi (2011) identified the implications for Sukuk investors choosing an asset based or asset 
backed structure, focusing on the Sukuk Ijarah structure as a case study. A default on asset based Sukuk is the 
same to investors as a default on unsecured bonds. No recourse can be expected against any of the assets used 
in the Sukuk. On the other hand, asset backed Sukuk may become more widely used as investors would have 
the ability to take possession of the assets backing the Sukuk. They concluded that asset based Sukuk may be 
more suitable where legal title to assets cannot be transferred to investors. The asset based Sukuk is more 
appropriate when there are restrictions on foreign ownership of certain asset classes such as property assets. In 
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addition, asset backed Sukuk may not be adequate in circumstances where the enforceability of assets may 
provide a challenge, such as sovereign owned assets.  
4.7.4 Managing Sukuk structure risks  
Sukuk provide opportunities for financial innovation, not all of which are available for conventional bonds. 
While Sukuk are exposed to certain risks beyond those born by conventional bonds, Sukuk financing also 
provides for new ways of managing these risks, and for tailoring Sukuk instruments to the particular needs of 
issuers and investors. Some contributions to financial innovation in Sukuk markets are discussed below.    
Considering the nature of Sukuk structures from the Shariah perspective, it is seen that the evolution of 
structures such as Sukuk Ijarah has been instrumental in increasing Sukuk issue size for issuers. Structures 
such as agency Sukuk (Wakalah) have allowed issuers to maximize the use of limited tangibles in an issuance, 
and thus allowed them to issue a larger quantum than if they had used an Ijarah structure. In practise, issuers 
like Ooredoo have used other real tangible assets such as airtime minutes via a Manfah (usufructs) structure 
under the Ijarah concept (Zawya, 2014).  
Sukuk are based on the Shariah principles, which, when applied properly, allow avoiding many risks associated 
with traditional financial instruments. However, since Islamic financial institutions have to function in 
traditional financial markets, and due to the imperfection of modern Islamic instruments, avoidance of many 
risks is impossible. While conventional bond holders have a variety of instruments to manage their risks, not 
all of these instruments are permissible for Islamic finance institutions. For example, there is an on-going 
discussion in the academic literature about permissibility of using options in Islamic finance. While most 
derivatives are clearly prohibited by Shariah scholars, there are some options that can be attached to certain 
Islamic financial instruments. Smolarski and Tahir (2006) argue that call and put options can be used for 
hedging purposes. Obaidullah (2004) analyses options by stipulation and option of determination as possible 
risk management instruments in Islamic finance. Tariq and Dar (2007) suggest using embedded options as a 
tool for Sukuk risk reduction. They argue that Shariah, while prohibiting debt trade, allows its exchange for 
real goods, assets and services. Thus, a Sukuk holder can have an option to exchange his zero-coupon Istisna’a 
Sukuk, for example, to an apartment (after a certain period) instead of waiting for maturity. The same authors 
(Tariq and Dar, 2007) discuss the possibility of swapping floating-rate Sukuk with zero-coupon-fixed-rate-
embedded Sukuk as a Shariah compliant instrument. Most of the authors argue that options allow for 
decreasing excessive risk (Gharar), which should be avoided under Shariah ruling, but are present at the 
current highly volatile market. While many academics agree that such detachable and non-trading options 
should be permitted in Islamic finance, and urge Shariah scholars to come up with a collective fatwa on this 
point, the latter are very reluctant to give such permission. 
As far as Sukuk risks are concerned, IFIS provided a report on Sukuk structures shows that the practice of 
Sukuk issuer in 2014 presented that Sukuk issuers are careful of selection which type of Sukuk structure to 
conducted Sukuk certificate on it. It provided evidence that different of selection of Sukuk structures by Sukuk 
issuer raised awareness of how type of Sukuk structure contains different features and the issuers should choose 
the right structure that suit to them investment strategy and omitting that Sukuk concerned as one unit, 
 125 
 
emphasising that actual difference among financial performance under Sukuk structures. The report presented 
that the total Murabaha Sukuk issuance in the world has slipped to US$69.7 billion in 2014, compared to 
US$74.4 billion last year and down from the record USD$77.3 billion reached in 2012, according to IFIS data. 
However, as a percentage of total Sukuk issuance, Murabaha use has increased both this year and last. 
Nevertheless, Wakala Sukuk has grown both as a percentage and in real terms. The comparative analysis of 
Sukuk structures of Sukuk issuance in 2014 shows that the common structures issued, Murabah, Ijara, Wakala, 
Musharaka, Wakala-bel-Istihmar and Mudharba came top in 2014. Murabaha issuance stood at USD$69.7 
billion, far beyond the second Ijarah, with USD$21 billion. Sukuk Wakala came next USD$17.5 billion and 
Musharaka completed the top four with USD$6.3 billion. Other most common Sukuk structures in 2014 
include Sukuk Istisna with USD$1.2 billion and Salam Sukuk with USD$ 1 billion worth of issuance.  
 
Figure 51: Sukuk structures issuance watch in 2014 
 
Sources: IFIS database, 2014 
The IFIS report shows that, with the exception of Sukuk Wakala, all other structures have slipped in issuance 
in 2014 in real terms, compared to the last year or the year before. The biggest fall was Musharaka with almost 
a %65% drop compared to 2012, when it stood at USD$18.5 billion. At the same time Sukuk Wakala issuance 
more than doubled from USD$7.6 billion in 2012 to USD$ 17.5 billion in 2014. This implies that Sukuk 
structure are not equal and each of those structures enjoy with different risk profiles as it shown in the previous 
studies summarised in the table earlier in table 2. This research attempts to investigate that how these 
differences have impact and influence financial performance of Sukuk certificate trade and evaluation by better 
understanding the Sukuk structure risk profiles with empirical evidences.  
 
In the other hand, 2007 Dubai’s Ports Customs and Free Zone Corporation issued the world’s first convertible 
Sukuk allowing to convert initial Sukuk into common shares of the originator. In 2007 Khazanah National 
(Malaysia) issued exchangeable Sukuk with an option to exchange them to existing shares of one of the 
subsidiaries of the originator. These issues attracted high interest both from investors as well as potential issuers 
of Sukuk as examples of risk reduction alternatives. While financial experts discuss the possibility of further 
 126 
 
innovation in Sukuk, such as mandatory exchangeable/convertibles, contingent-convertible Sukuk, reserve 
convertible Sukuk, etc., most of the scholars have forbidden these kinds of innovations (Abdullah and Ismail, 
2008), due to their similarity with derivatives and their perceived excessive uncertainty. 
Another on-going discussion among scholars is about permissibility of third party guarantees in some Sukuk 
issues (Hassan and Soumaré, 2007). Proponents of such guarantees, usually issued by the governments, claim 
that there is no clear prohibition of such action in any Islamic source. Thus, according to this discussion, as 
long as the guarantor is financially and legally independent from both contracting parties involved in the Sukuk 
transaction, the third party can guarantee the entire investment or part of it without obtaining any fees for this 
operation. Opponents of such a guarantee argue that it can open the possibility for Riba and highlight the 
Shariah prohibition of any kind of guarantee of the capital (Al-Amine, 2008). 
While this chapter has focussed on Sukuk structure risks, the conventional risk classifications discussed in 
Section 6.5.3 are also of value in identifying, measuring and managing Sukuk risks. Thus, risk management 
for Sukuk can borrow from the general risk management theory in conventional finance, for example, as 
discussed by Reilly and Brown (2012). In this regard, Al Sayed (2013) concluded in her paper that conventional 
risk management, variance for total risk and the Beta coefficient for systematic risk, can be used to measure 
total risk and systematic risk of Sukuk. In addition, the conventional risk management strategies of 
diversification and hedging are applicable to the management of Sukuk risk. This is confirming that risk 
management tools are support the risk analysis reading of Sukuk because that Sukuk in common with other 
investment instrument in finance industry.  
Moreover, the multifactor expected returns models that will discuss later in the methodology chapter is 
combine the insights and techniques of conventional finance with those derived from the risk analysis of Sukuk 
structures. Indeed, it is hypothesised that structure risk factors will be highly significant in the proposed 
expected return regressions of this research analysis.  
4.8 Conclusion  
A number of schemes for the classification of Sukuk risks have been proposed in the literature. The discussion 
of Section 4.6 shows that Sukuk are strongly exposed to conventional bond risks, such as credit risk, liquidity 
risk and foreign exchange risk. Conventional bond risks should be incorporated into any reasonable rating or 
pricing model for Sukuk. 
 
However, Sukuk are exposed to further risks, in addition to those faced by conventional bonds.  A recent 
development has been the development of risk classifications based on consideration of risk caused by 
differences in Sukuk structures. It is argued that Sukuk structure risk analysis provide a way of linking Sukuk 
risks with the fundamental factors causing those risks. Indeed, the different Sukuk structures follow directly 
from the fundamental ethical principles underlying Islamic finance. Thus, Sukuk structure risk classifications 
when combined with conventional risk factors are theoretically superior to purely conventional classification 
schemes, since structure risks are created by the necessity for Sukuk to conform to the Shariah. Sukuk structure 
risks are essentially Shariah created risks. 
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The evaluation of the structure risks of the Sukuk structure risk classification scheme proposed in this thesis 
are summarised in Table 14. 
 
This chapter concludes by looking ahead briefly to the hypothesis development sections of Chapters 5, 7 and 
8. As noted in Chapter 1, given the current development of Sukuk markets and the evolving state of Sukuk 
research, hypotheses on Sukuk can be stated only more tentatively and generally with less precision than is the 
case in conventional finance. Some researchers in the social sciences prefer the terminology expectations or 
propositions to hypotheses. The following expectations on the regression model of Chapter 8 are briefly stated 
here. 
 
1) Firstly, it is expected that conventional bond risk factors will be significant in explaining Sukuk returns. 
This is because Sukuk are exposed to conventional bond risks, and, importantly, this is well-known to 
Sukuk market participants. Thus, it is expected that these conventional bond risks will be priced in the 
Sukuk market. 
 
2) Secondly, it has been argued in Chapter 4 that Sukuk structure risks ought to be priced in the market, in 
accordance with the risk weightings given in Chapter 4, Table 14. However, the impact of Sukuk structure 
on Sukuk risk is currently not well-understood. While some researchers have discussed the impact of Sukuk 
structure on risk, this research development is comparatively recent. Therefore, it is not expected that Sukuk 
markets are currently pricing Sukuk structure risks efficiently. The expectation is that the theoretically 
correct signs and magnitudes of the coefficients of the Sukuk structure factors are unlikely to be found in 
the regression results, i.e. that the regression results for these factors will be mixed. 
 
3) Should the empirical tests show, contrary to expectations, that Sukuk markets are efficient, or near-efficient, 
at pricing structure risks then this research will have fewer implications, since it would show that the 
markets are already working quite well. However, the expectation is that the empirical results will show 
that the markets are currently mispricing risks to a considerable extent. 
 
The next chapter discusses the research methodology in further depth. 
 
 
*** 
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CHAPTER 5  
METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Islamic finance is a relatively new subject, and research in Islamic finance brings with it its own special 
difficulties. These are of two main kinds: 
1) There is still disagreement among researchers, scholars, practitioners, governments and regulators on how 
the basic principles of Islamic finance should be interpreted, applied and implemented in the modern 
world. 
2) Data for empirical research in Islamic finance is extremely limited compared to the data sets available for 
conventional finance. This is especially the case for research in Sukuk. Consequently, there are few 
empirical contributions on Sukuk markets.  
 
This chapter discusses research methodology. The discussion starts from a general theoretical perspective, 
discussing theories in the philosophy of science. The discussion moves from the general to the particular. After 
looking at research methodology from the general perspective the discussion moves on to apply these ideas to 
the particular Sukuk research of this thesis. 
 
In this research the deductive method is applied. However, before moving on to the general discussion, problem 
1) above can be addressed immediately.  
The deductive method is essentially value-free. The first step in applying the deductive method is to start with 
an important problem, a question, or a puzzle (or a set of connected important problems, questions or puzzles). 
However, whether or not something counts as an important problem is a value judgement, and the deductive 
method says nothing about how these value judgements should be made. 
 
In order to address 1) this thesis starts from the value judgement that a financial system based on the ethical 
principles of Islamic finance is a thing that is good in itself. For example, in the Islamic theory of money it is 
stated that in order for money to earn a return it ought to be put to work in the real economy, and in the 
production of goods and services that are not harmful (Haram), but beneficial to individuals and to society as 
a whole; money should not make a return simply by lying idle and accumulating interest by the mere passing 
of time. Agreement, or disagreement with this claim of the Islamic theory of money comes down, in the end, 
to a value judgement. 
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In making the above value judgement that Islamic finance is a good thing, it is by no means necessary to believe 
any of the theological claims of Islam. Indeed, there are many researchers and practitioners of Islamic finance, 
and very many customers of Islamic financial institutions, who are not Muslims but who have made the value 
judgement that Islamic finance is a better way of doing finance than conventional finance. 
 
Having stated the underlying value system, the answer to 1) is now straightforward. Once it is accepted that 
the ethical principles of Islamic finance are good, the question of how these principles can best be implemented 
in the context of modern, global financial markets can be resolved, over time by informed debate, by 
researchers, educators, scholars, practitioners, governments, regulators, and other stakeholders. This debate is 
already taking place, the progress of which has been reported in the large and rapidly expanding literature on 
Islamic finance. 
 
In this ongoing debate considerable progress has been made. In areas of disagreement, progress has been made 
in understanding exactly what the issues at stake are. In many cases the disagreement has been narrowed down 
to very specific and precisely defined issues. For example, researchers agree that they disagree over whether 
or not Bay-al-Salam contracts are Shariah compliant.  Furthermore, progress has been made in that there is 
now broad agreement on many general and specific issues.  
 
The solution to 1) then, is that researchers should carry on debating, just as they have been. The comprehensive 
literature review of this thesis, and the conclusions on Sukuk structure risk arising from it, are a further 
contribution to the ongoing debate. 
 
How can this value judgement, that the principles of Islamic finance are a good thing, itself be justified? This 
is a question for moral philosophy and theology, and it is not attempted to answer it in this thesis. 
5.2 The philosophy of science 
The following sections discuss the logic and methodology of the deductive method, and how it is applied in 
the research into Sukuk of this study. 
 
5.2.1 The inductive method 
The traditional view of scientific method seeks to explain natural phenomena through observation and 
experimentation and is a central idea of logical positivism, which asserts that only scientific knowledge is true 
knowledge. Its roots can be traced back to Francis Bacon (1626) who described the way scientist method should 
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proceed to search for natural laws. The elements of the scientific method include collection of data through 
observation and inductive generalisation. 
 
The method of using accumulated observation of particular instances to derive general statement is known as 
induction. According to the traditional view of scientific method, induction is the criterion that distinguishes 
science from non-science. Scientific statements based on generalisation from observations provide certain (or 
highly probable knowledge) knowledge. The growth of science can then be thought as an endless process of 
adding such certainties to the existing ones. In other words, scientific progress is a process of adding true 
statements to the pile of true statements that have already been verified.  
 
The steps in the logical positivist approach can be presented as follows: 
 
Step 1: Collect observations, O1, O2, …, On. For example: The first swan observed is white, The second swan 
observed is white, …, The nth swan observed is white. 
 
Sept 2: From the n observations O1, O2, …, On, use the Principle of Induction to obtain a general statement. 
For example: All swans are white. 
 
The Principle of Induction does two things. Firstly, it tells us which general statement emerges from the data, 
e.g. All swans are white. Secondly, it tells us that the statement is probably true (the probability increases with 
the number of observations), e.g. 3 observations of white swans tells us that the general statement All swans 
are white has a fairly small probability of being true. 10,000 observations of white swans tells us that the 
general statement All swans are white has a high probability of being true. 
 
The inductive method of scientific knowledge was challenged by Hume (1777), who demonstrated that the 
Principle of Induction is not a valid principle of logical inference. For example, from a statement that 10,000 
white swans have been observed it does not follow logically that the statement All swans are white is true with 
a probability of 99%, unless some prior assumption about the probability distribution of the colours of swans 
is already given (Pagas, 2008). 
 
Hume’s problem, as sometimes the problem of induction is referred to, implies that pure empiricism is not a 
sufficient basis for science. 
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5.2.2 Popper’s deductive method 
The most sustained attack on the inductive method was given by Karl Popper (Popper, 1959). 
Popper noted that Step 1 of the inductive method cannot in fact be carried out. Step 1 of the inductive method 
is to collect observations. But, observations of what? It is not possible to simply take observations unless some 
purpose for making the observations is already given. 
 
With regards to Step 2, Popper argued that collecting large quantities of data and passively waiting for the truth 
to emerge from the data by the Principle of Induction does not work, and is not how scientists actually behave.  
 
In addition, Popper, and other historians of science noted that science does not progress by adding further 
verified truths to the body of existing verified truths. Instead, science progresses by a process of creative 
destruction. The physics of Einstein is not Newtonian science + Some new truths established by induction. 
Rather, Newtonian physics was swept away and replaced by Einstein’s theory of general relativity. 
 
Popper’s research methodology is based on the asymmetry between verification and falsification. While even 
a large number of positive experiments cannot confirm a scientific theory, a single experiment or observation 
can disprove it. General statements like All swans are white are not verifiable, but they are falsifiable. A single 
observation of a black swan is sufficient to falsify the general statement that all swans are white. 
 
Falsifiability does not mean that something is false; it means that something may be disproved by empirical 
observations. A theory, therefore, is falsifiable if there is at least one observation statement that contradicts the 
theory. 
 
When testing theories in order to refute them it is possible for scientists to impose ad-hoc hypotheses in order 
to protect the theory and therefore reject or ignore falsifying evidence. Popper (1959) proposes that we do not 
design a methodology in order to protect any theory or statement and that we unambiguously to refutation. 
Theories, therefore, should be rationally criticised (critical rationalism), and only theories that have survived 
attempts at refutation (have been corroborated) can be included in the body of provisionally accepted theories. 
Furthermore, we should not abandon theories or statements easily as this may imply that they have not been 
rigorously tested. 
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Based on this philosophy of science, falsifiability is the criterion that separates science from non-science. In 
other words, a hypothesis or theory is scientific only if it is falsifiable. According to Karl Popper (1959), the 
growth of scientific knowledge can be described by the following formula: 
 
P1 ›› TS1,…, TSk ›› CT ›› P2 ›› 
P1 is a given problem. TS1, …, TSk are competing trial solutions (theories) which are subject to a rigorous 
attempts at falsification, the process of critical testing, CT. The resulting situation is P2. The theories that 
survive the process of refutation are not necessarily true but are more applicable to the problem situation P1. 
According to Popper (1959), the growth of scientific knowledge towards greater problems P2 advances through 
the trial solutions (tentative theories or conjectures) and error elimination (refutation). 
 
Popper’s theory regards science, not as a body of verified truths as in the inductive approach, but as a process 
of rational criticism.  
 
The methodological approach of this thesis is to adopt Popper’s falsificationist approach, however as a set of 
principles rather than as a set of strict rules. Before discussing how the deductive approach is applied to research 
in Islamic finance, two other well-known theories of scientific method will be discussed, Kuhn’s theory of 
paradigm shifts, and Lakatos’s theory of scientific research programmes. 
 
5.2.3 Kuhn’s paradigm shifts 
Kuhn (1962) on the other hand argued that science does not develop through the accumulation of provisionally 
accepted theories but through periodic revolutions called paradigm shifts. Kuhn’s (1962) theory of science has 
three and can be described by the following formula: 
Pre-paradigm ›› Normal science ›› Puzzle solving ›› Anomaly ›› Crisis ›› Revolution ›› New paradigm ›› 
 
The first stage, the pre-paradigm phase, exists only once and lacks a paradigm. This phase is characterised by 
incomplete theories. However, at some point, the members of the scientific community will be drawn to a 
particular framework and they will decide on terminology and methods of experimentation to increase insight. 
This is followed by the second phase, normal science, where scientists explore the results and effects of the 
new central paradigm and attempt to enlarge it through puzzle-solving. Failure of results to act in accordance 
with a paradigm is not seen as refuting the paradigm but is attributed to mistakes of the researcher. As more 
anomalous results arise the science reaches the point of crisis at which a new paradigm emerges. This is the 
third phase, which is termed revolutionary science, where the new paradigm subsumes into a new framework 
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the old results along with anomalous results and a new period of normal science begins. Kuhn (1962) therefore 
portrays science as a process in which scientists continue to hold onto their theories despite the anomalies until 
there is a period of great conceptual change. 
 
Kuhn’s theory can be viewed as the sociology of science rather than as the logic of science. It is hard to give a 
rational justification for the paradigm shifts that occur in the revolutionary stage of the scientific process. 
  
5.2.4 Lakatos’s scientific method 
Lakatos (1978) tried to solve the problem of choice related to replacement paradigms by combining Kuhn’s 
and Popper’s ideas in one model. According to Lakatos’s (1978) what we think of as a theory may be a 
collection of slightly different theories and experimental techniques developed over time. The collection of 
such successive theories (research programmes) shares common ideas which he called the hard core. The hard 
core of the particular programme is assumed to be protected from falsification behind some auxiliary 
hypotheses. Each research programme contains specific methodology rules; the negative heuristic is in place 
to protect the hard core, whereas the positive heuristic is in place to articulate anomalies and further develop 
the research programme. The changes in auxiliary hypotheses (problem shifts) can be thought of as progressive, 
if they are able to both explain apparent refutations and produce new facts, or as degenerate if they are just ad-
hoc. If a programme is progressive therefore it is rational for scientists to change the auxiliary hypotheses to 
protect it. If on the other hand, a programme is degenerate it is in danger of being replaced by a more 
progressive competitor programme. 
 
Lakatos (1978) therefore claims that instead of rejecting a theory in the light of anomalies as in Popper’s theory 
it is sometimes more appropriate to retain the research programme as in Kuhn’s theory, retaining the hard core. 
However, sometimes it is appropriate to abandon the hard core, and move to a new research programme. A 
problem for Lakatos’s theory is that it is not clear how scientists can make a choice between alternative research 
programmes on the basis of which is progressive and which is degenerate. 
 
5.2.5 Deductivism in the social sciences 
It is noted that all of the above theories are focused on the practises of scientists in the pure sciences, especially 
in physics. However, a too strict application of these ideas to the social sciences is too inflexible. The 
methodological approach of this thesis is to adopt Popper’s falsificationist theory, not as a set of strict rules, 
but rather as a collection of rational guidelines. 
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5.3 Research methodology in Islamic finance 
An extension of the outline of the deductive method given in Chapter 1, Section 1.10 is given below, with 
illustrations of how it is applied in the Sukuk research of this thesis. 
 
Step 1: The first step in the deductive method is a set of problems that arise from within a particular value 
framework. In this research the value framework comprises the ethical principles of Islamic finance, and the 
problems encountered are:  
 What are the key risk factors in pricing Sukuk? 
 What is the impact of Sukuk structure risk in Sukuk pricing?  
 On the basis of the data set available for this study, what is the empirical evidence that the theoretically 
motivated risk factors identified in this study are actually priced in the market? 
 
Step 2: Hypotheses are proposed which give tentative answers to the problems. 
The hypotheses concerning Sukuk are developed from two sources: 
a) The extensive review of the existing academic literature on Sukuk. 
b) The general background knowledge of the history, development and current practices in the Sukuk 
markets. 
 
A hypothesis is essentially the same thing as a theory = a model = a conjecture = an explanation = a story. The 
hypotheses, therefore are essentially expectations of what we expect to find when we look at the data. 
The complete set of the hypotheses investigated in this thesis are presented in the hypothesis development 
sections in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. However, one of these hypotheses will be briefly discussed here. 
 
From the critical review of the literature in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 it is evident that Sukuk in certain respects are 
similar to conventional bonds. It is therefore reasonable to conjecture that the risk factors used in explaining 
conventional bond returns will also be significant in explaining Sukuk returns. For example, it is hypothesised 
that Sukuk with long maturities are more risky than Sukuk with short maturities. Since high expected returns 
should be associated with high risk, it is hypothesised that Sukuk with long maturities, after controlling for 
other factors, should have higher returns than Sukuk with short maturities. 
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Step 2: The second step in the deductive method is empirically testing the hypotheses. In Popper’s terminology 
the data will either support the hypothesis (the hypothesis is corroborated) or the data will undermine the 
hypothesis (the hypothesis is refuted). 
 
Hypothesis testing in the social sciences is less clear cut than in the exact sciences. In particular, in the study 
of Sukuk “corroborated” means only that the hypothesis has obtained some degree of empirical support, while 
“refuted” means only that our confidence in the hypothesis has been weakened to some extent. Popper’s claim 
that a theory can be refuted, or falsified, by a single observation is clearly inappropriate when applied to the 
social sciences. 
 
Step 3: The third step in the deductive approach is evaluating the hypotheses in the light of the results of the 
empirical tests. This leads to further hypothesis development, where new hypothesis are proposed or existing 
hypotheses revised. It may also lead to further research questions. 
 
In the research hypotheses of this thesis, the results reported in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 show that some of the 
hypotheses are corroborated, while others are refuted.  
 
Step 4: Well-corroborated hypotheses may be applied in practice, and will be of value to many stakeholders, 
including investors, bankers, corporate and sovereign issuers, regulators and governments.  
 
As noted, a strict application of Popper’s deductive method in the social sciences would not be fruitful. If a 
theory can be rejected by a single observation, as Popper demands, then almost all social science theories would 
be rejected. In that case scientific progress in the social sciences would be impossible. 
 
However, treating the deductive method as a set of principles, or guidelines, makes it a kind of well-organised 
common sense approach. This well-organised common sense approach in conventional finance has proved to 
be very fruitful. Its application within the value framework of Islamic finance can be equally productive. 
 5.4 Data 
In the deductive approach data plays a crucial role. Without data Step 2 cannot be carried out at all.  
Islamic finance faces a severe problem in that for most of its development adequate data has not been available. 
For this reason, much of the published research in Islamic finance has focused on theoretical discussions and 
on interpretations of the principles of Islamic finance. 
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Nevertheless, researchers have produced valuable case study and survey research, as well as empirical studies 
making use of such data sets that have been available. 
 
The situation concerning data has gradually improved over time. The construction of Shariah compliant equity 
and Sukuk indices has resulted in research comparing the risk/expected return performance of conventional 
and Islamic indices. In Chapter 7, index data is also used for testing certain of the hypotheses on Sukuk risk 
investigated in this study. 
 
In addition to the index data, this study also uses a proprietary data set provided by Idealratings, Inc. The 
Idealratings data makes it possible, for the first time, to conduct regression tests on the power of the 
hypothesised Sukuk risk factors to explain Sukuk returns, similar to the regression tests conducted in 
conventional finance. 
 
In the deductive method, it is important that the hypotheses are stated in advance of conducting the empirical 
tests. Sometimes in the social sciences an approach is taken where the ‘hypotheses’ are discussed only after 
looking at the data. In other words, some data is collected and then, after looking at the data a story is told that 
fits the facts. Sometimes the impression is given that, since this story fits the facts it must be true. This is not 
logical. There will be many other stories that also fit the facts. 
 
In reality this approach is a version of the inductive method; data is collected and the truth is supposed somehow 
to emerge from the data by something resembling the Principle of Induction. However, as noted, the Principle 
of Induction is not a valid principle of logic. 
 
The above approach can, however be justified within the deductive method. According to the deductive method 
what is going on here can be explained as follows; some data is collected, and then some hypotheses are 
obtained by looking at the data. This makes sense from the standpoint of the deductive method. However, the 
problem is that all the data has been used up in obtaining the hypotheses. A new data set is then required in 
order to critically test the hypotheses. 
 
The problem here is that in Islamic finance, data is in extremely short supply. This is why it is so important 
that the hypotheses be formulated before looking at the data. Valuable data should be used in critically testing 
hypotheses, and not wasted by being used up in formulating the hypotheses.   
The data used in this study is discussed further in Chapter 6, and in the data sections of Chapters 7 and 8. 
The figure below shows an overview of the research methodology stages: 
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Figure 52: Research Methodology diagram  
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
Because of the limited amount of data in Islamic finance, the research method should be chosen that makes the 
most use of this very scarce resource. This is why the deductive approach has been chose in this research study. 
 
Popper’s falsificationist approach cannot be applied too strictly in the social sciences. However, it is a valuable 
tool for social science research when considered as a set of principles or guidelines, rather than as a strict set 
of rules. 
 
After discussing the data in Chapter 6, the deductive method will be applied in the empirical research conducted 
in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
 
*** 
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CHAPTER 6: 
DATA DESCRIPTION  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the data resources used in the empirical research in this thesis. The chapter explains 
what data are available in the Sukuk research field and explains why there is a limitation of Sukuk data. The 
main Sukuk data suppliers are presented with examples of academic papers that have been conducted using 
these data. The data used in the thesis is presented and discussed. 
6.2 Sukuk data at a glance   
Sukuk are recent entrants into the financial world. Their first appearance was back in the 1990s, with initially 
slow growth, followed by increasingly rapid expansion till 2009, when Sukuk issuance fell in line with the 
collapse in conventional financial markets in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Since then Sukuk 
markets have recovered, with the current Sukuk growth rate estimated to be around 15-20% annually (Nafith, 
2014). Despite its rapid growth, the Sukuk market is still tiny and illiquid when compared to the conventional 
bond market. Furthermore, data on the bond market is available going back even so far as the fixed income 
markets in Genoa and Naples in Italy in the 16th century. Hence, due to its short existence, small size and 
illiquidity the historical data available on Sukuk trades is negligible when compared to the empirical data 
available for conventional bonds. 
This presents a considerable obstacle to undertaking empirical research on Sukuk. 
6.3 The limitations of empirical research on Sukuk 
Much of the published research on Sukuk comprises descriptive and qualitative research, and the empirical 
research on Sukuk is limited. This observation has been found by many researchers, such as Naifara, 
Hammoudeh and Al-dohaiman (2016), Zulkhibri (2015), Vishwanath and Azmi (2009), Abdel-Khaleq and 
Richardson (2007) and Tariq and Dar (2007).  
Compared to the research on conventional bonds, little research on Sukuk has been published or indexed by 
major academic publishers (see Table 15 below). Most academic research on Sukuk has been reported in 
conference and seminar papers. This is in part due to the fact that Sukuk markets are quite new, and conferences 
and seminars are the appropriate forums for exchanging ideas on new phenomena in academic research. 
According to Zulkhibri (2015) research in Islamic finance, specifically on Sukuk, is underdeveloped for several 
reasons, summarised as follows: 
- Limited number of academic institutions where teaching, scholarship and research in Islamic finance is 
conducted. 
- Shortage of quality refereed journals devoted to Islamic finance. 
- Lack of global standards and accreditation for Islamic finance courses. 
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- Absence of available and consistent data 
- Ongoing debates on the concept of Sukuk among Shariah scholars. 
In addition to these reasons, there is an absence of research drivers for Sukuk research compared with 
conventional bonds, such as the limited global adoption of Sukuk as an investment instrument by governments, 
and the shortage of knowledge about Sukuk among investors.  
Zulkhibri (2015) categorised the existing literature on Sukuk into three groups: 
1. Research on the theoretical principles and nature of Sukuk 
2. Discussion on the operational matters related to Sukuk issuance and structure in practice 
3. The role of Sukuk in economic development. 
The table below presents publications of Sukuk research from 1990 to 2016 
Table 15: Publication of Sukuk research from 1990 to 2016  
Database or publisher Total no. of Journals No. of Sukuk articles 
Science Direct 5177 74 
Scopus Elsevier 5300 74 
Saudi Digital Library 300 316 
Taylor & Francis 168 1 
Wiley-Blackwell 53 4 
Springer 92 0 
Interscience 70 6 
Emerald Insight 84 42 
Google Schlaor (Arabic only) More than 160 million articles 309 
Source: Zulkhibri (2015) and updated by the Author (2016) 
  
The table above counts all journals in subjects of economics, finance, accounting, business, and management; 
it also uses the keywords “Sukuk”, “Islamic Bonds” and “Islamic Securities”. These articles in the main body 
of the table are only those shown in the English language, and available articles in other languages such as 
Arabic are not included. However, the last line of the table contains Arabic articles selected from the Google 
Scholar database to enhance the table above with another aspect of the research position in Sukuk. Of course, 
searching in different languages will present more details of the conducted research position on Sukuk.   
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Data on Sukuk have developed in line with the development of the Sukuk market. Currently, only 27 countries 
in the world are utilising Sukuk in their financial markets according to the IIFM Sukuk report (2015). Hence, 
data on Sukuk are still underdeveloped compared to its counterpart conventional bonds, which currently 
penetrate most financial markets around the world. Thus, it is expected that data on Sukuk will improve 
alongside the continuing expansion of Sukuk markets.  
There are a few data providers in Sukuk, as well as in Islamic finance generally. The next section presents the 
common data suppliers for the global Sukuk markets. 
6.4 Data suppliers in Sukuk markets 
Researchers in empirical finance usually collect data from reliable data engines, with most researchers using 
more than one data source when possible. The reason for using more than one data source is to close any gaps 
in missing data and to cross-check the reliability of the data. Here is a brief description of the commonly used 
data engines in empirical research papers on Sukuk: 
•   Thomson Datastream: Datastream is a global financial and macroeconomic data platform covering 
equities, stock market indices, currencies, company fundamentals, fixed income securities and key economic 
indicators for 175 countries and 60 markets. Some examples of papers that used Thomson Datastream as the 
data collecting platform for their research are: Haron and Ibrahim (2012), Ahmad and Abd Rahim (2014), and 
Rahim, Nursilah and Ahmad (2015). 
  
•   IFIS software: Islamic Finance Information Service (IFIS) is a very comprehensive and user-friendly online 
Islamic finance information portal with global coverage that tracks world-wide developments in the Islamic 
financial industry. It is updated frequently to report the latest events in the Islamic finance industry.  Recently 
the IFIS portal incorporated with Global Capital data (Global Capital, 2016). A number of academic papers 
have selected the IFIS database for their research, such as Ali (2008), Faye, Trika and Kangoye 
(2013) and Saad, Michael and Brown (2014). 
•   IdealRatings: IdealRatings Inc. is an American company founded in 2006 and headquartered in San 
Francisco. It is a leading provider of faith-based and responsible investment databases and information, serving 
top-tier financial institutions in over 25 countries across the globe. IdealRatings screens global equities, REITs, 
and Sukuk to provide customised solutions for capital markets investment managers. 
The IdealRatings Islamic financial data includes a Shariah compliant screening and income purification 
service covering over 40,000 listed equities and virtually the entire Sukuk universe (IdealRatings, 2016). This 
data is available on the University of Portsmouth campus, and, to the best of the author’s knowledge provides 
the best currently available data on Islamic equity and Sukuk markets. 
•   Bloomberg Terminal: Bloomberg describes itself as “connecting decision-makers to a dynamic network 
of information, people and ideas”. Bloomberg quickly and accurately delivers business and financial 
information, news and insight around the world (Bloomberg, 2016).  Bloomberg L.P. is a privately-held 
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financial software, data, and media company headquartered in Midtown Manhattan, New York 
City. Bloomberg L.P. provides financial software tools such as an analytics and equity trading platform, data 
services, and news to financial companies and organisations through the Bloomberg Terminal. Examples of 
academic papers using Bloomberg Terminal as the main data platform for their research include 
Samanta and Zadeh (2012), Najeeb, Bacha and Masih (2014) and Klein and Weill (2016). 
•   Zawya: Thomson Reuters Zawya.com, part of Thomson Reuters Middle East, is a leading source of regional 
news and intelligence, serving more than one million professionals with up-to-date country and industry news 
as well as essential global coverage from Reuters. 
In addition to news, Zawya.com supports business development through research reports, company databases 
and information on the latest projects from across the MENA region (Zawya, 2016). Sukuk monitoring reports 
and Sukuk forecast reports are valuable resources for Sukuk researchers. Zawya has been cited in academic 
and professional reports by Fitriya (2013) and Zulkhibri (2015).  
•   Tadawul )لوادت(: On the 19th of March 2007, the Council of Ministers approved the formation of The Saudi 
Stock Exchange (Tadawul). This was in accordance with Article-20 of the Capital Market Law establishing 
Tadawul as a joint stock company. Tadawul is the sole entity authorized in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to 
act as both the Securities Exchange (the Exchange) and the Securities Depository Centre (the Centre). It mainly 
carries out listing and trading in securities, as well as deposit, transfer, clearing, settlement, and registry of 
ownership of securities traded on the Exchange. The legal status, duties, and responsibilities of the Exchange 
and Depository Centre are explicitly defined in the Capital Market Law (CML) issued by Royal Decree Number 
(M/30), dated June 16, 2003. The Exchange is also the official source of all market information (Tadawul, 
2016). This data engine is widely used in the literature when research is conducted on the Saudi capital market, 
such as Polat and Al-khalaf (2014), Hokroh (2013) and Bruce (2012). This research uses Tadawul for 
enhancing the research data sample with Saudi Arabian Sukuk trades in the capital market. 
 
6.5 Data structure 
Based on previous studies it can be seen that most of the research in Sukuk has used secondary data. The 
present study will also focus on secondary data in order to conduct the research analysis. Thus, the first step 
will be that of data collection with the use of secondary data that relates to the research aims and objectives. 
According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, (2007) there are some important sources of secondary data, as 
follows: 
 
-   Government studies, reports and archives. 
-   Any written materials such as textbooks, journals and government publications. 
Furthermore, Sukuk issue prospectuses and financial reports; these are collected and analysed as well in order 
to evaluate the risk profile for these Sukuk types. 
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In addition, financial research engines will be used to collect updated figures of the market and the indices such 
as IFIS software, IdealRatings, Bloomberg, Zawya and Tadawul. 
 
However, when using data from secondary sources it is important to show consideration towards certain 
problems in the secondary sources such as the availability, format, and quality of data. The extent of these 
problems varies from source to source (Kumar, 2011). In addition, Kumar (2011) discusses certain issues that 
may arise in the use of secondary data, and which should be addressed when using the data. He summarised 
these as follows: 
-   Validity and reliability: The validity of information may vary markedly from source to source. The validity 
of the data may be evaluated by an examination of previous studies in the research field. 
-   Personal bias: The use of information from personal diaries, newspapers and magazines may have the 
problem of personal bias, as these writers are likely to exhibit less rigour and objectivity than one would expect 
in research reports. 
-   Availability of data: As always, data availability is the main challenge in the research. It should be available 
for researchers and readers to extend access to the data, presenting validity and quality. 
-   Format: Because the secondary data have been built in different formats, it is required to manipulate the data 
to format required for the research context. 
Kumar (2011) explained the two steps in data processing, editing and coding. Editing helps to ensure that the 
data is clean, i.e. free from inconsistencies and incompleteness. Editing consists of scrutinising the completed 
research instruments to identify and minimise, as far as possible, errors, incompleteness, misclassification and 
gaps in the information that was obtained. This is followed by the second step, coding of data, which entails 
developing a code book, pre-testing it, coding per se and verifying the coded data. Moreover, statistics are 
desirable. It helps to make sense of data, ‘read’ the data, explore relationships and the interdependence between 
variables, ascertain the magnitude of an existing relationship or interdependence and place confidence in the 
findings. 
It is important to state that Sukuk data is quite limited and that this limitation has an impact on the empirical 
research that can currently be undertaken. The University of Portsmouth has recently entered into an agreement 
with one of the leading data providers in Islamic finance, IdealRatings, for the purposes of undertaking joint 
research and contributing to the development of the Islamic capital markets. 
Most previous empirical studies on Sukuk are either case studies, or comparative analyses of the performance 
of conventional bond indices and Sukuk indices. The reason for this is the limited data available. Some 
researchers have been able to obtain data for a small number of Sukuk, sufficient to undertake valuable case 
study research. Data on conventional bond indices and Sukuk indices is obtainable from databases such as 
Datastream and Bloomberg. Part of the empirical contribution of this thesis is an up-dating and extension of 
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the ongoing research on comparing the performance of conventional bond and Sukuk indices. This research is 
presented in Chapter 7. 
The empirical research using a sample of the Idealratings data is presented in Chapter 8. The Idealratings 
services include a Shariah compliant screening and income purification service covering over 40,000 listed 
equities, and extensive data covering virtually the entire Sukuk universe.  
The description of the Sukuk sample data is presented in the table below. The total number of Sukuk is 1806, 
covering the period from 31st October 2012 to 2nd September 2016. 
  
 Table 16: Sukuk data description sample from Sukuk engine of IdealRatings 
 Source: IdealRatings, 2016 
The majority, over 90% of Sukuk are non-tradable, and in nearly all cases are held by investors to the 
redemption date. In that case holding period returns can be calculated only for a single time period, from the 
date of issuance to maturity. 
Sukuk can be either fixed or floating, where the coupons on floating rate Sukuk are referenced to a benchmark 
index such as LIBOR. While the exact interest formulas and historical coupon rates are available for, for 
example, USD denominated issues, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge this information is not available 
for, for example, the majority of Malaysian Ringgit denominated issues, from any source, official or un-official. 
After cleaning the data there is a total of 113 tradable Sukuk, which actually did trade in the secondary market, 
Total Sukuk 1806   
Asset class 
Asset Back Asset Based 
46 1620 
Market type 
International Domestic 
206 1600 
Issuance size 
<$200m >$200m 
304 1502 
Shariah structure 
types 
Asset Based 
(Ijarah) 
Debit Based 
(Murabaha, Istasna’a and Twaraq) 
Equity based 
(Mushararkah 
and Mudaraba) 
258 658 598 
Agency Based 
(Wakalah) 
Hybrid based 
(Mix structures)  
57 215 
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and for which market prices and other information necessary for computing total Sukuk market returns exists. 
This appears to be the most complete data set currently available on Sukuk market returns. 
The table and figure below show the data sample description. 
 
Further detailed information on the Idealratings data set is given in Chapter 8, where the results of the 
regression analysis are presented.  
 
Table 17: Data sample description 
Sukuk status 
Sukuk outstanding 118 Matured Sukuk 37 
Sukuk Coupon rate type 
Fixed coupon rate 119 Floating coupon rate 51 
  
 
Figure 53: Data sample description  
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6.6 Conclusion  
In the current state of development of Sukuk markets, only very limited empirical data is available. Previous 
empirical research on Sukuk is mainly of two kinds; case study research based on detailed information, but for 
only a small number of Sukuk, and quantitative research comparing the performance of broad-based 
conventional bond and Sukuk indices. The data for the case study research has generally been compiled by 
individual researchers, while the data on conventional bond and Sukuk indices is usually obtained from widely 
available data sources such as Datastream and Bloomberg. This index data is also used in the present study. 
This research also contributes to the empirical literature by using a new source of data, the IdealRatings Sukuk 
data, to use in a regression analysis of the risk factors hypothesized to be significant in explaining Sukuk market 
returns. To the best of the author’s knowledge, the data set used in this research is currently the most complete 
and accurate available. 
The comparative research on conventional bond and stock indices is reported in Chapter 7. The risk factor 
analysis using the Idealratings data is reported in Chapter 8 
 
*** 
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CHAPTER 7 
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE RISK AND RETURN PERFORMANCE OF 
SUKUK AGAINST CONVENTIONAL BONDS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters presented the research flow and story. This and the following chapter present some of 
the empirical work of the thesis. 
 
In Chapters 1 and 2 it has been noted that there are both similarities and differences between Sukuk and 
conventional bonds. The risk-return performance of Sukuk and conventional bonds should be the similar, to 
the extent that Sukuk and conventional bonds are similar. For example, both Sukuk and conventional bonds 
are affected by credit risk and liquidity risk. However, the risk profiles of Sukuk and conventional bonds differ 
in important ways as well. In some ways Sukuk are more risky than conventional bonds. The most important 
of these Sukuk specific risks is Shariah compliance risk. In other respects, Sukuk are safer than conventional 
bonds. For example, it is argued that asset backed Sukuk are less risky than conventional bonds. 
 
In this chapter a carefully selected sample of Sukuk and conventional bond indices is chosen and the risk-return 
performance of the indices is compared, in order to test the hypotheses developed in the following section. This 
research refines and extends the research on the relative performance of Sukuk and conventional bonds reported 
in the previous literature. 
 
7.2 Hypothesis development 
 
Many studies have been conducted on the similarities and differences between Sukuk and conventional bonds, 
including El Mosaid and Boutti (2014), Saad and Mohamad (2012), Arif and Safri (2012), Godlewski et. 
al. (2011), Haral (2010); Cheema and Hashmi (2010), El Mosaid and Boutti (2011), Wilson (2008) and Cakir 
and Raei (2007). 
 
7.2.1 Similarities between Sukuk and conventional bonds 
As noted by Tariq and Dar (2007), Wilson (2008), Alsaeed (2012) and Afshar (2013), while there are 
significant differences between Sukuk and conventional bonds, there are important similarities as well. The 
similarities arise for a number of reasons: 
 
 Islamic financial instruments in the modern era have generally been developed by taking existing 
conventional instruments and adapting them in order to make them compliant with Shariah.  Sukuk 
therefore have many features in common with conventional bonds. 
 
 148 
 
There are a number of reasons why the approach of adapting conventional instruments has been taken. 
 
 In the context of global financial markets Islamic finance has had to develop alongside or within existing 
conventional legislative and regulatory frameworks. Islamic financial instruments have therefore been 
designed to conform to these frameworks. 
 
 Conventional finance is well-understood by virtually all participants in the financial markets. Knowledge 
of Islamic finance is still relatively limited. Even though expertise in Islamic finance has grown rapidly, 
the knowledge base of Islamic finance has struggled to keep up with the annual double-digit growth in the 
Islamic financial markets. It is still easier for many issuers, investors, regulators and other market 
participants to think within the framework of conventional, and this is reflected in the securitisation 
mechanisms in the Sukuk markets. 
 
 Some Islamic financial products are disguised as conventional finance products. For example, interest is 
tax deductible in most tax jurisdictions. This can place Islamic financial products at a tax disadvantage 
compared to conventional products. Sometimes, what is in reality a Shariah compliant Islamic rate of 
return is disguised as an interest rate in order to obtain tax deductibility.  
 
In view of the strong similarities between Sukuk and conventional bonds identified and discussed in the 
literature, the following hypothesised: 
 
H1: The risk-return performance of comparable Sukuk and conventional bond indices is similar. 
 
In theory, the most important difference between Sukuk and conventional bonds is that the rate of return on 
Sukuk should not be an interest rate. However, many commentators have observed that Sukuk indices respond 
to changes in interest rates similarly to conventional bond indices (Abdul Rauf and Ibrahim, 2014). For 
example, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which dictates US monetary policy, voted 
unanimously in December 2015 to raise rates for first time since the 2008 financial crisis. Rates credit crunch. 
The Federal Funds Rate (FFR) was raised by 0.25 percentage points, from its previous 0pc to 0.25pc 
range. Prior to the rate rise both Sukuk and conventional bonds were volatile as the market speculated on the 
possibility of a rate rise, which is understandable from the aspect of conventional bonds but questionable from 
the aspect of Sukuk. However, such behaviour is in line with H1; coupon rates on Sukuk are typically given in 
terms of a conventional interest reference rate, exposing Sukuk to interest rate risk in the same way as 
conventional bonds (Godlewski et. al., 2011, Miller, et al, 2007). 
 
7.2.2 Differences between Sukuk and conventional bonds 
 
The research literature has also noted ways in which Sukuk differ from conventional bonds. 
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The major difference is that Sukuk are exposed to Shariah compliance risk, the risk that an issued Sukuk may 
subsequently be deemed non-Shariah compliant. This risk is greatly increased because of the under-developed 
state of Islamic finance legislative and regulatory frameworks, and differences in legal and regulatory regimes 
in different countries. Thus, Shariah compliance risk exposure makes Sukuk riskier than bonds. 
 
However, there are ways in which Sukuk can be safer than conventional bonds. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
Sukuk structure should be regarded as a risk factor, since Sukuk with different structures have different risk 
profiles. For example, asset-backed Sukuk are safe, and indeed safer than most conventional bonds. It has been 
argued that, in theory, Sukuk should in general be safer than conventional bonds. 
 
Given that the choice of Sukuk structure may off-set Shariah compliance risk, it might seem that the 
relationship between Sukuk risk and conventional bond risk is difficult to discern. In this respect the following 
point is important; Sukuk structure is currently not very well understood. Therefore, it is very unlikely that 
Sukuk structure risk is being correctly priced in the market. 
 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, research into the impact of Sukuk structure on risk is a more recent 
development, and is not currently widely known. On the other hand, failures of Shariah compliance are highly 
visible, and market participants are well aware of the risks posed by Shariah non-compliance. It is therefore 
conjectured that the market perceives Sukuk to be riskier than conventional bonds, and that this perception is 
reflected in the relative performance of Sukuk and conventional bond indices.  
 
H2: The returns on Sukuk indices are higher than returns on comparable conventional bond indices. 
 
This is because Sukuk, being perceived to be risky investments, are priced by investors to yield a high return 
as compensation for bearing this risk. 
 
H3: The volatility of returns on Sukuk indices is higher than the volatility of returns on comparable 
conventional bond indices. 
 
Shariah compliance risk is non-diversifiable. A ruling by Shariah scholars can influence the entire Sukuk 
market; diversified Sukuk indices are also exposed to this risk. 
 
7.2.2.1 Financial crisis risk 
There is an exception to hypothesis H3, namely: 
H4:  Sukuk indices fall less than comparable conventional bond indices during a banking crisis. 
 
A fundamental principle of Islamic finance is that financing is tied to the needs of the real economy. Islamic 
financial institutions and instruments should be less exposed to speculation and over-leverage. Hence it is 
expected that Sukuk indices should be exposed to less downside risk in a banking crisis. 
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7.3 Data and methodology  
  
The calculation of conventional bond returns is given as follows: 
  
The month-to-date (MTD) total return (TR) of a conventional bond on day t is the sum of the MTD interest 
return and the MTD price return: 
 
TRt= IRt + PRt 
 
Where: 
IRt = MTD interest return on day t. 
PRt = MTD market price return on day t. 
Price return measures the return due to the change in the market price of the bond. Interest return (or coupon 
return) includes the return due to the interest earned on that bond. 
  
Sukuk returns are computed using the same formula except that the conventional bond interest rate is replaced 
by the Sukuk coupon profit rate. 
 
In order to test the hypotheses, the study uses globally based total return indices. The reason for this is that a 
total return index takes into account the price changes and interest accrual and payments of each index 
constituent. 
 
In order to compare the performance of Sukuk and conventional bonds, comparable indices must be used. 
There are no exactly comparable indices, so some considerable judgement is required in making the selection. 
For example, according to Cakir and Raei (2007), Sukuk are in many aspects similar to conventional 
Eurobonds. Therefore, it is justified to match FTSE Euro Corporate sub-indices against Sukuk sub-indices, as 
indicated in Table 18. 
 
New Sukuk indices that can provide better comparisons have recently been introduced to the market. On the 
10th October 2016 Nasdaq Dubai and IdealRatings launched a new Sukuk index, the Nasdaq Dubai Ideal 
Ratings Global Sukuk Index, covering the global Sukuk market with a minimum issue size lower than that of 
the Dow Jones Sukuk Index; the latter limits coverage to Sukuk issues of US$200 million or greater, compared 
to the former with a limit of US$100 million or greater. Thus, the Nasdaq Dubai Ideal Ratings Global Sukuk 
Index has wider coverage than Dow Jones Sukuk Index. However, the base date of the new index is 1st 
November 2012 compared to Dow Jones Sukuk Index base date of 30 September 2005. Hence the Dow Jones 
Sukuk Index is used in this study.  
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Figure 54: Sukuk ownership in the global market 
 
Secure: IdealRatings, 2016 
The indices used here are also suggested by those already used in the literature, for example, by Gencay, Selcuk 
and Whitcher (2002), Abdul Rauf and Ibrahim (2014), and by Zawya, IFIS and Ernst and Young reports (2010-
2014). 
 
The indices used in this study are presented in Table 18 and Tale 19. The data was downloaded from 
Bloomberg. 
  
74%
22%
4%
Corporate Quasi. Sovereign Sovereign
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Table 18: Description of conventional bond and Sukuk indices used in this study 
Market 
Index 
Name 
Type Description 
Base 
Value 
Base date Currency 
Bloomberg 
Ticker 
1 
Global 
convention
al bond 
market  
J.P. 
Morgan 
Global 
Aggregat
e Bond 
Index 
Bond 
The J.P. Morgan Global 
Aggregate Bond Index 
(JPM GABI) is a 
comprehensive global 
investment grade 
benchmark. The JPM 
GABI series represents a 
new flagship foundation 
which ties together 
established J.P. Morgan 
indexes and serves as a 
platform for future index 
products and tradable 
offerings. Additionally, the 
new series provides 
investors with more 
benchmark options via a 
flexible aggregate index. 
100 Nov 1988 USD JGAGGUSD 
2 
Global 
Sukuk 
Market 
Dow 
Jones 
Sukuk 
Total 
Return 
Suku
k 
The Dow Jones Sukuk 
Total Return (ex-
Reinvestment) is designed 
to track the performance of 
global Islamic fixed 
income securities, also 
known as Sukuk.  The 
index measures an 
investment (excluding 
reinvestment) in U.S. 
dollar-denominated, 
investment-grade Sukuk 
that have been screened 
for Shariah compliance 
100 30 Sep 2005 USD DJSUKTXR 
 
Conventional bonds market indexes are commonly used for analysing bonds and managing bond portfolios. 
They have several significant uses, including acting as performance benchmarks, as a benchmark for investors 
who want to invest through index funds, and as a means to determine fixed income asset risk/return 
characteristics and correlations as inputs into the asset allocation decision (Frank and David, 2005). 
The use of maturity based indices is widespread. Sub-indices based on maturity are used in this study in order 
to control for maturity. Maturity is a measure of interest rate risk. Given that both Sukuk and conventional 
bonds are strongly exposed to interest rate risk, maturity mis-matching could lead to incorrect results. This 
accounts for the use of sub-indices matched for maturity in this study. 
One of the challenges is the limited research conducted on maturity based indices. Among the existing 
empirical research on the comparison between conventional bond and Sukuk, Abdul Rauf and Ibrahim (2014) 
investigated the relationship between total return and risk of Sukuk and conventional bonds including maturity 
risk as a critical factor. They used Dow Jones sub-indices based on maturity. They emphasised the importance 
of tracking total return performance according to different factors to introduce an appropriate tracking to 
evaluate the return performance. Table 2 below presents a description of the study’s sample of sub-indices 
according to maturities of Sukuk and conventional bonds. 
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Table 19: Description of conventional bonds and Sukuk sub-indices used in the study 
Market 
Index 
Name 
Type Description 
Base 
Value 
Sub-indices Base date  Currency 
Bloomberg 
Ticker 
1 
Global bonds 
market 
FTSE Bond 
FTSE Euro Corporate Bonds 
indices include Euro issues 
from corporate entities. This 
excludes Government 
authorities or other public 
issuers and banks. The index 
also includes issues from 
external finance firms of 
corporate entities, with a 
minimum rating of BBB-, 
denominated in Euro.                                                                                                                    
The average life or time to 
maturity index is derived by the 
time to maturity and weighted 
by the nominal amount 
outstanding. 
100 
The index has five 
maturity sub-
indices, and four 
of them are 
selected to match 
with Sukuk 
indexes weight 
level. Those 
indices are: 
All sub-
indices are 
July 1999 
All 
indices 
include 
four 
credit 
rating 
series: 
AAA,
AA, A 
and BBB 
USD 
 
1-3 years FECM3 
3-5 years FECM5 
5-7 years FECM7 
and 7-10 years FECM10 
2 
Global Sukuk 
Market 
Dow 
Jones 
Sukuk 
Total 
Return 
Sukuk 
The Dow Jones Sukuk Total 
Return Measures the 
performance of global Islamic 
bonds—also known as Sukuk. 
Its screens for Shariah 
compliance consistent with 
those of the Dow Jones Islamic 
Market (DJIM) Indices. It is 
composed of 39 
Global U.S. dollar-denominated 
investment-grade bonds that are 
Shariah-compliant. 
100 
The index has 
four maturity sub-
indices: 
 
All 
Securities 
are rated at 
least BBB-
/Baa3 by 
S&P, 
Moody’s, 
or Fitch 
USD 
 
1-3 years 30 Sep 2005 DJSUK3T 
3-5 years 30 Sep 2005 DJSUK5T 
5-7 years 
30 April 
2010 
DJSUK7T 
and 7-10 years 31 July 2007 
 
DJSUK10T 
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7.4 Results  
 
The results of the study are summarised in these tables and graphs. The study obtained the data from the 
Bloomberg and Dow Jones databases (2016) for the period of 30th September 2005 to 31st May 2016. The 
recent financial crisis in 2007-2009 is used to test the hypothesis H4 on the performance of Sukuk and 
conventional bond indices during a banking crisis. Moreover, measuring sub-indices according to maturities 
calculated also helps to identify the position of the performance of each index. The study used data description 
tools to measure the central tendency using mean then measured the variability using standard deviation. 
Data modelling techniques are used for continuous data measurements: return on price index (ROPI), Pearson 
correlation and regression analysis model. Regression analysis is used to measure the sensitivity of Sukuk 
performance in risk and return compared its counterpart conventional bonds.  
 
Table 30: Statistical description for the Sukuk and conventional bonds indices for the pre-crisis period  
Bloomberg 
ticker 
Type 
Total return performance Risk performance 
Avg. 
monthly 
return 
Max. Min. skew kurt Std.Dev. Variance 
Per-crisis period 30th Sep 2005 – 31st Dec 2006 
JGAGGUS
D 
Bonds 
All 
Maturities 
0.0475 0.0253 -0.0165 -0.0924 -1.2317 0.0438 0.0002 
DJSUKTXR Sukuk 
All 
Maturities 
0.0545 0.0064 0.0023 -0.0692 -0.6481 0.0043 0.0000015 
FECM3 Bonds 1-3 Yrs -0.0457 0.0533 -0.0406 0.7794 0.7571 0.0895 0.0007 
DJSUK3T Sukuk 1-3 Yrs 0.0496 0.0069 0.0011 0.0268 -0.5328 0.0056 0.000003 
FECM5 Bonds 3-5 Yrs -0.00018 0.05244 -0.01744 2.0999 5.77291 0.06004 0.00030 
DJSUK5T Sukuk 3-5 Yrs 0.058902 0.00649 0.001953 -1.0773 0.680720 0.004370 0.000002 
FECM7 Bonds 5-7 Yrs 0.0210 0.0180 -0.0120 0.5830 0.3417 0.0273 0.0001 
DJSUK7T* Sukuk 5-7 Yrs        
FECM10 Bonds 7-10 Yrs 0.02337 0.0159 -0.01325 0.0101 -0.58122 0.02826 0.00007 
DJSUK10T* Sukuk 7-10 Yrs        
* The index wasn’t launched in this period 
Note: Avg.Mon.: Average Monthly Return Annualised, Std.Dev.: Monthly Standard Deviation Annualised, 
Min: Minimum, Max: Maximum, skew: skewness and kurt; kurtosis  
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Figure 55: Total return of ROPI of Sukuk and conventional bonds indices for the pre-crisis period  
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Table 31: Statistical description for the Sukuk and conventional bonds indices during the crisis period  
Bloomberg 
ticker 
Type 
Total return performance Risk performance 
Avg. 
monthly 
return 
Max. Min. skew kurt Std.Dev. Variance 
During-crisis period 31st Jan 2007 – 31st Dec 2009 
JGAGGUSD Bonds 
All 
Maturities 
0.07927 0.06561 -0.03833 0.00203 0.21422 0.07775 0.00050 
DJSUKTXR Sukuk 
All 
Maturities 
0.0324 0.0956 -0.1393 -1.0953 5.4757 0.1345 0.0015 
FECM3 Bonds 1-3 Yrs -0.0131 0.08116 -0.04041 0.82802 1.75479 0.08715 0.00064 
DJSUK3T Sukuk 1-3 Yrs 0.0634 0.11199 -0.11670 -0.59758 11.1279 0.10486 0.00092 
FECM5 Bonds 3-5 Yrs -0.0083 0.02021 -0.02209 -0.20560 -0.94414 0.03883 0.00013 
DJSUK5T Sukuk 3-5 Yrs -0.0111 0.09441 -0.14983 -1.52484 8.78850 0.12488 0.00130 
FECM7 Bonds 5-7 Yrs -0.0014 0.02359 -0.01746 0.53358 0.12629 0.03517 0.00011 
DJSUK7T* Sukuk 5-7 Yrs        
FECM10 Bonds 7-10 Yrs -0.0244 0.01389 -0.01143 0.53956 -0.88517 0.02418 0.000049 
DJSUK10T Sukuk 7-10 Yrs 0.0642 0.1953 -0.3087 -1.2988 6.6396 0.2958 0.0073 
* The index wasn’t launched in this period 
Note: Avg.Mon.: Average Monthly Return Annualised, Std.Dev.: Monthly Standard Deviation Annualised, 
Min: Minimum, Max: Maximum, skew: skewness and kurt; kurtosis 
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Figure 56: Total returns of ROPI of Sukuk and conventional bonds indices for during -crisis period  
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Table 32: Statistical description for the Sukuk and conventional bond indices for the post-crisis period  
Bloomberg 
ticker 
Type 
Total return performance Risk performance 
Avg. 
monthly 
return 
Max. Min. skew kurt Std.Dev. Variance 
Post-crisis period 31st Jan 2010 – 29th April 2016 
JGAGGUSD Bonds 
All 
Maturities 
0.02437 0.02833 -0.03874 -0.68928 1.00567 0.04397 0.00016 
DJSUKTXR Sukuk 
All 
Maturities 
0.05229 0.018917 -0.021968 -0.707731 0.773569 0.026720 0.000059 
FECM3 Bonds 1-3 Yrs -0.00153 0.08624 -0.04964 0.52949 0.57173 0.09206 0.00071 
DJSUK3T Sukuk 1-3 Yrs 0.03540 0.02188 -0.01707 0.08379 3.25516 0.01989 0.00003 
FECM5 Bonds 3-5 Yrs 0.01230 0.05565 -0.02329 1.12893 1.29897 0.05960 0.00030 
DJSUK5T Sukuk 3-5 Yrs 0.05518 0.01828 -0.01716 -0.57892 0.87322 0.02272 0.00004 
FECM7 Bonds 5-7 Yrs 0.00192 0.03979 -0.01693 1.04630 0.49179 0.04496 0.00017 
DJSUK7T Sukuk 5-7 Yrs 0.01495 0.04724 -0.19061 -4.85912 32.5302 0.09650 0.00078 
FECM10 Bonds 7-10 Yrs 0.01491 0.04288 -0.01783 1.03089 1.09922 0.04064 0.00014 
DJSUK10T Sukuk 7-10 Yrs 0.04278 0.03755 -0.04563 -0.33442 1.62933 0.05098 0.00022 
 
Note: Avg.Mon.: Average Monthly Return Annualised, Std.Dev.: Monthly Standard Deviation Annualised, 
Min: Minimum, Max: Maximum, skew: skewness and kurt; kurtosis 
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Figure 57: Total returns of ROPI of Sukuk and conventional bonds indices for post -crisis period  
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Table 33: Statistical description for the Sukuk and conventional bond indices for the overall period  
 
Bloomberg 
ticker 
Type 
Total return performance Risk performance 
Avg. 
monthly 
return 
Max. Min. skew kurt Std.Dev. Variance 
Overall period 30th Sep 2005 – 29th April 2016 
JGAGGUSD Bonds 
All 
Maturities 
0.04412 0.06561 -0.03874 0.02060 1.36767 0.05558 0.00026 
DJSUKTXR Sukuk 
All 
Maturities 
0.04691 0.09565 0.09565 -1.93452 20.97464 0.07387 0.00045 
FECM3 Bonds 1-3 Yrs -0.00996 0.08624 -0.04964 0.61821 0.72042 0.08980 0.00067 
DJSUK3T Sukuk 1-3 Yrs 0.04494 0.11199 -0.11670 -0.71505 35.97423 0.05730 0.00027 
FECM5 Bonds 3-5 Yrs 0.00504 0.05565 -0.02329 1.18414 2.00444 0.05428 0.00025 
DJSUK5T Sukuk 3-5 Yrs 0.03698 0.09441 -0.14983 -3.01454 31.77666 0.06844 0.00039 
*FECM7 Bonds 5-7 Yrs -0.00051 0.03979 -0.01693 1.07835 0.58774 0.04509 0.00017 
*DJSUK7T Sukuk 5-7 Yrs 0.01495 0.04724 -0.19061 -4.64227 29.26729 0.10214 0.00087 
FECM10 Bonds 7-10 Yrs 0.00058 0.04288 -0.01783 1.21441 1.86872 0.03693 0.00011 
DJSUK10T Sukuk 7-10 Yrs 0.04863 0.19530 -0.30873 -2.05420 24.09532 0.15882 0.00210 
 
*The comparison weight designed from 30th April 2010 to 30th May 2016 because DJSUK7T launched later 
than FECM7.  
**The comparison weight designed from 30th July 2007 to 30th May 2016 because DJSUK10T launched later 
than FECM10.  
Note: Avg.Mon.: Average Monthly Return Annualised, Std.Dev.: Monthly Standard deviation Annualised, Min: 
Minimum, Max: Maximum, skew: skewness and kurt; kurtosis 
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Figure 58: Total returns of ROPI of Sukuk and conventional bonds indices for the overall period  
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Furthermore, the regression analysis shows the relationship between DJ Sukuk total return index and J.P. 
Morgan Global Aggregate bond index (USD). In Appendix F the graphs and tables present the results. 
 
7.5 Discussion and analysis  
 
The key results, in summary, are as follows. First recall the hypotheses developed in the hypothesis 
development section, Section 7.2: 
 
H1: The risk-return performance of comparable Sukuk and conventional bond indices is similar. 
 
H2: The returns on Sukuk indices are higher than returns on comparable conventional bond indices. 
 
H3: The volatility of returns on Sukuk indices is higher than the volatility of returns on comparable 
conventional bond indices. 
 
H4:  Sukuk indices fall less than comparable conventional bond indices during a banking crisis. 
 
The results for the entire period 2005-2016 for the aggregate indices, the DJ Sukuk all maturities global index 
and the J.P. Morgan Global Aggregate conventional bond index, corroborate H1, H2 and H3. However, the 
results for the maturity based indices for the whole 2005-2016 are more mixed, while the results for the sub-
periods are very mixed. A more detailed discussion follows. 
 
The results presented above show the comparison of return and risk performance of Sukuk over conventional 
bonds in the global market. In terms of average annualised monthly return, the DJ Sukuk all maturities global 
index outperforms its counterpart over the entire examined period (2005-2016). In terms of volatility, the J.P. 
Morgan Global Aggregate conventional bond index shows a safer risk performance than the DJ Sukuk global 
index, as shown in Table 33 and Figure 54 above. These results are supportive of hypotheses H2 and H3, that 
Sukuk are higher risk, higher expected return securities when compared to conventional bonds. 
 
It can be seen that the average annualised monthly return of the DJ Sukuk all maturities global index is similar 
to that of the J.P. Morgan Global Aggregate conventional bond index returns overall in the period, where the 
DJ Sukuk all maturities global index achieved 4.69% and the J.P. Morgan Global Aggregate conventional bond 
index 4.41%. The volatility figures of 5.558% for the J.P. Morgan Global Aggregate conventional bond index 
and 7.387% for the DJ Sukuk index show that these indices have similar volatility. Thus, hypothesis H1 that 
the risk-return profiles of Sukuk and conventional bond indices is corroborated. 
 
These results also exemplify the positive relationship between risk and return that should hold in an efficient 
market. 
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These results are in contrast with those of Alsaeed (2012) who found that Sukuk have a better risk profile than 
bonds, being supported with mandatory underlying assets to reduce risk exposure. However, the study results 
are similar to those of Afshar (2013), who justified his results in terms of type of underlying Sukuk assets, such 
as tangible or intangible, existing or described with deferred delivery, usufruct or services. In addition, another 
justification is that the risk profile is fed by the Shariah influence in the Sukuk market as explained in Chapter 
4, and discussed in Section 7.2. 
  
Thus, the results for the overall 2005-2016 period and the aggregate indices corroborate the well-motivated 
hypotheses H1, H2 and H3, and are in line with the correct theoretical relationship of conventional finance. 
However, this clear picture dissolves when the mixed results for the maturity based indices and for the sub-
periods are considered. 
 
Sukuk recorded lower risk in the pre-crisis period and recording a higher return compared to its counterpart 
bond index. Meanwhile, the picture is opposite in the bond index. Surprisingly enough, during the crisis period 
the position swaps between each index. Sukuk became higher risk than conventional bonds and with lower 
returns than conventional bonds. The results also show the same picture in the post-crisis period. However, the 
results presented for the overall period are different from sub-periods as the whole period shows that the Sukuk 
index was riskier than conventional bonds with a higher return compared to the conventional bond index. This 
is back to the general theory in the finance field. These observations can be attributed to the following reasons:  
 
 Sukuk pricing issues: the Sukuk pricing mechanism and process, so far, is still a contentious matter in 
the Islamic finance industry. According to the literature, there are ongoing debates among experts in the 
Islamic finance field, such as Al-Amine (2001) and Usmani (2008) on Sukuk pricing methods. The 
debate concerns two approaches. The first approach is that Sukuk pricing should follow the conventional 
bond pricing mechanism and involve the interest rate factor; the second is that Sukuk should have its 
own pricing process according to Sukuk nature and the Shariah securitisation model of Sukuk. In 
practice, currently, the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is the most common benchmark 
adopted in determining Sukuk returns, but is undesirable under Shariah law because it is an interest-
based benchmark. However, the AAOIFI Shariah standard (8) approved interest based indices for 
benchmarking purposes. As such, the Sukuk pricing process adopts the same pricing mechanism as 
bonds (Ahmed, Islam and Alabdullah, 2014). 
 
 The short time period of each sub-period of the research sample: The sample of research was divided 
into sub-periods according to the recent financial crisis benchmark. The first issue is that there is no an 
accurate timeline of when exactly the financial crisis started. The financial crisis began during the 
summer of 2007 according to the studies cited in Chapter 1. The whole period of the study of 10 years 
shows a holistic picture compared with a snapshot period based on an estimate of the beginning and 
ending of the financial crisis. The size of the period plays a critical role in presenting a complete picture 
of risk and return over the period. Thus, the findings for the sub-time period do not conform with that 
of the entire time period. 
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 Shariah risk factor: Shariah risk is a unique risk factor of Sukuk. Therefore, Shariah risk has an impact 
on the risk performance of the Sukuk index, leading to a higher required rate of return than for 
conventional bonds. The Sukuk market was hit in 2008 by Usmani’s fatwa when he stated that the 
majority of existing Sukuk are not in compliance with Shariah principles, leading Sukuk investors to 
panic. In addition, this was at the time of the global financial crisis (Wilson, 2008). Thus, this double-
hit on the Sukuk market may explain the anomalous high risk-low return profile experienced by Sukuk 
indices during the crisis period.  
  
The regression analysis presents the p-value for each index testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient is 
equal to zero (no effect). A low p-value (< 0.05) indicates rejection of the null hypothesis. In other words, a 
predictor that has a low p-value is likely to be meaningful, question because changes in the predictor's value 
are related to changes in the response variable. 
 
In the output above, it is noticeable that the predictor variables of price movement of the Sukuk index and the 
conventional bond index are significant because both of their p-values are (0.000). However, the p-values for 
all other sub-indices of Sukuk compared to sub-indices of conventional bonds are greater than the common 
alpha level of 0.05, which indicates that this is not statistically significant. Thus, hypothesis of a significant 
relationship in the price movements between the Sukuk index and the conventional bond index is rejected for 
sub-periods. 
  
The risk and return matrix below summarises the outputs between Sukuk and conventional bonds as a 
comprehensive view. This helps to answer the research questions and presents more justification towards the 
results analysis. Matrix analysis is common in academic research (Meyer, 2000) and follows Tariq and Dar 
(2007) on presenting risk factors of Sukuk via a matrix approach; the matrix below explains the comparison 
between Sukuk indices over conventional bond indices based on the output of the research. 
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Table 34: Risks and return matrix of comparison between outputs of Sukuk index and conventional index 
Period Index type 
Sukuk conventional bonds 
Return Risk Return Risk 
Pre-crisis 
All maturities High Low Low High 
1-3 Yrs High Low Low High 
3-5 Yrs High Low Low High 
*5-7 Yrs  
*7-10Yrs  
During crisis 
All maturities Low High High Low 
1-3 Yrs High High Low Low 
3-5 Yrs Low High High Low 
*5-7 Yrs  
7-10Yrs High High Low Low 
Post-crisis 
All maturities High Low Low High 
1-3 Yrs High Low Low High 
3-5 Yrs High Low Low High 
5-7 Yrs High High Low Low 
7-10Yrs High High Low Low 
Whole period 
All maturities High High Low Low 
1-3 Yrs High Low Low High 
3-5 Yrs High High Low Low 
5-7 Yrs High High Low Low 
7-10Yrs High High Low Low 
Average 
More higher 
return 
Major risk 
exposure  
Lower return 
Less risk 
exposure 
* The index wasn’t launched in this period  
 
The results for aggregate indices for the entire period support the hypotheses H1, H2 and H3. However, the 
results for the sub-indices and sub-periods are quite mixed. This is in line with the results of previous studies, 
where some studies found that Sukuk are less risky than conventional bonds while others found the opposite, 
such as El Mosaid and Boutti (2014), Saad & Mohamad (2012), Arif and Safri (2012), Godlewski et. al. (2011), 
Haral (2010); Cheema and Hashmi (2010) and El Mosaid and Boutti (2011), Wilson (2008) and Cakir and Raei 
(2007). The up-dating and refinements of the previous research presented here tends to confirm the mixed 
picture on the risk-return relationship of Sukuk compared with conventional bonds.  
The discrepancies of the risk and return profiles between Sukuk and conventional bonds can be summarised as 
follows: 
- Real differences between Sukuk and conventional bonds: It can be seen that Sukuk have some risk factors 
that do not exist for conventional bonds, in particular the Shariah risk factor. The results show that market users 
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understand the Shariah risk factor. This indicates that the market is semi-strong efficient towards understanding 
the Shariah risk factor and understands that there is a real different between Sukuk and conventional bonds. 
- The short period of data sample: The general theory of finance states that high-risk instruments are associated 
with high return. However, the results obtained for some time periods of the study are not in line with this 
general theory. This may be because the short period of examination for certain time periods, such as the pre-
crisis period covering only 2 years, due to the fact that the Sukuk Index, the first global index launched in 
Sukuk, was founded only in 2005, However, the average for the whole period shows that the risk and return 
profile overall is within the framework of the general theory that high risk goes together with high return. 
- The aftermath of recent financial crisis: There is no accurate data to tell when exactly the recent financial 
crisis started. There are signs that it began in the summer of 2007 although its main impact was seen in 2008. 
This crisis hit the both the Sukuk market and conventional bonds. This implies that the results obtained are to 
some extent dependent on judgements about the timing of the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. 
7.7 Conclusion  
 
The chapter concludes with several conclusions on the comparative risk and return performance between Sukuk 
and conventional bonds. The research accepts the first hypothesis H1 stating there is no big difference in the 
risk and return profiles of Sukuk and the counterpart conventional bonds. In contrast, the research rejects the 
hypothesis H4 on the risk and return performance of Sukuk and conventional bond indices during the crisis. 
Moreover, the relationship of price movements between Sukuk and conventional bonds was statistically proved 
for aggregate indices, but rejected for sub-indices. 
  
The research contribution of this chapter is summarised in the risk and return matrix, which presents a holistic 
picture of the risk and return performance of Sukuk compared to conventional bonds. This leads to a better 
understanding of Sukuk risk securitisation and how it impacts on financial performance. 
 
*** 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUKUK STRUCTURE RISK ANALYSIS 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter 8 presents the empirical results on the risk factors that are hypothesised to be significant in explaining 
Sukuk market returns, using the Idealratings Sukuk data introduced in Chapter 6. The story of this chapter is 
to investigate Sukuk market efficiency in respect of the structure risk factors, while the previous chapter 7 
conducted an investigation of Sukuk market efficiency on the Shariah risk factor. Chapter 8 reviews the Sukuk 
risk factor classifications and then moves on to explain the research hypotheses. The rest of the chapter explains 
the data and methodology and then discusses the research findings and results.    
 
8.2 Sukuk risk factor classifications  
 
A number of different risk classifications were defined and discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Of greatest 
significance for the empirical research of this thesis are: 
 
 Shariah compliance risk 
 Legal risk 
 Conventional bond risk 
 Structure risk 
 
Recall that: 
 
Shariah compliance risk concerns the risk borne by Sukuk investors due the fact that issued Sukuk may 
subsequently be deemed to be non-compliant, discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.5. 
 
Conventional bond risks are those risks arising from the fact that Sukuk are, to some extent, similar to 
conventional bonds, discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.6. 
 
By legal risk is meant the distinction between asset-backed Sukuk and asset-based Sukuk, discussed in Chapter 
3, Section 3.5. 
 
Structure risk concerns the classification of Sukuk into asset-based, equity-based, debt-based and agency-
based, as presented in the risk matrix in Chapter 4, Table 14. 
 
8.3 Research hypotheses development 
 
8.3.1 Shariah compliance risk 
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Shariah compliance risk is of fundamental significance. It is closely related to the legislative and regulatory 
risks discussed in Chapter 4, Sections 4.6.7 and 4.6.8. Shariah compliance risk is greatly magnified by the fact 
that the legislative and regulatory frameworks for Sukuk are currently insufficiently developed. 
 
In order to conduct market-based tests of hypotheses about Shariah compliance risk it is necessary to compare 
the performance of Sukuk and conventional bonds. It is hypothesized that, other things being equal, Sukuk are 
riskier than conventional bonds, since Sukuk are subject to Shariah compliance risk while conventional bonds 
are not. 
 
Tests of Shariah compliance risk are reported in Chapter 7. While the results of Chapter 7 are somewhat mixed, 
some support is obtained for the claim that Sukuk have higher expected return and higher variability of returns 
than their conventional counterparts. 
 
Shariah compliance risk is not investigated in Chapter 8, since the data set of Chapter 8 is exclusively 
comprised of Sukuk. 
  
8.3.2 Legal risk 
 
According to the discussion of Chapters 3 and 4, asset-backed Sukuk are safer than asset-based Sukuk. It is 
therefore hypothesized that asset-backed Sukuk have lower expected returns and lower variability of returns 
than asset-based Sukuk. 
 
No market-based tests of this hypothesis are possible at the current time. This is because the data set does not 
contain any asset-backed Sukuk; there are no market prices in the secondary market for asset-backed Sukuk, 
and no market returns can be calculated.  
 
8.3.3 conventional bond risk 
 
Sukuk bear many similarities to conventional bonds. These have been discussed extensively in previous 
chapters. It is therefore hypothesized that the risk-expected return profiles of Sukuk and conventional bonds 
should be similar, though not the same. This hypothesis was tested in Chapter 7, by comparing the 
performances of a range of carefully selected Sukuk and conventional bond indices. The results of Chapter 7 
support the work of earlier researchers, who have found that the performance of Sukuk and conventional bond 
indices is quite similar. 
 
Chapter 8 extends the analysis by conducting a regression analysis, where the dependent variable is Sukuk 
monthly return, and where the independent factors include a number of dummy variables representing 
conventional bond risk factors. The conventional bond risk factors used are: 
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 Maturity 0 – 3 years 
 Maturity 3 –  5 years 
 Maturity 5 – 7 years 
 Maturity 7 – 10+ years 
 Floating rate coupon 
 Fixed rate coupon 
 AAA, AA or A rated 
 BBB, BB or B rated 
 Unrated 
 
It is hypothesised that lower maturity Sukuk have lower returns than longer maturity Sukuk, that floating rate 
Sukuk have lower returns than fixed rate Sukuk, that A rated Sukuk have lower returns than B rated Sukuk, 
and that B rated Sukuk have lower returns than unrated Sukuk.  
 
The hypotheses follow directly from the conventional finance theory that expected return is positively related 
to risk. Since conventional finance theory is well-understood by participants in the Sukuk market, and since 
the similarities between Sukuk and conventional bonds are also well-understood by market participants, it is 
reasonable to expect that these conventional bond risk factors should be priced in the market, and related to 
market returns as hypothesised. 
 
The results of the regressions, overall, support the hypothesis that conventional bond risk factors are positively 
and statistically significantly related to Sukuk returns. 
 
8.3.4 Structure risk 
 
In Chapter 4 it was argued that Sukuk structure is a significant factor in explaining Sukuk risk. According to 
the Sukuk Structure Risk Matrix of Table 1, Chapter 4, the relationship between Sukuk structure and risk is as 
follows: 
 
 Equity based – Low risk 
 Agency based – Medium risk 
 Debt based or Asset – High risk 
 
In addition to the four single structures, there are also Hybrid structures which contain elements of one or more 
single structures. For example, a Hybrid Sukuk may be a combination of Murabaha and Wakala contracts, i.e. 
a Sukuk with an Equity-Agency based structure. In general, the risk profile of complex Hybrid structures varies 
depending on the particular single structures and the way they are combined. Overall, Hybrid structures tend 
towards the medium to high risk end of the scale. Thus: 
 
 Hybrid structure – Medium to High risk 
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It might now seem logical to hypothesise that Sukuk structure risk should be positively related to Sukuk return, 
in line with the conventional finance theory that high risk should go together with high expected return. 
However, the risk-expected return relationship of conventional finance presupposes that the market is efficient 
at pricing risk. 
 
Throughout the thesis, it has been observed that it is only relatively recently that researchers have focused on 
investigating the connection between Sukuk structure and risk. For example, there is currently no general 
agreement even on what is the most appropriate risk classification scheme for Sukuk. Sukuk structure risk is 
therefore not currently well-understood. Hence, it appears to be unlikely that Sukuk structure risks are currently 
being correctly priced in the market. The expectation therefore, is that the regression results for the Sukuk 
structure risk factors will be mixed. The particular way in which the results will be mixed cannot be made 
precise. However, it is expected that the regression results will contain evidence that structure risks are being 
mispriced in the market. 
 
The results of the regressions do indeed show mixed results for the Sukuk structure risk factors. These mixed 
results can be interpreted in a number of ways, which will be discussed after the results are presented. 
 
To emphasise the still-developing state of the understanding of Sukuk structure by market practitioners, at the 
Euromoney London Islamic Finance and Investment Conference of 11th-12th February 2015 in London, a 
presentation was given on the Sukuk issuance experiences of Aramco, the largest oil producer in Saudi Arabia. 
Aramco’s first Sukuk issuance took 18 months, the lengthy delays being caused by the fact that the choice of 
Sukuk structure and its implementation in practice is by means an easy matter. Even after all these efforts, it 
was subsequently felt that not the most appropriate structure had been chosen. The second, and appropriately 
structured Sukuk issuance took 6 months. 
 
The Aramco case study indicates that even major players in the Sukuk market are still getting to grips with 
understanding the risk implications of Sukuk structures. It is unlikely that risks that are not fully understood 
by major market participants are being correctly priced in the market. 
To conclude this section, as far as Sukuk structures are concerned, the categories as explained are: Asset-based, 
debt based, equity-based, agency based and hybrid structure. According to the IdealRatings database, the most 
common structure used in the global Sukuk market is debt based and the lowest is agency based. The figure 
below shows the percentages of each structure exercised in the global Sukuk market.   
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Figure 59: % of Shariah structure types of Sukuk in global market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IdealRatings, 2016 
8.4 Research methodology 
 
This chapter uses a multifactor regression analysis to estimate Sukuk securities’ exposure to the risk factors 
presented in Section 8.2. Multiple regression analysis is a common technique used to assess the relative 
influence of several independent (predicting) variables when they are used to predict a dependent variable 
(Foster, Barkus and Yavorsky, 2006).  
 
The regression equation is given as follows: 
 
Y=a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3+b4X41+ b4X42 + b4X43+b5X5…. b10X10  
 
Where: 
  
Y:  is the Sukuk monthly return 
 
a: is the Intercept 
 
X1 to X10 are dummy variables taking the value 1 if the Sukuk has the given characteristic and the value 0 if 
it does not. 
 
b1: is the Slope (Beta coefficient) for X1 
X1: Shariah structure type of Sukuk (Shariah Agency based), first independent variable that is explaining the 
variance in Y. Thus, X1 takes the value 1 if the Sukuk is Agency based and 0 if it is not Agency-based. 
 
b2: is the Slope (Beta coefficient) for X2 
14%
37%33%
3%
12%
Asset Based Debit Based Equity Based Agency Based Hybird Based
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X2: Shariah structure type of Sukuk (Shariah Hybrid), second independent variable that is explaining the 
variance in Y. Thus, X2 takes the value 1 if the Sukuk is Hybrid and 0 if it is not Hybrid. 
 
b3: is the Slope (Beta coefficient) for X3 
X3: Shariah structure type of Sukuk (Shariah Asset based), third independent variable that is explaining the 
variance in Y. Thus, X3 takes the value 1 if the Sukuk is Asset based and 0 if it is not Asset based. 
 
X4: Shariah structure type of Sukuk (Shariah Debt based compared), fourth independent variable that is 
explaining the variance in Y. Thus, X4 takes the value 1 if the Sukuk is Debt based and 0 if it is not Debt based.  
b4: is the Slope (Beta coefficient) for X4 
 
X5: Maturity of Sukuk (3-5 years to maturity), fifth independent variable that is explaining the variance in Y. 
Thus, X5 takes the value 1 if the Sukuk has 3-5 years left to maturity and 0 if it is does not have 3-5 years left 
to maturity. 
b5: is the Slope (Beta coefficient) for X5 
 
X6: Maturity of Sukuk (5-7 years to maturity), sixth independent variable that is explaining the variance in Y. 
Thus, X6 takes the value 1 if the Sukuk has 5-7 years left to maturity and 0 if it is does not have 5-7 years left 
to maturity.  
b6: is the Slope (Beta coefficient) for X6 
 
X7: Maturity of Sukuk (7-10+ years to maturity), seventh independent variable that is explaining the variance 
in Y. Thus, X7 takes the value 1 if the Sukuk has 7-10+ years left to maturity and 0 if it is does not have 7-10+ 
years left to maturity. 
b7: is the Slope (Beta coefficient) for X7 
 
X8: Coupon rate (Fixed rate), eighth independent variable that is explaining the variance in Y. Thus, X8 takes 
the value 1 if the Sukuk has a fixed rate coupon and 0 if it does not have a fixed rate coupon. 
b8: is the Slope (Beta coefficient) for X8 
 
X9: Sukuk rating (BBB, BB, B), ninth independent variable that is explaining the variance in Y. Thus, X9 
takes the value 1 if the Sukuk is BBB, BB or B rated and 0 if it is not BBB, BB or B rated. 
b9: is the Slope (Beta coefficient) for X9 
 
X10: Sukuk unrated, tenth independent variable that is explaining the variance in Y. Thus, X10 takes the value 
1 if the Sukuk is unrated and 0 if it is rated. 
b10: is the Slope (Beta coefficient) for X10 
 
In addition, R2 reflects the proportion of the variance in the values of the dependent variable Y explained by 
all the independent variables, the Xs in the equation in total.  
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In a linear regression with dummy variables, one risk factor out of each category of risk factors is not included 
in the regression. The factors left out in the above regression are: Equity-based (from the Sukuk structure risk 
category), 0-3 year to maturity (from the time to maturity risk category), floating rate coupon (from the fixed 
or floating coupon risk category), and AAA or AA or A rated (from the rating risk category). 
 
The omitted factors are the reference group. Note that for each risk category it is the lowest risk factor that is 
omitted. Indeed: 
  
1. Shariah Equity based structure (theoretically the safest Sukuk structure according to the theoretical risk 
analysis for Sukuk Shariah structures in Chapter 4).  
 
2. Short maturity Sukuk with maturity between 0-3 years (the Sukuk with the fewest years to maturity are 
the safest). 
  
3. Floating coupon rate Sukuk (Sukuk with floating rate coupons have lower interest rate exposure than fixed 
coupon Sukuk). 
 
4. Sukuk with AAA, AA, or A rating (Highly rated Sukuk are safer than low rated or unrated Sukuk).  
 
Thus, the Slope coefficients, the b1 to b10, measure how much extra return a risky Sukuk earns over and 
above the return on the safest reference Sukuk, i.e. an Equity-based Sukuk with 0-3 years to maturity with a 
floating rate coupon that is AAA, AA or A rated.  
 
8.5 Statement of hypotheses 
 
Now that the regression model has been presented, the hypotheses of Section 8.3 can be stated more precisely. 
 
Firstly, it is expected that the conventional bond risk factors X5 to X10 should be positively related to returns, 
i.e. that the Slope coefficients b5 to b10 should be positive: 
H1: b5 > 0 
 
H2: b6 > 0 
 
H3: b7 > 0 
 
H4: b8 > 0 
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H5: b9 > 0 
 
H6: b10 > 0 
 
Within the Sukuk maturity category, the X5, X6 and X7, shorter maturity Sukuk should be safer than longer 
maturity Sukuk, i.e. the Slope coefficients for lower maturity Sukuk should be smaller than the Slope 
coefficients for longer maturity Sukuk. This is because the Slope coefficients measure how much extra return 
the Sukuk should earn over the reference Sukuk, the safest Sukuk, other risk factors being held equal, if it has 
a longer maturity. Thus: 
 
H7: 0 < b5 < b6 < b7 
 
Within the BBB, BB or B rated Sukuk, and rated Sukuk should be safer than unrated Sukuk. Thus: 
 
H8: 0 < b9 < b10 
 
When it comes to the Shariah structure risk factors it was argued in Section 8.3 that mixed results are expected, 
since it is not expected that the market is currently efficient at pricing Sukuk structure risk. 
 
However, in empirical finance ‘mixed results are expected’ is not the standard way of stating a hypothesis. 
Thus, for the purpose of stating the hypotheses it is assumed that the market is efficient.  Thus: 
  
H9: b1 > 0 
 
H10: b2 > 0 
 
H11: b3 > 0 
 
H12: b4 > 0 
 
Within the Sukuk structure risk category, the structures have been ranked from safest to riskiest, e.g. X1 
(Agency based) is safer than X2 (Hybrid), and both are safer than X3 (Asset based), which has the same risk 
as X4 (Debt based). Thus, assuming market efficiency: 
 
H13: 0 < b1 < b2 < b3 = b4 
 
While market efficiency is implicitly assumed in stating the hypotheses on Sukuk structure, it has been argued 
in the thesis that the Sukuk market is unlikely to be efficient in pricing Sukuk structure risks. Hence, the 
author’s expectation is that the hypotheses H9, H10, H11, H12 and H13 will, overall, be rejected. 
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8.6 Data 
The data of the research were downloaded from the Idealratings data engine. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, it is the best available database covering the Sukuk global market. 
The total number of Sukuk on the Idealratings database is 1806 as at 13 August 2016. However, the Idealratings 
subscription service provides only two years of historical data. Due to the relationship between the University 
of Portsmouth and IdealRatings, the author obtained access to the data on the Idealratings back data files. The 
period covered is from 31st October 2012 to 02nd September 2016, 47 months in total. 
One limitation of the research is that most Sukuk are issued in private placements, with the majority of 
investors holding the Sukuk until the redemption date. In some, but not all cases this is caused by the fact that 
Shariah restrictions on some types of structure, such as debt based structures, do not permit trading in the 
Sukuk. From the Idealratings database it is seen that debt based Sukuk make up 37% of the global Sukuk 
market, representing the largest segment of current Sukuk structure types. In other cases, tradable Sukuk are 
held to maturity by choice. For example, Takaful (Islamic insurance) companies prefer to hold to maturity as 
part of their asset and liability management. 
The Sukuk in the sample are denominated in US dollars. The information required to compute coupon returns 
for Sukuk denominated in Malaysian ringgit is not available. 
 
One limitation of the data set is the relatively short time series (47 months). This limitation can only be 
overcome by the passing of time. It appears that sufficiently detailed and complete data on Sukuk have not 
been systematically collected earlier to make it possible to significantly extend the time series further back in 
time. 
After excluding Sukuk for which prices or other information required to calculate returns is unavailable, the 
complete data set is as described in the table below.  
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Table 35: Sukuk data description sample from IdealRatings 
Total Sukuk 
222 
 
Asset class 
Asset Back Asset Based 
0 222 
Sukuk Price 
Sukuk has prices Sukuk has no prices 
113 109 
Maturity type 
0-3 Yrs 3-5 Yrs 5-7 Yrs 7-10+ Yrs 
75 18 10 16 
Coupon rate 
Fixed Floating 
153 69 
Shariah structure types 
Asset Based 
(Ijarah) 
Debt Based 
(Murabaha, Istasna’a and 
Twaraq) 
Equity based 
(Mushararkah and 
Mudaraba) 
37 4 16 
Agency Based 
(Wakalah) 
Hybrid based 
 
27 29 
Source: IdealRatings, August 2016 
 
The Sukuk sample consists Sukuk certificates from the global market and the Sukuk issuer’s mixture of 
business sectors. The figure below shows further descriptive details about the Sukuk issuers of the data sample 
of Sukuk securities.   
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Figure 60: Business sectors of Sukuk issuers on Sukuk data sample 
 
 
8.7 Sukuk monthly return calculation 
Monthly returns are computed for the period of November 2012 to September 2016.  
The price is computed as the mid-point of the bid and ask price. In cases where end of month prices are not 
available, the end of month price is computed by linear interpolation, using the ipolate function in SATA 
software. Using the interpolation approach is commonly used for constructing indices, according to Meijering 
(2002).  
The interpolation formula is applied as follows: 
The value Y at r is found by finding the closest points (r0, y0) and (r1, y1), such that r0 < r and r1 > r where y0 
and y1 are observed, and calculating as: 
𝑦 =
𝑦1 − 𝑦0 
𝑟1 − 𝑟0 
+ (𝑟 − 𝑟0) + 𝑦0  
 
If ipolate is specified and if (x0, y0) and (x1, y1) cannot be found on both sides of x, the two 
closest points on the same side of x are found, and the same formula is applied. If there are multiple 
observations with the same value for x0, then y0 is taken as the average of the corresponding y values for those 
observations. (x1, y1) is handled in the same way. 
36%
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In the Sukuk markets under study there is no trading on Sundays. Consequently, Sundays were omitted from 
the data, and the interpolation used the preceding Saturday price. If no Saturday price existed, the most recent 
previous price is used. 
The monthly Sukuk return consists of the capital return resulting from the monthly price changes together with 
the coupon payments. Each Sukuk certificate has different dates for issuance and redemption. Dates for the 
coupon payments are computed by working backwards from the redemption date. 
For fixed coupon Sukuk the coupon payment is specified in the Sukuk contract as a fixed percentage of the 
face value. For floating rate Sukuk the coupon payment is specified in terms of a benchmark index, such as 
LIBOR. 
Given the end of month prices and coupon payments the Sukuk monthly return can then be calculated by the 
same formula used for conventional bonds. 
8.8 Presentation and discussion of the regression results 
For each of the 47 months, a regression was run on all of the Sukuk in the sample that existed during that 
month, a total of 47 regressions. For each k = 1 to 10, the average of the 47 regressions for the Slope coefficient 
bk was obtained.  The results are displayed in Table 36. 
Table 36: Descriptive statistics for Sukuk returns 
 
Sukuk return Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Shariah Agency Based -.0165794 .0160068 -.000139804 .0073615776 
Shariah Hybrid Based -.0161897 .0247517 -.000382925 .0085168962 
Shariah Asset Based -.0799027 .0224090 -.001479231 .0134315118 
Shariah Debt Based -.0262888 .0344593 -.000171953 .0076405057 
Maturity 3-5 Yrs -.0216136 .0341747 .001873511 .0086378262 
Maturity 5-7 Yrs -.0300833 .0814635 .001526784 .0154090524 
Maturity 7-10+ Yrs -.0406654 .1136022 .002964195 .0219707025 
Fixed rate -.0181055 .0278023 .002016312 .0074930279 
Rating BBB, BB or B -.0132313 .0265944 .001533691 .0065426569 
Unrated -.0264969 .0236339 .000986664 .0085972719 
     
 
 
The important column in Table 36 is the column of mean (average) values. As hypothesised, the averages of 
all the Slope coefficients for all of the conventional bond risk factors are positive. That is, the mean values for 
Maturity 3-5, Maturity 5-7, Maturity 7-10+, Fixed rate, Rating BBB, BB or B and Unrated are all positive. 
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Thus, the results support H1: b5 > 0, H2: b6 > 0, H3: b7 > 0, H4: b8 > 0, H5: b9 > 0 and H6: b10 > 0. 
 
The results for the stronger hypotheses H7 and H8 are mixed. 
 
 H7: 0 < b5 < b6 < b7 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, b5 (= 0.001873511) and b6 (= 0.001526784) are both less than b7 (= 
0.002964195), as hypothesised (7-10+ Maturity Sukuk tend to have higher returns than both the 3-5 year 
Maturity Sukuk and the 5-7 year Maturity Sukuk). However, contrary to hypothesis b6 is very slightly greater 
than b7, though not statistically significantly so, i.e. the safer 3-5 year Maturity Sukuk tend to have very 
slightly higher returns than the riskier 5-7 year Maturity Sukuk. 
 
H8: 0 < b9 < b10 
 
H8 is corroborated by the test, as b9 (= 0.0065426569) is indeed smaller than b10 (= 0.0085972719). Thus, the 
safer BBB, BB and B rated Sukuk tend to have lower returns than the riskier unrated Sukuk, as stated by H8. 
 
Thus, overall the results corroborate the hypotheses on the conventional bond risk factors, namely, that Sukuk 
markets are efficient at pricing conventional bond risks. 
 
When it comes to the hypotheses on the Sukuk structure risk factors, all of the hypotheses are rejected. H9: 
b1 > 0, H10: b2 > 0, H11: b3 > 0 and H12: b4 > 0 are all rejected, since the signs of the Sukuk structure risk 
factor Slope coefficients are all negative. Thus, returns on the safest reference Sukuk, the equity based Sukuk, 
tend to be higher than the returns on Sukuk with theoretically riskier structures. 
 
Also, H13: 0 < b1 < b2 < b3 = b4 are rejected, not only because all the Slope coefficients are less than 0, but 
also because the ordering of the size of the coefficients are not as hypothesised. 
 
For example, b1 (= -0.000139804) the Slope coefficient of the Agency based structure is smaller in absolute 
value than all the other Shariah structure Slope coefficients, b2, b3 and b4.   Returns on the safer Agency 
based structures tend to be higher than on the relatively riskier Hybrid, Asset based and Debt based structures.  
 
The ordering is correct only for the Hybrid and Debt based structures. b2 (= -0.000382925), the Slope 
coefficient of the Hybrid structure is higher in absolute value than b4 (= -0.000171953), the Slope coefficient 
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of the theoretically riskier Debt based structure. Returns on the safer Hybrid structures tend to be lower than 
returns on the relatively riskier Debt based structures, as market efficiency suggests. 
 
Overall, the results for the hypotheses on Sukuk structure risk factors are mixed, with most of the hypotheses 
being rejected. Note however, that this is what was expected. The hypotheses are formed under the assumption 
that the Sukuk market is efficient at pricing Sukuk structure risks. This thesis has argued that the Sukuk market 
is unlikely to be efficient in this respect. Thus, the expected mixed results are in line with the claim that the 
still developing Sukuk markets are currently failing to efficiently price Shariah structure risks.  
 
The results corroborate the work of previous researchers who claim that the Sukuk securitisation mechanism 
is designed to replicate conventional bonds, and thus that there are strong similarities between Sukuk and 
conventional bonds, as stated by, for example Wilson (2004), Miller et. al, (2007). Tariq (2015) commented 
that, while Sukuk are meant to be different from conventional bonds in theory, in practice most Sukuk 
prospectuses are drafted by lawyers copying conventional bond structures. He claimed that in the Sukuk market 
Sukuk with a value of over US$600 billion have been issued with the aim of creating Islamic securitizations 
equivalent to conventional bonds. 
  
Other, more recent studies, such as Reboredo and Naifar (2017) have focused on those aspects in which Sukuk 
differ from conventional bonds, though noting that, due to the fact that Sukuk markets are still under-developed, 
Sukuk prices are dependent on US conventional bond prices and tend to co-move with them.  
 
In recent years researchers have discussed Sukuk structure as an important distinguishing feature of Sukuk 
compared to conventional bonds. Recalling the case of the Aramco Sukuk issues discussed previously in 
Section 8.3.4, the implication is that issuers are coming to realize the fundamental importance of structure risk 
on Sukuk securitization. Thus, the finding of this study that the Sukuk market is mis-pricing Sukuk structure 
risks has implications for Sukuk market players, including credit rating agencies, issuers, market regulators 
and investors. While conventional bond risk factors are currently efficiently priced, this research has found 
evidence of mis-pricing on those factors that make Sukuk different from conventional bonds. This confirms 
the finding of Ahmed, Islam and Ariffin (2015) that it is necessary to reconsider the method of structuring 
Sukuk and in marketing Sukuk as a different class from conventional bonds. 
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Table 37: Correlation between Sukuk return and risk factor variables 
 
 Shariah 
Asset 
based 
Shariah 
Debit 
Based 
Shariah 
Agency 
Based 
Shariah 
Hybrid 
Based 
Maturity 
3.5Yrs 
Maturity 
5.7Yrs 
Maturity 
7.10Yrs 
Fixed 
rate 
Rating 
BBB.BB
.B 
Shariah Asset based 
Pearson Correlation 1         
Sig. (2-tailed)          
Shariah Debt Based 
Pearson Correlation .048 1        
Sig. (2-tailed) .750         
Shariah Agency Based 
Pearson Correlation .346* .064 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) .017 .668        
Shariah Hybrid Based 
Pearson Correlation .313* .051 .597** 1      
Sig. (2-tailed) .032 .731 .000       
Maturity 3-5 Yrs 
Pearson Correlation -.692** .019 -.159 -.524** 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .900 .285 .000      
Maturity 5-7 Yrs 
Pearson Correlation -.804** -.016 -.084 -.214 .737** 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .916 .573 .148 .000     
Maturity 7-10+ Yrs 
Pearson Correlation -.753** -.003 -.172 -.311* .829** .835** 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .986 .247 .034 .000 .000    
Fixed rate 
Pearson Correlation -.009 .107 -.049 .039 .084 -.056 -.041 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .953 .474 .742 .795 .573 .706 .784   
Rating BBB, BB or B 
Pearson Correlation -.468** .164 -.249 .163 .064 .401** .332* .306* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .271 .091 .275 .671 .005 .023 .037  
Unrated 
Pearson Correlation -.278 .092 .107 .129 .219 .310* .146 .709** .424** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .058 .539 .475 .389 .139 .034 .327 .000 .003 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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It is observable that there is high collinearity between some of the factors. However, these collierarities hold 
between risk factors in different and unrelated categories. Further, overall the table indicates only a moderate 
level of multicollinearity and which is not problematic. 
Table 38 presents the tests of statistical significance of the key regression results presented in Table 36. 
 
Table 38: One Sample Test for Coefficients beta overall observations of Sukuk Return and Related 
Independents of risk factors  
One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 0 
t Df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Shariah Agency Based 0.133 46 0.447 -.0001398036 -.002301244 .002021637 
Shariah Hybrid 0.315 46 0.377 -.0003829255 -.002883580 .002117729 
Shariah Asset Based 0.771 46 0.222 -.0014792313 -.005422871 .002464408 
Shariah Debt Based 0.158 46 0.438 -.0001719531 -.002415290 .002071383 
Maturity 3-5 Yrs 1.519 46 0.068 .0018735112 -.000662650 .004409672 
Maturity 5-7 Yrs 0.694 46 0.246 .0015267840 -.002997483 .006051051 
Maturity 7-10 Yrs 0.945 46 0.175 .0029641945 -.003486645 .009415034 
Fixed rate 1.885 46 0.033 .0020163121 -.000183723 .004216347 
Rating BBB.BB.B 1.642 46 0.054 .0015336912 -.000387305 .003454687 
Unrated 0.804 46 0.213 .0009866640 -.001537590 .003510918 
 
Table 39: Average of Regression Statistics for Coefficients beta overall observations of Sukuk Returns and Its 
Related Independents of risk factors  
Multiple R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Standard 
Error 
Observations Intercept 
0.50414 0.27364 0.11015 0.01568 58.17021 -0.00053 
 
 
Regression analysis was used to test hypotheses on the relationship between Sukuk return and risk factor 
variables. The regression results from the value of R and R square indicate that the risk factor variables in total 
explain 27% to 50% of the variation in Sukuk return. 
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As noted, the hypotheses on Shariah Sukuk structure risks were generally rejected. This is in line with the 
expectation that Sukuk markets are not currently pricing structure risks efficiently. The results on the structure 
risks are mixed, in the sense that none of the Shariah structure risk factors are statistically significant.  
 
The key column of Table 38 is column 3 giving the 2-tailed p values. The lowest p value is 0.222 for the Asset 
based structure. Since the hypotheses are that the Slope coefficients are greater than 0, and not merely that the 
Slope coefficients are different from 0, it can be argued that 1-tailed p values are more appropriate to consider. 
However, in that case it is still true that none of the Slope coefficients for the Shariah structure risk factors are 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
The Slope coefficients for the conventional bond risk factors are generally statistically significant.  If 1-tailed 
p values are used all except two of the conventional bond risk factors are significant at the 10% level, the 
exceptions being 5-7 year Maturity (12.3%) and Unrated (10.65%).  
 
The results on statistical significance further support the claim that the Sukuk markets treat Sukuk similarly to 
conventional bonds, and are efficient at pricing conventional bond factors that impact on Sukuk risk. These 
results also support the claim of that Shariah structure risk factors are not currently well-understood and that 
Sukuk markets are not efficiently pricing these risks. 
This study tests the risk and return of Sukuk according to structure risk factors. It is an investigation of the 
semi-strong efficiency of the Sukuk market (EMH), testing how publicly available on Sukuk structure risks 
impacts on Sukuk market returns. The hypotheses tested is that high structure risks are associated with high 
returns. The empirical results show that there is no significant relationship between Sukuk structure risk factors 
and realised Sukuk returns, however that the theoretical relationship between risk and return does hold for 
conventional bond risk factors. The Sukuk structure risk factors are summarised in the Sukuk structures risk 
matrix presented in chapter 4. The positive results on the pricing of conventional bond risk factors support the 
conclusions of those researchers who stress the similarities between conventional bonds and Sukuk, as in the 
research by Wilson (2004), Miller et. al, (2007), Tariq (2015) and Reboredo and Naifar (2017). The empirical 
results indicate that all Sukuk structures types have been treated the same by market users. Market participants 
have not applied the differences between Sukuk structures in accordance with the research of Sukuk theorists 
and AAOIFI Sukuk Shariah standard no. (17), which emphasise that Sukuk are different from conventional 
bonds and that the differences arise from the different Sukuk structures. This indicates that the Sukuk market 
is not semi-strong efficient in discounting publicly available information on Sukuk structure risks. The efficient 
markets' hypothesis (EMH) has been presented as the best description of price movements in securities markets 
(Clarke, Jandik and Mandelker, 2001).  Clarke et al., 2001 state that financial researchers have found empirical 
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evidence that is overwhelmingly consistent with the semi-strong form of the EMH. The empirical results 
reported here however, appear to show that the Sukuk market is not semi-strong efficient at incorporating public 
information on structure risk factors in Sukuk market prices. 
 
On the other hand, it could be argued that the pricing model of Sukuk structure risk is wrong or that it has not 
been tested correctly. However, the response to that is that the Sukuk structure risk classification is built based 
on the literature and applied value judgments by the author. These judgements may change when the nature of 
Shariah classifications of structure types undergoes further investigations and developments by researchers, 
market participants and Shariah scholars. 
 
The conclusions are qualified by the observation that the data set is small and covers a period of 47 months 
only. While there are over 1,800 Sukuk issued on the Idealratings database, only around 10% of them trade in 
the secondary market. Sukuk markets are still thin and illiquid. Further, there is no data going back further than 
4 years. Sukuk are a recent development and data on Sukuk has been systematically captured, recorded, stored 
and structured only recently. Nevertheless, sufficient data is now becoming available that will make possible a 
considerable expansion in empirical research in Sukuk. The situation will improve as Sukuk markets continue 
to develop. 
The analysis of results interpreting the fourth and fifth research objectives contributes to a better understanding 
of Sukuk risks. The first and second questions in this study sought to determine which risk factors are relevant 
to Sukuk pricing. The results indicate that structure risk factors have no power to explain Sukuk market returns. 
This implies that there is a gap between theory, which implies a positive relationship between Sukuk structure 
risks and Sukuk realised returns, and practice, which reveals no such relationship. Since information on Sukuk 
structures is a subset of publicly available information, the main conclusion of the study is that the Sukuk 
market is not efficient at pricing structure risks, in the sense of the semi-strong form of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis. Sukuk market does not take into account the public information provided by Sukuk theorists and 
Sukuk scholars on structure risk. The results are consistent with those of other studies which suggest that Sukuk 
pricing evaluation is like the conventional bond pricing evaluation mechanism. 
8.9 Conclusion 
 
The findings from this study make several contributions to the current literature. First, Sukuk market do not 
price Sukuk structure risks correctly. The findings observed in this study mirror those of previous studies that 
have examined the effect of treating Sukuk as being the same as conventional bonds. This has been explained 
by the limitations of Sukuk expertise combined with high demand for Sukuk issuances. This pushes Sukuk 
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underwriters to mimic conventional bonds in Sukuk prospectuses, leading Sukuk traders to use only 
conventional bond risk measures in making investment decisions on Sukuk. The neglect of Sukuk structure 
risk factors, which previous studies have demonstrated means that market participants are not taking into 
account important risk factors in their decision-making. This implies Sukuk practitioners need to consider 
reviewing the risk analysis of Sukuk to accommodate other risk factors that are applicable to Sukuk, such as 
structure risk. A better understanding of Sukuk structure risks will also assist in designing securitisation 
structures that meet the needs of issuers, investors, and other stakeholders who can benefit from the existence 
of deep, liquid, well-regulated and efficiently priced markets for Islamic financial instruments. 
  
*** 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION  
 
9.1 Introduction 
Admittedly, the research journey on Sukuk is ongoing. This research builds on the literature to bridge certain 
research gaps in the analysis of Sukuk risk. In particular, the research is a critical evaluation and investigation 
of those risks arising from differences in Sukuk structures. The purpose of this concluding chapter is to review 
the research aims and research questions, and to discuss the main implications of the research findings. This 
chapter also includes an overview of the limitations of this research and the primary recommendations for 
future research. 
  
9.2 Achievement of research aims and questions 
The present study was designed to determine the effect of Sukuk structure risk factors on Sukuk returns. 
 The Islamic financial system has expanded rapidly over recent decades. This expansion has engaged the 
attention of significant numbers of academic researchers and practitioners, opening the door to the development 
of new innovative investment instruments to meet the needs of issuers and investors. The Islamic financial 
system is continually evaluated, keeping academics, practitioners and other stakeholders informed and updated 
on the developments and progress achieved in Islamic finance. These developments are covered in this study, 
and key issues concerning Sukuk structures are brought up to date, especially those concerning the impact of 
Sukuk structure on risk and return. 
  
The theory of Islamic finance, and its features and specifications were given in Chapter 2, introducing the main 
research issues of interest and distinguishing the research gaps. It has been noted in the literature that 
conventional bonds are the main competitor to Sukuk. Hence, many previous studies have been conducted 
examining Sukuk compared with conventional bonds. This study extends this research, in finding how Sukuk 
are differentiated from their conventional counterparts. 
Sukuk are different from conventional bonds from various aspects, including both theoretical and practical 
issues. In theory, Sukuk are different from conventional bonds in that Sukuk are designed to be based on trade, 
while conventional bonds are designed to be based on debt. This study confirms that Sukuk are indeed different 
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from conventional bonds in certain respects. Sukuk are more flexible than conventional bonds, in that there is 
great scope in Sukuk for innovative structures to meet the needs of issuers and investors. 
  
Saudi Arabia and Malaysia have hosted the biggest applications of Sukuk in their capital markets. Both markets 
are considered to be hubs of Sukuk investment. The Saudi Arabian market has its own interpretation of Sukuk 
as a Shariah-compliant financial instrument. This leads to differences in the treatment of Sukuk in the Saudi 
Arabian capital market compared with Malaysia. The research address these differences in interpretations, and 
how this impacts on Sukuk securitisation and performance. 
  
One of the most significant findings to emerge from this study is that Sukuk risks can be classified in a number 
of different ways. It is argued that Sukuk structure risk, a risk that has hitherto not been discussed much in the 
literature, is one of the main risk factors that should be taken into account when evaluating Sukuk risk. Chapter 
four presents this discussion, and concludes with the construction of a new Sukuk risk matrix that evaluates the 
impact of Sukuk structure on risk. 
  
Returning to the questions posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to state that theoretically, the 
key risk factors in pricing Sukuk are the legal structure, Shariah structure, maturity, the coupon (fixed or 
floating) and the Sukuk rating. It can be seen that, from the standpoint of theory, Sukuk structure should have 
a significant impact on Sukuk pricing. However, in practice, the empirical investigation of the Sukuk market 
shows that the Sukuk market is not efficient in pricing Sukuk structure risks. Indeed, Sukuk Shariah 
structure risks have no power to explain observed Sukuk returns. Multiple regression analysis reveals that there, 
after controlling for other factors, there is no statistically significant relationship between Sukuk return and 
Shariah structure type. These results confirm the views of some authors that market participants do not 
distinguish Sukuk from conventional bonds.  
  
The other major finding of the empirical investigation concerns a comparative analysis of Sukuk indices and 
conventional bond indices. It is concluded that for broad aggregate indices covering the entire 2005-2016 time 
period, there is no big difference in the risk and return profile of Sukuk indices and their counterpart 
conventional bond indices. Furthermore, multiple regression analysis reveals that the relationship of price 
movements between these broad aggregate Sukuk and conventional bond indices was positive and statistically 
significant. These results add further support for the claim that the market does not distinguish between Sukuk 
and conventional bonds. 
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In contrast, for comparable narrow Sukuk and conventional bond indices, and for sub-periods of the 2005-2016 
full period, the results are mixed and difficult to interpret.  
  
The most critical finding to emerge from this study is that, from the theoretical standpoint, Sukuk structure risk 
should be a critical factor in the pricing of Sukuk securities. The study of Sukuk structure is a comparatively 
recent development in the research literature, and it has not yet been sufficiently addressed. Because of this, 
Sukuk issuers and investors are not sufficiently aware of the impact of Sukuk structure on risk. It is therefore 
not expected that these structure risks are priced in the market and shows that the Sukuk market is not semi-
strong efficient.This expectation is confirmed by the empirical results. 
  
9.3 Research contributions 
 
This research provides a range of contributions to the existing knowledge base for Islamic finance in the field 
of Sukuk. The key contributions are discussed below: 
 
9.3.1 First area of contribution 
  
The systematic review of the literature is a comprehensive and up to date review of this topic, identifying and 
evaluating more studies than previous reviews. The literature review covers what is currently 
known about Sukuk, drawing on the contributions of academic researchers and on studies of market practices 
in the Sukuk market in professional reports. In particular, previous studies on Sukuk risks and Sukuk structure 
are incorporated into the construction of the Sukuk risk matrix model developed and used in this study. 
  
Moreover, the literature review systematically discusses the similarities and differences between Sukuk as an 
independent class of investment instrument and its counterpart conventional bonds.  
  
The contribution in this area has been presented in a conference research paper, and a paper published in a peer 
reviewed academic journal. These are:  
  
 Alswaidan, M., Daynes, A., Pagas, P., and Mohammden, M. (2014). ‘’Risk Sharing in Islamic Finance: 
Recent Trends and Development’’. 4th Islamic Banking and Finance Conference (IBF 2014) Lancaster 
University Management School, United Kingdom 23rd – 24th June 2014 
 Alswaidan, M., Daynes and A., Pagas, P. (2015) ‘‘Understanding and Evaluation of Risk in Sukuk 
Structures’’. Presented to the an Islamic Perspective of Accounting, Finance, Economics and 
Management, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom 07th – 09th April 2015. The 
paper was been accepted for publication in the Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research, in a 
special issue on Sukuk on 22nd October 2016 (2017, vol: 8, iss: 4). 
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9.3.2 The second area of contribution 
The empirical research uses a unique proprietary Sukuk data set provided from the back data files underlying 
the Idealratings subscription service. This data set is used to test hypotheses regarding the pricing of structure 
risk, and other risks, in the Sukuk market. 
The main reason for the lack of empirical research in Sukuk, and in Islamic finance generally, has been the 
lack of empirical data. The advantage of this research is that it is conducted on the data on Sukuk that most 
Sukuk practitioners use for their investment decisions. This implies the validity of the data in the Sukuk market. 
For example, this is the data used by The Nasdaq Dubai index to construct a new Sukuk index, “The Nasdaq 
Dubai IdealRatings Global Sukuk Index” as illustrated in Chapter 6. According to the best of my knowledge, 
this study is a pioneer empirical work conducted using data from the Idealratings database. 
9.3.3 The third area of contribution 
The present study makes noteworthy contributions to Sukuk knowledge by introducing a new critical risk factor 
in Sukuk, Sukuk legal and Shariah structure type risks, leading to a better understating of Sukuk risk. 
This work contributes to our existing knowledge Sukuk pricing and market efficiency by providing empirical 
evidence based on comparisons of the available Sukuk and bond indices. This approach is updated and refined 
in this study. In addition, the study investigates Sukuk structure risk as a risk factor. Hypotheses concerning 
Sukuk structure risk, in combination with several other risk factors, are empirically tested using the uniquely 
available Idealratings data set referred to above. This research serves as a base for future studies and assists 
Sukuk professionals in evaluating and pricing Sukuk risks. This study is one of the early detailed academic 
studies on the evaluation of risks arising from Sukuk structures. 
 
 In addition, the contribution of this area has been published in:  
 Alswaidan, M. (2013) ‘‘Saudi Arabian Sukuk Market: Recent Trends and Development’’ The Business 
Review, Cambridge Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2, December (2013) 
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9.4 Implications of research findings 
 
This study contributes to the work on the creation of evidence-based risk management techniques in Islamic 
finance and to the expansion of ethical financial management. 
The results on the informational inefficiency of Sukuk markets have significant implications for Sukuk decision 
makers such as issuers, investors, governments, regulators, scholars and researchers. The Sukuk issuers 
including governments should enhance structure risk in their Sukuk issuance process and investors should 
extend the investment analysis to take into account the differences between risk profiles among Sukuk 
structures. Government bodies require more adoption of Sukuk in the debt markets. Structure risk should help 
to facilitate this adoption as the main element of differentiating Sukuk from conventional bonds. The results 
add value to Sukuk regulators to update market standards and Shariah standards to accommodate structure risk. 
Scholars and researchers are the main pillars of developments of the Sukuk market journey by their 
contributions and investigations. Structure risk of Sukuk should be considered by scholars and researchers in 
their research for further development. 
Taken together, these results of this research suggest that Sukuk users importantly need to take in account 
structure risks factor as part of the investment decision process. This is driven by the fact that Sukuk are Shariah 
compliant instruments, and are influenced by the Shariah parameters underlying Sukuk structures. 
  
9.5 Research reflections, limitations and challenges 
Data is the main platform of empirical research. Data is always limited, and in the context of Sukuk are more 
limited due the limited development of the global Sukuk market. Growth in the market creates more data for 
research. Although this thesis has the advantage of using a unique data set from the Sukuk market via the 
IdealRatings Sukuk data engine, which, although the best data set currently available, is still relatively small 
and covers only a relatively short time period. Despite this, the data is sufficient to critically test a number of 
core hypotheses on Sukuk structure risk. 
   
9.6 Recommendations and future research 
This research has thrown up many questions in need of further investigation. Also, it offers some 
recommendations that may be found to be usefully applicable in practice. In the view of the researcher, these 
recommendations may help Islamic financial institutions to give more attention to their practices concerning 
finance regulation and supervision. 
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The most important factor that should be considered by experts in the field is filling the gaps of the Sukuk 
industry in order to be independent of the conventional bond industry. It has been noticeable from this study 
that Sukuk are dependent on conventional bonds, such as using the same credit agencies, financial techniques, 
and market scope. In other words, the Sukuk should create its own parameters to show an independence rather 
than use or copy from the conventional bonds then customise to fit with the Shariah guidelines. This might 
direct the contributions from the scholars, researchers, and Islamic bankers to focus on this target. This 
information can be used to develop targeted interventions aimed to update Sukuk standards issued by market 
regulators such as AAOIFI and IFSB, to mitigate the risks arising from Shariah non-compliance in Sukuk 
securitisations. 
  
Another possible area of future research would be to investigate Sukuk pricing models, as it is seen in the study 
that the Sukuk market does not efficiently price Sukuk risks. More investigation is required on how Sukuk 
pricing models are different from conventional pricing models. This aspect of research will help to improve 
Sukuk market efficiency and independence. 
  
An implication of these findings is that Sukuk structure risk should be considered by Sukuk education 
programmers, whether in higher education programmes or in professional training courses. In fact, the Sukuk 
industry needs to expand its footprint to accommodate more expertise and educate more market players. 
Increasing the knowledge base will assist in better Sukuk investment decisions and market practises. 
  
In summary, Sukuk risk analysis is a new line of research distinguishing Sukuk from conventional bonds, as 
well as helping to avoid failure or default in the market. Sukuk users will protect their investment by knowing 
the critical risk exposures of Sukuk and how to mitigate those risks via Sukuk structure risk analysis techniques. 
  
9.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the main contributions, limitations, and recommendations for future work of this study are 
highlighted. It is hoped that this study may contribute to the development of Islamic financial markets, and to 
the Sukuk market achieving its full potential as a Shariah compliant financing instrument.  
***  
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Appendix B:  
Saudi Arabian Sukuk Market 
Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to give sufficient background to the Saudi Arabian market to support the discussion 
in the rest of the thesis. Some further background material is contained in the Appendices. 
The importance of Saudi Arabia for Sukuk lies in the fact that Saudi Arabia has the largest financial market in 
the GCC and is becoming the hub of the Islamic finance industry. This is influenced by the flourishing oil trade 
in Saudi Arabia which makes the country one of the wealthiest in the world. 
This chapter gives an overview of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and discusses the Saudi Arabian financial 
system and capital markets, the role of Islamic finance in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Arabian Sukuk market, and 
the relationship between Sukuk market performance and oil market trends within the context of Saudi Arabia. 
Some recent and current developments and challenges for the Saudi Arabian Sukuk market are discussed. 
 
Overview of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest free market economy in the Middle East and North Africa, holding 
25% share of the total Arab GDP. The Kingdom’s geographic location provides easy access to export markets 
in Europe, Asia and Africa. It has a continuously expanding domestic market, with annual population growth 
of 3.5%, which is adding to a young and consuming population with strong buying power. The investment 
environment in the Kingdom reflects traditions of liberal, open market, private enterprise policies and its new 
Foreign Investment Law allows 100 % foreign ownership of projects and real estate. The Kingdom has an 
impressive record of political and economic stability and has a modern world-class infrastructure. 
Saudi Arabia has the biggest oil reserves in the world (25%). The Kingdom is endowed with other natural 
resources including a wide range of industrial raw materials and minerals such as bauxite, limestone, gypsum, 
and phosphate and iron ore. There are no restrictions on foreign exchange or repatriation of capital and profits. 
It has a very stable currency, has no foreign exchange curbs, and companies are allowed 100% repatriation of 
profits. The Kingdom is among the few countries in the world that allow companies to carry forward losses 
indefinitely, effectively relieving businesses of the tax burden until they become profitable. The Kingdom does 
not impose personal income taxes. Labour costs in almost all spheres are low. Additional incentives offered to 
investors include exemption of export goods from storage fees for 10 days, annual land rent in industrial areas 
fixed at 2 US cents/square meter, cuts in corporation tax of 30%, 50% cuts in port fees on all exports, and 
exemption of industrial machinery and equipment from duties.  
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The Saudi Arabian Financial System  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s financial sector posted solid growth in 2011 and 2012 and is now one of the 
largest in the GCC, with total assets reaching $439.7 billion by the third quarter of 2012. In addition, bank 
profitability has risen in recent years, reaching $8.23 billion at the end of 2011, up from $6.94 billion at the 
end of 2010 and $7.14 billion in 2009. The financial industry’s expansion over the past few years is largely the 
result of strong fundamentals and a proactive government, especially in the wake of the 2008-09 international 
economic downturns. Since mid-2011, in particular, the banking sector has benefitted from solid non-oil GDP 
growth and strong spending from both the government and private sectors. Looking ahead, the continued 
expansion is expected for the sector, with high liquidity levels meaning that many banks are preparing to boost 
lending further (The report: Saudi Arabia 2013, Oxford Business Group). The growing GDP figure, 
compressing the economic progress of the country into a single figure, provides evidence too of a society 
‘getting its collective act together’ (Growth report, 2008). As the economy grows, society becomes more tightly 
organized, more interconnected, one in which energies and resources are better deployed, and in which 
technologies are mastered and applied for the benefit of its members. Figure 1 below shows the historical 
performance of the Saudi GDP index from 1970 till 2011. It shows that the nominal GDP of the Kingdom has 
roughly doubled since 2005. In comparison with its neighbouring countries, Saudi Arabia achieved the highest 
GPD performance within the GCC countries. Also, the table below illustrates the major developments in GCC 
economies via different economic factors over 2010 and 2011. It is clearly seen that Saudi Arabia has a stronger 
economy against the GCC countries. This is because Saudi Arabia is the largest crude oil exporter in the world 
with the oil sector accounting for roughly 80% of budget revenues, 45% of GDP, and 90% of export earnings. 
On a global scale, the Kingdom is a member of the group of G20 countries.  
Figure 1: Gross Domestic Product 
 
Source: World Bank data, 2013  
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Table 1: Major Developments in GCC Economies  
 
Source: 48th Annual Report, SAMA, 2013 
The economy of Saudi Arabia is strong and favourably situated to achieve positive growth. The economic 
growth rate reflects all other economic activities in the country. According to the 48th Annual Report (2013): 
“issued by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the growth rate rose from 5.1 percent in 2010 to 7.1 
percent in 2011. In fact, the growth has been uneven due to changes in the price of crude oil; still it has been 
sufficiently robust, with consistent positive growth rates over the past several decades”. The International 
Monetary Fund issued a world economic outlook report (April, 2013) that stated that the average oil price rose 
by 31.6 percent in 2011, and increased further by 10.3 percent to US$ 114.7 per barrel in 2012. To shed light 
on the growth impact, data on GDP at constant prices, including import duties, show that it grew by 7.1 percent 
to Saudi Riyals 941.8 billion in 2011 from Saudi Riyals 879.8 billion in 2010. All major economic activities 
grew at varied rates. The financial sector grew by 3.0 percent (SAMA, 2013). This means the economy of Saudi 
Arabia continues to be based around oil which provides the dominant source of funds through which financial 
institutions are based (Akhter, 2010). This may be considered as one reason explaining why the financial crisis 
was less pronounced in Saudi Arabia compared to the western economies. 
The government’s current account surplus has been strong and consistent, averaging about 20% of GDP, while 
the capital account deficit declined from 22.4% to 9.4% of GDP from 2006 to 2010. Bank lending to the private 
sector increased strongly and consistently over this period, reaching a yearly increase of 13.5% in April 2012. 
The Tadawul All Share Index (TASI) increased from 5,500 in March 2011 to 7,900 in March 2012, continuing 
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to increase to 8,481.1 in December 2013. The number of factories increased from 3484 in 2004 to 4878 in 
2011, with unemployment down from 12% in 2006 to 10.5% in 2012 (Gamble 2012 and Ministry of Economy, 
2011). 
 
On the other hand, the essential system which should be followed in Saudi Arabia is the Islamic finance system, 
because it is classified as an Islamic country. Al-Hassan, Jhamis and Oulidi (2010) investigated why both 
systems work in the Saudi market (Islamic finance and Conventional finance). Also, they illustrated how 
similar these systems are. They claimed that because of the massive production and export of oil from Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf countries, it can be said the Saudi market shares with neighbouring countries the same 
economic principles, which means sharing the strengths and vulnerabilities. After all, Islamisation on banking 
products and services in Saudi Arabia was driven also in some way from a marketing perspective in order to 
meet the interest of the bank users by adopting what they need.  The financial sector in this area is obviously 
controlled by banks. In other words, financial institutions are found to be fewer than banks and do not compete 
head to head with banks in this field. Al-Hassan et al. (2010) also argued that the investment system in Saudi 
Arabia was exposed to vulnerability in some cases, such as the recent financial crisis. According to Woertz 
(2008), the Saudi Arabian market suffered around a 40% decrease in their indices. However, Gomel and Saidi 
(2010) indicated that banks benefited from an average increase in the GDP, which was about seven percent 
from 2003 to 2008. The investment system in Saudi Arabia is well known for having its features shared. Obay 
and Kashani (2008) described the investment sector and mentioned that the main feature is its work in the 
narrow domestic market. Another factor is that this system is monitored by highly restricted regulations from 
the government. Obviously, these regulations affect the operations of the Saudi banks, but at the same time 
they help reduce involvement in high risk investments.  
 
It has been observed that there are new developments occurring to boost the profitability of these investment 
companies and banks. One of these developments, discussed by Pock, Croonenberg and Buchta (2007), is that 
there are some emerging contracts between banks, clearly to strengthen their financial positions on this matter. 
Specifically, in 2008 Saudi Arabia became a member of the World Trade Organisation which obliges their 
members to open the local market to foreign investors; they allow foreign banks to share domestic banks and 
operate in new banks’ brands. However, this sharing policy has its limits and conditions and is not fully open 
to foreign banks owning open equity. For example, the percentage of the ownership for foreign banks is limited 
to no more than 40%. 
 
Nevertheless, Ariss, Rezvanian and Mehdian (2007) claimed that the revolution of globalisation puts Saudi 
financial institutions under pressure to be more productive and actively competitive. Because of this, financial 
institutions in Saudi Arabia are advised to focus on putting efficiency high on the scale, which obviously 
concentrates on increasing profitability with decreasing costs. 
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There are other economic indices measuring the economy of Saudi Arabia such as interest, inflation rates and 
country public debt. According to a SAMA report (2013): “the interest rate in Saudi Arabia as set by the Saudi 
Inter-Bank Offered Rate (SIBOR) is affected by two factors. Firstly, as Saudi Arabia is an open economy, there 
are no restrictions on currency exchange. Secondly, Saudi Arabia has utilised a Riyal/Dollar pegged currency 
exchange rate scheme since 1986 at USD$ 1 = SR3.75 as it plays a decisive role in monetary policy, inflation 
stability and the balance of payments”. The consequences of such pegging imply that Saudi Arabia’s financial 
market is highly integrated, although not always, with the US market. Therefore, the concentrations of foreign 
exchange outflow and US dollar/riyal interest rate differentials (of about 1½ percent) have some affect in 
shaping the Riyal interest rates (USA International Business Publications, 2005).  
 
The public debt of the country also reflects the economic development in the Kingdom. The outstanding public 
debt recorded a decline of 18.9% to SR 135.499 million or 6.1% of GDP at the end of the fiscal year 1433/1434 
H (2011) compared to a decline of 25.8% and 9.8% of GDP in fiscal year 2010. The total amount borrowed 
during 2011 stood at SR 5.422 million against SR 15 million in the preceding year. The total amount paid out 
stood at SR 36.922 million compared to SR 124 million in the previous year (SAMA annual report, 2013)  
 
Table 2: Public Debt index in Saudi Arabia  
 
Source: 48th Annual Report, SAMA, 2013 
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Table 3 (a): Selected Economic Indications (1) 
 
Source: 48th annual report, SAMA, 2013 
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Table 3 (b): Selected Economic Indications (2) 
 
Source:42nd,43rd,44th,45th, annual report, SAMA 
 
The empirical research we perform throughout this thesis discusses the financial risk of the Saudi Arabian 
Sukuk market. The choice of Saudi Arabia as a case study is for several reasons. First, the Saudi Arabian 
financial market is the largest market among its rivals in both the Middle East and North African (MENA) area 
and the Muslim world. Second, the Saudi market contains most of the properties that distinguish an emerging 
financial market from a developed one including high levels of volatility, market incompleteness, market 
imperfection and violation of the efficient market hypothesis. Third, on macroeconomic and monetary levels, 
the country shares common characteristics with some major developing countries such as China. The Kingdom 
has, recently, been experiencing fast growth rates; it is an export driven economy and it adopts a fixed exchange 
rate policy. Fourth, it has a major impact on the global economy as it is the world’s largest oil supplier. Last, 
the Saudi Arabian economy is strongly affected by Islamic principles. Saudi Arabia is known as the most 
religious country in the world, where people are practicing Islam in daily life. Therefore, any activity or exertion 
that contradicts Islamic rules would be rejected by the people, or at least by the majority. As far as the financial 
system is concerned, the influence of Islamic principles is clearly affecting the financial institutions. Thus, a 
good understanding of the characteristics and financial risks of the Sukuk market will assist in understanding 
the factors that drive similar emerging financial markets, especially in the GCC region.  
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The Saudi Arabian Capital Market 
The Saudi Arabian stock, bond and Sukuk markets (Arabic: ةيدوعسلا ةيلاملا قوسلا) operated by the Tadawul 
company are the only tradable financial securities markets in Saudi Arabia. They are supervised by the Capital 
Market Authority. The Tadawul All-Share Index (TASI) reached its highest pre-crisis level at 20,634.86 on 25 
February 2006. It lists 160 publicly traded companies (as of December 25, 2013), distributed into 15 sectors. 
Its trading hours are 11AM to 3:30PM, Sunday to Thursday (Tadawul site, 2013). 
 
Historically, the capital market first appeared in Saudi Arabia in the 1930s. At that time the market had not 
achieved high standards of regulation because it was considered an informal and unorganised market. Most of 
the projects and corporations at the time were owned primarily by the government or families. Even after the 
boost in oil prices between 1973 and 1981, which meant that the country needed to set up new projects, the 
government ignored the need for a capital market to facilitate financial instruments in order to finance these 
new projects; their solution instead was to borrow money from financial institutions such as the Saudi Industrial 
Developing Bank (SIDB).  
 
After 1984, Saudi Arabia experienced significant industrial development, which bought awareness of the need 
to establish new economic schemes. Financial institutions such as SIDB were no longer efficient at financing 
new projects, and the private sector believed that the government should adopt new methods to help mobilise 
national savings through capital markets in order to finance the emerging growth.  
For this reason, stock market trading was regulated by the Ministerial Committee in 1984; afterwards, in 1997, 
the authorities allowed foreign investors to invest in the stock market through mutual funds in order to increase 
the depth of the stock market. Recently, in 2015 CMA made the Saudi Stock market a free trade market and 
foreign investors can access the market directly.   
 
The Capital Market Authority (CMA) is the Saudi Arabian government organisation responsible for regulating 
the Saudi Arabian capital market. It has financial, legal and administrative independence and reports directly 
to the Prime Minister. Its responsibilities include setting rules and regulations, making sure they are followed, 
operating a committee to settle disputes and developing the capital markets in Saudi Arabia. Its role also 
includes regulating the Saudi bonds and Sukuk markets. The CMA was established by the Capital Market Law, 
issued by Royal Decree No. M/30 dated 14/5/1425H [2 July, 2004] (CMA site, 2015). 
 
The CMA describes its duties as summarised below: 
• Improving and regulating the capital market. 
• Enhancing investors’ and the public’s protection from illegal and unfair actions, such as fraud, dishonesty, 
deception, manipulation and unfair trade. 
• Applying practices to guarantee fair, efficient and transparent financial transactions. 
• Developing scales to mitigate the risks associated with financial transactions. 
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• Improving, regulating and supervising the issuance and trading in financial securities. 
• Regulating and supervising activities adopted by entities operating under the control of CMA. 
• Regulating and supervising disclosures and information related to the financial market and the entities 
operating under the control of CMA. 
• Regulating market operations and public offerings. 
 
The capital market law is mainly designed for restructuring the capital market in the Kingdom by introducing 
new concepts that may contribute to protecting investors, enhancing confidence in the market, attracting 
investments and increasing market transparency. The law provides an umbrella and integrated regulatory 
reference for the market that explains structures, regulations, supervision and operational entities and defines 
their duties and obligations.  
The Saudi Arabian stock market has been growing positively since 2008, as shown by the stock market 
indicators in the following table.  
 
Table 4: Saudi Arabian Stock Market Indicators  
 
Source: 48th Annual Report, SAMA, 2013 
The Saudi Arabian capital market comprises stock, bond and Sukuk trades. On the debt securities side, another 
debt instrument adopted in the market but restricted to government trades only, is the Treasury Bill. Because 
the thesis focuses on the debt market in Saudi Arabia, only a quick introduction to the Saudi Treasury Bills 
trade is given. It is considered a short term debt security. Treasury Bills are used for cash-flow management 
and are offered only to banks. In 1991, another cornerstone evolution took place in the Saudi capital market 
where Treasury Bills took the place of Bankers Security Deposit Accounts (BSDAs, i.e. Central Bank Bills) 
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being offered on a weekly basis for quarterly fixing linked to 3-month SIBOR for maturities of 1, 4, 13, 26, 
and 52 weeks (SAMA, Annual Report, 2007). 
Due to the fact that the Saudi government fiscal situation improved considerably in 2005 and 2006 as oil prices 
surged, the Saudi government diminished its recourse to a weekly issue of Treasury Bills from SR 2 billion in 
2005 to SR 1 billion in 2006. The Saudi GDP strengthened at an unprecedented rate which helped to bring 
down the public debt from 82 percent in 2003 to 65 percent in 2004, and to 38.9 percent in 2005, and 27.9 
percent in 2006 (SAMA Annual Report 2007). Treasury Bills (t-bills) have been an efficient scheme in the 
liquidity management currently implemented by SAMA.  
 
Islamic Finance in the Saudi Arabian Market 
Islamic finance in the Saudi financial market is in direct competition with the Conventional financial system. 
However, the question remains as to whether the Islamic finance system is able to be a lasting competitor. In 
other words, is the Islamic finance system developed enough to remain as a fundamental finance system or is 
it just a bubble that is expected to burst in the near future? One of the key answers to these questions is illustrated 
by Al-Zamel (2006), who indicated that the principles that Islamic banks in the Saudi market, or even in the 
whole world, depend on, make this competition even harder. One of the key issues in this case is that one of 
the banks’ essential sources of income is from instruments based on interest, which forces Islamic banks to 
find other innovative methods as alternatives to this traditional profitable window. To resolve these issues, Al-
Zamel (2006) suggested that Islamic banking needs to be included in the framework as a part of the ultimate 
Islamic economy which requires more open Islamic markets and involvement in the whole creation of Islamic 
countries’ GDP. For example, in the case of resolving the problem of interest rates and interest-related issues, 
Al-Zamel (2006) gave alternatives by creating a financial capital rate instead of interest rate. This rate employs 
equity and shares as factors to move the rate up or down as an index. In this regard, Wilson (2008) argued that 
in Saudi Arabia, the GDP should be considered as a benchmark for price based on sovereign Sukuk.  
 
On the other hand, in the debt securities context, currently there are alternative indices which the Islamic finance 
industry might use, such as the Dow Jones Sukuk Index which is designed to measure the performance of the 
global Sukuk market launched in 2006. The Islamic Interbank Benchmark Rate (IIBR) was launched on 22 
November, 2011 by Thomson Reuters. It is classified as the dominant Islamic Interbank Benchmark Rate. It is 
designed to provide an objective and dedicated indicator for the average expected return on Shariah-compliant 
short-term interbank funding (Thomson Reuters site, 2011). It may be noticed that those Sukuk indices 
addressed Sukuk performance regardless of the type or financial structure, treating it as one unit while omitting 
Sukuk structure in the performance measurement. This may lead to an inaccurate result on the investment 
decision of investors. This research attempts to figure out the relationship between Sukuk structure and 
performance in terms of risk and return. It investigates the idea of Sukuk performance measurements by having 
different scales of measurement based on Sukuk structure in the global market.  
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The Islamic finance market size in Saudi Arabia has increased overall. For instance, much of the Islamic 
investment activity in the GCC has involved Islamic syndicated financing of projects, with, not surprisingly 
Saudi Arabia the most active market followed by the UAE, as Table 3 shows. 
 
Table 5: Syndicated Islamic Finance in the GCC, 2000-2008 
Country No. of deals Value of deals 
in US$ million 
Bahrain 30 4.222 
Kuwait 15 5.148 
Oman 2 345 
Qatar 24 4.088 
Saudi Arabia 46 28.537 
UAE 41 15.655 
Source: Islamic Finance Information Service, October 2008 
 
This implies that the provisions are clear and there is no problem in drawing up legal contracts consistent with 
Shariah principles for this type of financing facility (Siddiqi, 1985). 
 
As a consequence Islamic banking in Saudi Arabia has been very profitable, with AlRajhi Bank being by far 
the most profitable bank in Saudi Arabia with net income exceeding SR6.4 billion in 2007 and SR6.5 billion 
in 2008. Despite a stock market correction negatively affecting fees and Murabaha repayments, almost SR 99 
billion was held in AlRajhi demand deposits in 2008, but a mere SR 17.7 billion held in time deposits on which 
a return was earned.  
 
Wood’s (2009) study addressed the market size of the Islamic market in Saudi Arabia. He stated that Saudi 
Arabia is the second most important centre for the Islamic finance fund management market. There were 131 
Islamic funds domiciled and managed in Saudi Arabia by late 2009, against 149 in Malaysia. It may be argued 
that the expansion of the Malaysian market against the Saudi Arabian market is driven by the different Shariah 
school that they follow and adopt for interpretations of Islamic finance principles. Kettel (2013) commented 
that the current practice of Islamic banking in Malaysia has been criticised as being insufficiently different 
from Conventional banking. The focus of this criticism is the application of Shariah to the Bay-Al-Inah contract 
in creating a number of so-called Islamic financing products. Bay-Al-Inah is a sale contract with immediate 
repurchase. It takes place when a financial institution sells an asset on credit terms and immediately buys back 
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the asset, for cash, at a lower price. The classical jurists are in disagreement in assessing the legality of the 
contract. It was impermissible in other Shariah schools such as the school followed in Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf states. This is a critical consideration between the two competitive Islamic finance markets.  
 
The Saudi Arabian Sukuk Market  
First, the Saudi Arabian market in government bills and bonds has become much more sophisticated in recent 
years, partly reflecting the growth of government debt and the consequent efforts to find more methods of 
funding it. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) handles these through its transactions with the 
commercial banks, and with the repossessions serving as their liquid assets. The average value of repos was 
SR1.8 billion and reverse repos SR3.2 billion in 2002, compared with averages of SR1.6 and SR1.0 billion 
respectively in 2000 (Wilson, 2008). Moreover, the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis encouraged 
the market trend towards Sukuk investment, due to the perceived lower risk profile of Islamic finance enjoyed 
during the crisis. This lead SAMA to establish a secondary market for Sukuk trade. Globally, Saudi Arabia has 
become a competitor in the Sukuk market with Malaysia and UAE.  
 
Figure 2: Global Sukuk markets by countries 
 
 
Figure 3: Global Issuance data by value for 2012 (USD million) 
Source: IIRA, Islamic Capital Market, 2012 
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Source: Zawya, 2012 
 
13th June 2009 was the first day of the first trading session in Saudi Arabian bonds and the Sukuk market. The 
new electronic market provides services such as: listing of Sukuk and bonds, order and transaction execution, 
clearing and settlement among traders, and price information direct dissemination. The mechanism for trading 
Sukuk via the market takes place through licensed brokerage firms operating in the exchange and using the 
same investment portfolio used for trading stocks. The Sukuk and bonds market is meant to create new 
investment options to Saudi investors to facilitate the investment strategy of portfolio diversification after the 
collapse of the stock market. In contrast with trading in stocks, the ratio of price change of Sukuk and bonds is 
unlimited. For example, there is no maximum or minimum limit for the change in prices. The Sukuk and bonds 
markets follow the Saudi capital law supervised by CMA and operated by Tadawul Company.  
 
The growth of the Sukuk market in Saudi Arabia is dynamic. Fayez (2009) contributed a study of the Sukuk 
market in Saudi Arabia. He stated that Saudi Arabia offers great potential for the development of financial 
services by setting up the Sukuk market. He expects the Sukuk market to increase the use of Sukuk in the global 
market, which is a tremendous opportunity for Saudi Arabia. According to a Zawya report in 2009, one of the 
factors which would lead to the increasing use of Sukuk would be greater limits on the size of bank loans. 
Companies in need of finance and investment would be encouraged to use Sukuk if banks do not provide higher 
valued loans. Latham and Watskin (2010) stated that a sense of urgency to develop diversified sources of 
income has developed in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. Sukuk are financing a lot of these 
development activities, especially infrastructure projects, which the Saudi government mainly tends to establish 
these days. To elaborate, economists believe that the Saudi Arabian economy needs to reduce its dependency 
on its dwindling oil resources. Recently, this was enhanced with the Kingdom announcement on 23 December 
2013 by King Abdullah Ben Abdul Aziz that the government strategy intends to increase the diversification of 
the economy towards non-oil resources in the country. Thus, the finance ministry announced that the 
government will issue sovereign Sukuk in 2014 sponsored by the government treasury to finance infrastructure 
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projects in the Kingdom, starting with new airports across the country. Regarding the GCC Sukuk markets, 
Saudi Arabia has become the third player in terms of Sukuk issuance after UAE and Bahrain. Table 4 below 
shows Sukuk issuance numbers in the GCC countries over the period 2000 to 2008. Because Saudi Arabia 
started up in Sukuk investment later than other GCC countries, such as UAE and Bahrain this explains the 
smaller number of issues in the Kingdom. However, the total value of Sukuk issued by Saudi Arabia is bigger 
than the total value of the Bahrain Sukuk.  
 
Table 6: Sukuk securities issuance in the GCC over the period 2000 to 2008 
Country 
No. of 
Sukuk issuances 
Value 
in US$ million 
Bahrain 89 4.543 
Kuwait 12 2.203 
Qatar 5 1.571 
Saudi Arabia 15 9.585 
UAE 34 26.823 
Source: Islamic Finance Information Service, October 2008 
 
Type of structures and listing of Sukuk 
According to Alawwal Capital (recently name Saudi Hollandi Capital) report in Sukuk (2013), the Saudi 
Arabian Sukuk market has developed different Sukuk structures over the years, with Investment Sukuk (mixed 
structures) and Mudharabah being the most prominent, each accounting for approximately 30% of Sukuk 
issued so far. Prior to 2011, Investment Sukuk was the most popular structure among issuers. Recently, issuers 
have started preferring the Mudharabah based structure. In terms of listing, domestic issuers have preferred 
private placements rather than public issuances, with roughly a third of issuances listed on Saudi Arabia’s stock 
exchange, Tadawul. Prior to 2011, there were more public issuances, with 50% of Sukuk being listed. However, 
since 2011, there have been just four public issuances out of 18 (approximately 20%). With some of the earlier 
issuances being redeemed early, there are just eight Sukuk currently listed on Tadawul. 
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Figure 4: Saudi Arabian Sukuk market breakdown by structure 
 
Source: Sukuk report, (Saudi Hollandi) Alawal Capital, 2013 
 
Figure 5: Saudi Arabian Sukuk breakdown by listing 
 
Source: Sukuk report, (Saudi Hollandi) Alawal Capital, 2013 
 
Furthermore, the Sukuk market in Saudi Arabia inherited its strength from the solid economic drivers of the 
Saudi Arabian economy. Sukuk, as a Shariah compliant instrument generates an investment trend geared 
towards local investors in the Saudi market. In general, the major drivers of demand and supply of Sukuk in 
Saudi Arabia are the following:  
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1) Sukuk offered alternative source of funding for issuers. 
2) Sukuk are attractive as Shariah compliant investment options. 
3) Increasing infrastructure and industrial investments. 
4) Banks’ inclination to lend mostly for the short term. 
 
Saudi Arabian Sukuk Market Analysis 
To date there has been no record of bond trading in the market since it was established in 2009. This opens the 
wholesale market for Sukuk trading only. The development of corporate Sukuk was conducted only after the 
establishment of the sovereign Sukuk, with the main corporate Sukuk issuers being Saudi Arabia Basic 
Industries Corporation (SABIC), Saudi Electricity Company, Aramco Company and Alawwal Bank. 
 
The general view of the Sukuk market is a positive one. The total value of issued Sukuk reached SR38.3bn in 
2012. The TASI Sukuk and bonds market index recorded 994.03 points, a decrease from the starting point of 
1000 in 2009. The total number of Sukuk listed is eight, three of which were issued by SABIC with a nominal 
value of SR16 bn. One Sukuk was issued by the Alawwal Bank with a nominal value of SR 725 million, and 
three were issued by the Saudi Electricity Company with a nominal value of SR19 bn. The Saudi International 
Petrochemical Company (Sipchem) issued one Sukuk with a nominal value of SR1,800 million, Arabian 
Aramco Total Services Company contributed by issuing one Sukuk with a nominal value of SR3,750 million 
and recently the Saudi ORIXL leasing company issued one Sukuk with a nominal value of SR240 million. In 
2012, SABIC 2 and Saudi Electricity 1 Sukuk were redeemed and delisted from the Sukuk and bond market 
on 15 July 2012. Sukuk total traded value declined by 75.3% to SR 446.0 million in 2012 with 20 compared to 
49 in 2011, as presented in Table 5 (Annual report 2012, CMA). 
 
Table 7: Saudi Arabian Sukuk and bond market highlights 
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Source: Annual Report 2012, CMA 
The Sukuk issuance rate has performed positively over the last 8 years, apart from dropping during the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
Figure 6: Total Amount of Sukuk issuance in the Saudi Arabia over the period 2004 to 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IFIS, Sukuk Database, 2013 
 
 
More of the recent trends and development of the Saudi Arabian Sukuk market in Chapter 7 of this study 
computation of Sukuk returns and risk measures are presented, in order to provide a comparison between the 
return and risk profiles of the Saudi Arabian Sukuk market with the global Sukuk market. A main conclusion 
is that the consistency of positive returns during the period after the recent financial crisis has contributed to 
the development and growth of the Sukuk industry in Saudi Arabia.   
 
Other studies conducted on the analysis of the Sukuk market in Saudi Arabia include Wilson (2008) and 
Alsaeed (2012). Wilson (2008) provided an analysis of different Sukuk types from a financial prospective, 
discussing in particular whether the payment flows are stable in the case of sovereign Sukuk when the returns 
are based on the gross domestic product rather than fixed interest as is the case in Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. 
He found that the GDP-based pricing benchmark would have resulted in less payment volatility in the Saudi 
Arabian sovereign Sukuk but not for the Malaysian. He also noted that use of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) 
is a prerequisite for the successful issuance and management of Sukuk. Alsaeed (2012) contributed with a thesis 
evaluating the recent trends and the positive expectations of Sukuk issuance in Saudi Arabia. He also analysed 
corporate Sukuk issuances in the Saudi market over the period 2004 to 2010, by examining the issuance of 
corporate Sukuk and seeking opinions from market makers as to how this type of financing can be taken 
forward. He claimed that Sukuk have a better risk profile than bonds, as they are supported with mandatory 
underlying assets to reduce risk exposure. However, it might also be attributed to differing risk default factors 
between Sukuk and bonds. The study concluded that the outlook for Sukuk in Saudi Arabia is positive, with 
Sukuk becoming an important financing instrument complementing bank lending and IPOs. 
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Key Challenges for the Saudi Arabian Sukuk Market 
There are ongoing debates and criticism on current practices in Sukuk markets. Sukuk are still relatively new 
instruments and further research is required.  
Since late 2007 the Sukuk market has been adversely affected by two major events (Weddernurn-Day, 2010). 
First was the announcement by AAOIFI on the permitted Sukuk structures that adversely affected scholars’ 
acceptance of certain types of Sukuk. Second, the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on sovereign Sukuk 
issuance that contributed to the fall in Sukuk issuance. This means that interpretation of Shariah rules is not 
yet adequately standardised. This impedes the development of the Sukuk market, as Shariah scholars may 
interpret the Shariah rules differently, leading to inconsistent views on what is acceptable to investors. In this 
context, Fayez (2009) mentioned that it is observable that the Saudi Arabian Sukuk market lacks sufficient 
regulation and legislation. He argues that more regulation is needed, in particular because the current regulation 
does not enable the efficient setup of special purpose companies dedicated to the issuance of Sukuk and to the 
special transactions relating to Sukuk. 
 
In addition, Sukuk default is a major concern, which affects the investors’ trust for further investment in the 
same defaulted instrument. Challenges arise because Sukuk are based on Islamic law, which bans interest and 
requires a tangible asset to underlie financial transactions. 
In Saudi Arabia, Sukuk default recorded a lower rate compared with other Sukuk markets such as the GCC 
markets. It recorded one case of default in May 2009, Saad Group ‘Golden Belt’ with a value of US$650 
million. Saad’s Golden Belt Sukuk are secured by land in Saudi Arabia, valued at about 40% of the Sukuk 
principal (Robin, FT, 2009). The issue is not clear cut due to confusion arising from the difference between 
‘‘asset-based’’ and ‘‘asset-backed’’. This is a critical point in understanding the Sukuk structure concept and 
it will be discussed further in the following chapter (chapter 4). 
 
The limitation in the number of tradable Sukuk in the Saudi Arabian debt market creates limited trade volume. 
Despite the total outstanding payouts from Sukuk, it is important to achieve further development in Sukuk 
issuance and listing in the market.  
 
There are certain reasons for the slow Sukuk market development, including the lack of financial experts who 
are versed enough in two areas, Shariah requirements and financial skills. Anjum (2008) said that the legal 
framework of Sukuk needs a careful evaluation and the market needs to be regulated. In addition, inefficient 
government regulations make brokerage firms unable to engage in the trade of Sukuk. Finally, a major issue 
facing the Sukuk market is the diversity in the interpretation of Shariah law regarding Sukuk which leads to 
difficulty in standardisation of the instrument. In this regard, the Shariah interpretation issues on Sukuk play a 
crucial role because it can contribute to Sukuk default risk (Wilson, 2008). 
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The absence of domestic rating agencies is another issue facing the market. Saudi Sukuk and bonds markets do 
not have a local credit rating agency. The major foreign rating agencies have been providing rating services to 
local companies. The high costs and considerable time required for obtaining initial ratings have discouraged 
many companies. The rating methodologies of the foreign rating agencies tend to benchmark local companies 
with their peers in other markets. Sometimes such comparisons lead to unfavourable ratings for the local 
companies. Issue ratings are a valuable tool for pricing the security in secondary market trading. The 
establishment of a local rating agency would not only be helpful to the issuers and the investors but would also 
facilitate the development of an active secondary market.  
The credit rating of issuances has become important for financial institutions since the adoption of the Basel 
III framework for capital adequacy. Credit rating also enables issuers to secure batter pricing, increase tenures 
and attract more investors. The challenge so far is that the majority of domestic issues of Sukuk in Saudi Arabia 
are not rated. In contrast, the majority of international issuances tend to be rated as for international investors 
credit rating is a pre-requisite. Credit ratings are important for domestic Sukuk for ascertaining the quality of 
issues and improving liquidity in the secondary markets.  
 
The Saudi secondary Sukuk and bond market remains shallow and illiquid. After the building of the Sukuk 
platform in 2009, the total value of Sukuk traded on Tadawul was SAR446 million in 2012. There were only 
20 transactions recorded. Just seven Sukuk traded during the year. This low liquidity in the Sukuk market has 
been a constraint in attracting institutional and retail investors to the Sukuk market.  
 
One of the main challenges facing the Sukuk market is the absence of a comparable benchmark in the form of 
a yield curve. However, this is undergoing a change. Saudi Arabia issued its first government backed Sukuk in 
January 2012. The USD$4 billion GACA Sukuk has helped set a benchmark for the pricing of conventional 
and Islamic bond issues going forward. Sovereign issuances not only provide investors with a much needed 
pricing benchmark but also act as anchor securities for portfolio management and secondary trading. The 
Malaysian market, also considered the most liquid, is supported by frequent issuances by the government and 
its central bank. Such quasi-government-backed issuances will drive demand going forward (Sukuk report, 
Saudi Hollandi Capital, 2013). 
 
To summarise, those issues may be categorised into six major and inter-connected challenges: the interpretation 
of the Shariah rules is not adequately standardised; there is an insufficiently developed legal and regulatory 
framework; the lack of credit ratings for domestic Sukuk; the lack of Sukuk expertise; liquidity risk; the lack 
of an established benchmark yield curve; and insufficiently developed risk measurement tools within the 
context of Islamic finance theory. This implies that Sukuk need more research to be a reliable secured 
investment instrument.   
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Figure 7: Key challenges for the Saudi Arabian Sukuk market 
 
 
The Saudi Arabian Sukuk Market and Oil Market 
Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer in the world and plays a significant role in stabilising the crude oil 
market. Through its membership within the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it has 
always helped in harmonising demand and supply for oil to ensure that world economic growth rates are 
sustained to a satisfactory level. Oil was discovered in the Kingdom in 1938 (saudiaramco.com, 2013). Today 
it is sitting on top of more than a quarter of the world’s proven oil reserves; it has 261 bn barrels of proven oil 
reserves and up to one trillion of ultimately recoverable oil making the country one of the wealthiest in the 
world.  
It is questionable that there is an association between the oil market and Sukuk market in Saudi Arabia. A lot 
of research highlights that the financial system in Saudi Arabia is influenced by the oil market, such as Wilson 
(2009), Akhtar (2010) and Alsaeed (2012).  
In the Saudi oil market, “actual oil revenues recorded a rise of 54.3% to SR 1,034 bn in 2011. The share of oil 
revenues stood at 92.5% of total revenues in 2011, compared to 90.4% in 2012” (SAMA annual report, 2012). 
Besides, “non-oil revenues rose by 16.9% to SR 83.4 bn in 2011 against a fall of 5.4% in 2012. Their share 
was 7.5% of total revenues during 2011, compared to 9.6% in 2012” (SAMA annual report, 2012). Figure 4 
below shows an overview of Saudi Arabian revenue trends of actual oil and non-oil products. 
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Figure 4: Trends of Actual Oil and Non-Oil Revenues 
 
Source: SAMA Annual report, 2012 
 
To shed light on that, the contribution of the oil sector to GDP is positively associated. At 2012 oil prices the 
contribution to GDP was 58.0% during 2011 against 51.5% in 2012. The oil sector, at 2012 oil prices, registered 
an increase of 47.7% during 2011 against a growth of 31.7% in 2012. Table 8 and figure 5 below illustrate that 
contribution.  
Figure 5: Contribution of economic sectors to GDP in 2011  
 
Source: SAMA Annual report, 2012 
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Table 10: Contribution of oil sector to GDP
 
Source: SAMA Annual Report, 2012 
 
The contribution from the oil sector it reflected directly in the majority of economic activities in Saudi Arabia 
including Sukuk market.  
“Saudi Arabia had traditionally been considered the sleeping giant of regional debt capital markets, but this 
has certainly changed in the past eighteen months as we have seen an upsurge in riyal Sukuk issuance,” says 
Stuart Ure, partner at law firm Clifford Chance in Dubai, 2011’’ (Oil & Gas News website, 2015). 
 
High oil prices have resulted in large surpluses for Gulf countries and created opportunities for strong economic 
growth. Thanks to the oil windfall, oil-exporting countries’ cumulative current account surplus increased from 
5.4% of GDP in 2002 to 20% in 2006. 
The focus of domestic economic policy on the private sector has made the oil-induced economic boom of this 
period different from the previous ones that the GCC has experienced. Across the GCC, the non-oil sector grew 
at almost double the rate of the oil sector and, within the non-oil sector the private sector has taken the lead. 
Saudi Arabia’s performance is particularly remarkable as the largest economy in the region, representing more 
than 50% of the GCC, having successfully embarked on a programme of economic diversification and reforms. 
Given the size of proposed projects, equity and government budgets alone cannot be the only source of 
financing for the next phase of the Kingdom’s economic growth and industrialization. Increasingly, reliance 
will be on debt capital markets for raising funds through Sukuk and other instruments. 
During the period 2007-11, over USD200 billion of debt was required across the GCC region to finance 
infrastructure, petrochemicals and other projects. In the past, syndicated loans have dominated the funding of 
domestic investment projects. 
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This is now changing with capital markets gradually increasing in importance and replacing banking as the 
major source of funding. Thus, Sukuk financing is witnessing strong growth.  
After the oil price crisis beginning in late in 2014 Sukuk issuance was affected, slowing its development in 
Saudi Arabia. The decline in oil prices was recorded from around USD$115 per barrel in June 2014 to an 
average of USD$80 per barrel in 4thQ 2014 and USD$58 per barrel in 1stQ 2015 (Bloomberg, 2014). The Oil 
and Gas sector has dominated the Saudi Sukuk market which accounted for 34.3% of total value of Sukuk 
issued during 2003-2009 (Aljazira Capital report, 2010). 
The oil price decline has affected the global economy, including Russia and United States. Overall, lower oil 
prices are positive for the global economy, especially for advanced economies which are predominantly oil 
importers. These economies benefit from lower inflation and better consumer sentiment. Nevertheless, 
economic prospects for oil producing countries remain subdued in the near future, as these economies adjust 
to lower oil prices and lower export earnings, amongst others. Oil experts and financial professionals have 
referred that to the oil price war and Saudi Arabia’s role in it. Appendix D presents the story of the recent oil 
price crisis.   
It has observed, after reaching new heights in 2015, global Sukuk issuances for the 1stQ 2015 declined to 
USD$18.7 billion from USD$24.2 billion in 4thQ 2014. As the global Sukuk market is closely tied to sentiment 
in the global economic and financial sector and, as most Sukuk issuing countries are among the world’s leading 
oil producers, the decline in oil prices has been a notable factor affecting the Sukuk market. However, this 
decline in Sukuk issuances is expected to be temporary as growth drivers for the Sukuk market remain intact, 
continuing to attract cross-border issuances, issuances from supra-national organisations, sovereign entities and 
corporate issuers tapping the market for capital expansion and working capital needs. Generally, Sukuk are 
expected to maintain its status as a viable and competitive source of funding (Global Sukuk report, 2015) 
 
In summary, it can be witnessed that in the long term the Sukuk market in Saudi Arabia may rely on the 
continuing support of the oil market, with oil revenues continuing to be the main revenue source of the country 
for a significant period. Diversification of the economy away from oil will provide further opportunities for the 
growth of the Sukuk market. This may be seen as an interesting study for further empirical research on the 
relationship between Sukuk and oil indices in Saudi Arabia.  
The Summary  
There are quite a few conclusions that can be drawn from the preceding discussion. First, the Saudi economy 
is showing a strong economic and financial performance with high growth rates and surpluses in its balance of 
payments and high profitability in the banking industry. Second, the economy is highly dependent on the oil 
market. Most of the deficits it had during the slowdown period were caused by drops in oil prices and a decrease 
in the global demand for oil. Likewise, all surpluses and booms during the Kingdom’s history are due to high 
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levels of oil prices. Third, the Saudi Arabian financial market is the largest within its area. Fourth, Sukuk is an 
alternative investment instrument which has created investor interest in the last decades. Many researchers 
consider Sukuk as a Shariah compliant instrument providing an alternative to the fixed income securities of 
conventional finance. The performance of Islamic financial institutions and instruments during and after the 
2008 financial crisis has provided strong support to the development of the Sukuk industry around the world. 
Finally, the Saudi Arabian government intends to expand the Sukuk and bond markets using its strong financial 
position in the global oil market. These conclusions have consequences for the analysis we perform in the 
thesis, as they indicate the incompleteness and imperfections in the Sukuk market and which should be 
accounted for. Below more fact information about the Saudi Arabia. 
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Overview of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
o Official Name: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
 
o Area: Saudi Arabia occupies four-fifths of the 
Arabian Peninsula with an area of more 
than 2,250,000 square kilometers. 
 
o Phy. Features: Deserts, Plateaux, Mountains   
o Natural Glimpse Saudi Arabia occupies most of the Arabian Peninsula, and consists of narrow 
valleys along the coast of the Red Sea (Tuhama plains), followed to the east by 
mountain ranges extending along the length of the country (the mountains of the 
Hijaz and Asir, where maximum height exceeds 2000m), followed by deserts and 
rocky plateaus in the centre (90% of the total space). The largest desert is 
Alnufood in the north and Arruba Alkhali in the south. In the east, coastal plains 
stretch wide along the Gulf coast. 
o Population: 22,678,262   
o Language: Arabic   
o Religion: Islam   
o Flag: Green Banner of Islam, bearing the inscription: "There is no God but God; and 
Muhammad is his Messenger". The sword was added in 1906, symbolizing the 
military successes of Islam and of Ibn Saud, founder of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia 
o Currency: Saudi Riyal  
o Capital: Riyadh  
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o Head of State: King Salman bin Abdul Aziz, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques 
o Highest Court: Supreme Council of Justice.   
o Administrative 
Regions: 
Riyadh, Makkah, Madinah, Al-Baha, Al-Jouf, Asir, Eastern, Hail, Jizan, Najran, 
Northern Border, Qasim, Tabouk 
o Location: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is located in the far south-west of Asia. It is bordered 
by Jordan, and Iraq on the north and northeast, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates on the east, Oman on the southeast, and Yemen on the south. It is also 
connected to Bahrain by the King Fahd Causeway. The Red Sea lies to its west, 
and the Persian gulf lies to the northeast 
o Emerging 
Economy: 
Saudi Arabia is fully committed to increasing private sector participation in 
economic growth. Privatization is a key element of the Kingdom’s economic 
liberalization and a host of sectors are being opened to the private sector. 
Telecommunications, electricity, airlines, postal services, railways, port services 
and water utilities are some of the potential areas for investment. 
The Kingdom proposes to invest $200 billion in the oil, gas, electricity and 
desalination and petrochemical industries. Global oil companies are also 
considering investing $100 billion over a period of 20 years in the production of 
natural gas. It is also expected that $6 billion worth of domestic capital will be 
invested in the tourism sector. Saudi Arabia is a founding member of Convention 
on Arbitration and is in the process of obtaining World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
membership. The Kingdom is also a member in numerous other international and 
regional organizations. 
Saudi Arabia’s privatization and economic diversification efforts have gained 
momentum since the creation of the new Supreme Economic Council (SEC). The 
purpose behind the creation of the SEC is to speed up economic reforms aimed at 
opening Saudi markets and ensure stability for investors. The SEC has been 
officially responsible for the Kingdom’s privatization efforts since early 2001. It 
plays a supervisory role in the formulation of economic policy, managing the 
budget and coordinating the implementation of policies between government 
departments and agencies. The SEC evaluates economic, industrial, agricultural 
and labour policies to assess their effectiveness and impact on the national 
economy, diversification of the country’s economic base and the growth of its 
competitive economic strength.  
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Source: Saudi Arabian embassy of United Kingdom, 2015 
 
 
Pictures form Saudi Arabia 
Figure 6: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia location  
 
  
o Economic 
industries:  
 Petrochemicals and Downstream Industries 
 Natural gas extraction and distribution 
 Water desalination 
 Electrical power generation 
 Information Technology 
 Infrastructure 
 Industrial equipment and spare parts 
 Mining 
 Tourism 
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The Holy Mosque in Makkah Al-Mukarramah 
 
The Holy Mosque in Almadinah Al-Munawarah 
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Appendix C:  
Malaysian Sukuk Market  
Introduction  
In Islamic capital finance, Sukuk considered as a hot topic that addressed recently by academics and 
practitioners. The biggest excises of Sukuk have been accommodated in Malaysia. Malaysian Sukuk Market is 
the main player and holds the biggest global market share of Sukuk, representing 70% of global Sukuk 
insurance based in Malaysia. This chapter is link up with pervious chapters by explains the research filed and 
introducer of the research data place of Sukuk market that will examine later in analysis chapter. Moreover, 
this chapter explains how Islamic finance emergence in Malaysia and how emergence manner influences on 
constructing Sukuk market. Also, it is presents the similarities and dissimilarities between Saudi Arabian Sukuk 
Market and Malaysian Sukuk Market. This chapter concludes by revealing the comparison stage and nature of 
the environment of the two players of Sukuk market that examines in this research. This chapter is continuing 
presenting the research filed and introduce of research data place.    
 
Overview of Malaysia  
 
According to the World Bank database (2015) describing Malaysia is a highly open, upper-middle income 
economy. Malaysia was one of 13 countries identified by the Commission on Growth and Development in 
its (2008) Growth Report to have recorded average growth of more than 7 percent per year for 25 years or 
more. Economic growth was inclusive, as Malaysia also succeeded in nearly eradicating poverty: the share of 
households living below the national poverty line (USD$8.50 per day in 2012) fell from over 50 percent in the 
1960s to less than 1.0 percent currently.  
From an economy dominated by the production of raw natural resource materials, such as tin and rubber, even 
as recently as the 1970s, Malaysia today has a diversified economy and has become a leading exporter of 
electrical appliances, electronic parts and components, palm oil, natural gas and Islamic finance services. After 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, Malaysia continued to post solid growth rates, averaging 5.5 percent 
per year from 2000-2008. Malaysia was hit by the Global Financial Crisis in 2009 but recovered 
rapidly, posting growth rates averaging 5.7 percent since 2010. 
Growth was accompanied by a dramatic reduction in poverty from 49.3 percent in 1970 to 1.0 percent in 2014. 
However, pockets of poverty remain and income inequality remains high relative to other developed countries: 
Malaysia’s gini coefficient (the measure ratio of statistical dispersion) of income inequality stood at 0.41 in 
2014, compared with 0.31 and 0.33 in the Republic of Korea and Japan (both as of 2010), for example. Real 
income of the bottom 40 percent of households increased by an average 6.3 percent per year between 2009 and 
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2012, compared to 5.2 percent for the average household, suggesting the benefits from growth were being 
shared. 
Malaysia’s near-term economic outlook remains overall favorable, despite some risks. The economy has 
diversified from commodities and the Government has taken steps to broaden the revenue base by introducing 
a Goods and Services Tax in 2015. Short-term risks include further declines in oil prices and oil related taxes 
that still account for around 30 percent of public revenues, although this is partially compensated by 
the removal of fuel subsidies in 2014. Other risks are related to the volatility in capital flows from the 
normalisation of US monetary policy. The long-term sustainability of this favorable outlook hinges on 
structural reforms to strengthen medium-term fiscal planning, and to boost capabilities and competition within 
the economy. 
Accelerated implementation of productivity enhancing reforms to increase the quality of human capital 
and create more competition in the economy will be key for Malaysia to secure a lasting place among the ranks 
of high income economies. In fact, Malaysia has been working to address these challenges. In 2010, Malaysia 
launched the New Economic Model (NEM), which aims for the country to reach high income status by 2020 
while ensuring that growth is also sustainable and inclusive. The NEM includes a number of reforms to achieve 
economic growth that is primarily driven by the private sector and moves the Malaysian economy into higher 
value-added activities in both industry and services. 
 
Malaysia is strategically located at the heart of ASEAN, a region that pulses with a population of over 600 
million, total GDP of USD$2.3 trillion, total trade of USD$2.5 trillion and with total FDI of USD$108 billion 
(World Bank data, 2013). Furthermore, ASEAN and its emerging markets are a gateway between the powerful 
growth economies of greater Asia, which include China, India, Japan and Korea. The figure below shows the 
GDP growth movement and prediction. 
Figure 1: Malaysia GDP growth movement and prediction 
 
Source: World Bank data, 2015 
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Islamic Finance in Malaysian Market 
Islamic Finance has evolved as a competitive and resilient component of the global financial system. The range 
of Islamic financial products continues to broaden to meet the diversity and differentiated requirements of 
businesses and markets. It has been noticeable that Malaysia has marketplace connectivity through each 
segments of Shariah compliant financial industry with attractive value propositions and opportunities for global 
institutions, talents, investors, issuers and lastly researchers. Undoubtedly to say that Malaysia is recognised as 
a leading Islamic financial marketplace that is open to the world by focusing on the following areas: 1) Islamic 
Capital Market Products and Services Sukuk, Shariah compliant equities and Islamic Fund and Wealth 
Management. 2) International Islamic Banking. 3) Takaful and re-takaful Products and Services. 4) 
Professional Ancillary Services in Islamic Finance (Bank Negara, 2015). This leads to say that Islamic finance 
comprise a community of international and domestic financial institutions dealing with Shariah compliant 
products and services.  
 
Islamic finance in Malaysia is characterised by a robust regulatory, supervisory, Shariah and legal framework, 
a deep primary and active secondary Sukuk market, an efficient and transparent price discovery platform, a 
diverse talent base with global capabilities and an efficient system for multi-currency clearing and settlement.  
 
Historically, Islamic finance in Malaysia began with an Islamic savings institution known as the Pilgrims 
Management and Fund Board (Lembaga Tabung Haji) in 1969 (Yusoff and Wilson, 2005). As awareness of 
Shariah compliant finance increased, a step-by-step approach was implemented to develop a comprehensive 
Islamic financial industry the first full-fledged Islamic bank was established on the back of the Islamic Banking 
Act 1983. Introduction of Islamic “windows” which allow conventional financial institutions to offer Shariah 
compliant banking products and services enabled the Islamic banking industry to grow organically. This has 
spearheaded the creation of a dual-financial system where Islamic finance operates alongside the conventional 
financial system. The launch of an Islamic interbank money market in 1994 allowed the Islamic banking 
industry to continue to flourish. Takaful companies were subsequently incorporated under the Takaful Act 
1984.  
Meanwhile, the Islamic financial industry progressively liberalised over the years, allowing more foreign 
participation. Notable milestones that mark the internationalisation of Malaysia’s Islamic financial industry 
include the first Sukuk issuance which was issued by a foreign owned company in 1990, entry of the first 
foreign Islamic bank from the Middle East in 2005 and establishment of the country’s first Islamic banking 
subsidiary of a locally incorporated foreign bank in 2008. 
 
The issuance of licences to foreign Islamic financial institutions promoted healthy competition and added to 
the dynamism of the Islamic financial industry. The market demand was met with highly innovative Shariah 
compliant products. It has been noticeable that over the years, Malaysia’s Islamic capital market grew deeper 
and broader as multilateral financial institutions and multinational corporations found Shariah compliant 
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products such as Sukuk to be an attractive alternative means of raising capital. Progressive liberalisation of the 
country’s foreign exchange administration rules further buoyed the Sukuk market. Other pioneering 
innovations that were introduced include the first global sovereign Sukuk in 2002 and the first Islamic real 
estate trust fund (I-REIT) in 2006. These products received wide acceptance and proved the effectiveness and 
competitiveness of Islamic finance as a form of financial intermediation. After more than three decades, 
Malaysia’s Islamic financial industry is now home to a critical mass of international and domestic financial 
institutions and a diverse range of innovative products and services. Malaysia’s Islamic financial community 
continues to globalise their business offerings to strengthen economic and financial linkages with other global 
financial centres. In 2006, the Malaysia’s Islamic finance marketplace (MIFC) initiative was launched to 
position Malaysia as an international Islamic financial hub. Malaysia is the place to foster Islamic finance 
business linkages especially within the Asian region, and take advantage of pro-business policies and market 
incentives.  
 
Furthermore, Malaysia hosts the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) which was described earlier in 
chapter two. This international prudential standard setting organisation promotes soundness and stability of the 
global Islamic financial industry by issuing prudential standards and guiding principles. Its international 
membership base includes regulatory and supervisory authorities, intergovernmental organisations and 
financial market players. Malaysia continues to contribute to strengthening the soundness of global Islamic 
finance. Initiatives included participating in a Task Force on Liquidity Management and a Task Force on 
Islamic Finance and Global Financial Stability. Both of these task forces were established by IFSB and the 
Islamic Development Bank (IDB). The outcome of these task forces led to the establishment of the International 
Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation (IILM) to facilitate global cross-border liquidity management; a 
report with recommendations to strengthen the global financial infrastructure, and the formation of Islamic 
Financial Stability Forum (IFSF).  
 
In general, the reading of Islamic finance sector in Malaysia provides that it have an environment was realised 
from a long history of developing Islamic finance, with thought leaders and talents who understand how 
Shariah and finance work together. It is established and growing business connectivity to the different regions 
of the world. This global connectivity consists of economic and financial linkages with other global financial 
centres and the continuing liberalisation of Malaysia’s Islamic financial industry. The figure below presents a 
summary of Islamic finance marketplace of Malaysia. 
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Figure 2: Islamic Finance Marketplace of Malaysia 
 
Source: Malaysia marketplace report, MIFC, 2015 
 
In addition, Malaysia enjoyable with the distinction of set up national Shariah regulator supervises the Islamic 
banking sector. As it known that Islamic banking is banking activities, services and products based on Shariah 
principles. In Malaysia market the story is different form other Islamic finance markets. Products and services 
offered by an Islamic bank in Malaysia must be approved by its national Shariah committee. Consisting of 
scholars that are knowledgeable in modern finance and Islamic principles, the role of a Shariah committee 
encompasses both compliance and advisory functions. 
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The Shariah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia is the apex authority in Malaysia’s Islamic banking 
industry. This proactive council approves new product structures and deliberates on timely topics and Shariah 
issues. 
There are 16 Islamic banks and 4 International Islamic banks in Malaysia. The Islamic banking assets constitute 
24% of Malaysia’s total banking assets as at 1st quarter of 2013, with continual average double-digit growth 
for the past decade (MIFC, 2015). 
A lot of papers such (Rudnyckyj, 2014, Najeeb & Vejzagic, 2013, Yusoff and Wilson, 2005) committed that 
Malaysia is creates and develop a competitive edge beyond banking operations and products that comply with 
Shariah growing demand, active government support, consumers’ ability to choose between Shariah compliant 
and Conventional banking products, as well as efforts made by Conventional banks and Islamic banks to 
develop their footprints in this arena indicate an increasing global market for Islamic banking. This global 
industry recorded compounded annual growth rates of 16% from 2006 to 2013.   
 
As an international marketplace for Islamic finance, Malaysia has many innovators and thought leaders in 
Islamic banking. For example, the first electronic multicurrency commodity trading platform, Bursa ‘Suq Al-
Sila’ (BSAS) facilitates financing for Islamic financial institutions and liquidity management. This innovative, 
one-of-its kind, commodity trading platform, operated by Bursa Malaysia, facilitates cross-border 
intermediation between institutions across multiple markets. This platform provides a regulated trading 
framework as well as a Shariah governance model to facilitate uniformity in trade practices and enhance trade 
volumes. Today 74 members from 10 countries manage their liquidity through Bursa ‘Suq Al-Sila’ (Rudnyckyj, 
2014). 
 
Adherence to Shariah is addressed by Malaysia’s Shariah, governance, regulatory and supervisory framework 
to provide soundness and financial stability, resulting in a high level of investor confidence. This reflects the 
strengthening the legal framework in Malaysia. Malaysia’s Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 (IFSA) is the 
culmination of efforts to modernise the laws that govern the conduct and supervision of financial institutions 
in Malaysia. The new legislation aims to ensure a sound, responsible and progressive Islamic financial system 
to meet the increasing integration of the Malaysian economy with the region and the world. IFSA 2013 provides 
the statutory foundation for a Shariah contracts-based regulatory framework in a manner that would facilitate 
the next level of Islamic banking business, transcending beyond financial intermediation to include real 
economic sector participation, complete with the consequent regulatory checks and balances, thereby 
increasing the level of transparency required. The main thrust of IFSA 2013 deals with clarity of regulatory 
objectives in promoting Shariah compliance and financial stability, which in turn contributes to a high degree 
of consistency in the regulatory treatment and legal position of Islamic financial transactions. 
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IFSA 2013 enables greater clarity to be accorded to the obligations and rights of customers under the respective 
Shariah contracts, which are the key determinants for the unique characteristics of Islamic financial 
transactions. The Act takes into account the international dimension that Islamic finance will undertake, where 
specificities unique to the Islamic financial industry, including in terms of control and composition of Islamic 
financial groups, have been recognised. Recognising the dual financial system in which Islamic finance 
operates in Malaysia, regulatory parity is ensured for similar areas that are applicable across both Islamic and 
conventional financial sectors. Collectively, IFSA 2013 and other components of the legal framework provide 
an additional value proposition in Malaysia’s Islamic finance marketplace in terms of allowing the 
predictability and enforceability of laws for Islamic financial transactions. 
 
Malaysian Islamic Capital Market 
 
The Islamic Capital Market in Malaysia has grown rapidly and successfully. As compared to other Muslim 
countries, Malaysia offers a superior infrastructure for and provides on-going government support that provides 
impetus for the continued growth of the Malaysian Islamic Capital Market. The leadership and support provided 
by the government through the facilitation of policies and incentives has ensured the successful development 
of the Islamic Capital Market. 
The Malaysian Islamic capital market has experienced phenomenal growth and raised the bar globally for 
product innovation and financial intermediation (Abdullah, Roudaki and Clark, 2004). 
 
As stated earlier, IFSA 2013 and other legislations acts enables greater environment to capitalise investments 
in Malaysia under the respective Shariah contracts, refracting the reasons behind the rapid development of 
capital market in Malaysia. The figure below summarised the market’s development since its emerged in 1990s.  
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Figure 3: Development of Malaysian Islamic capital market 
 
 
Source: Malaysia marketplace report, MIFC, 2015 
 
Islamic capital market in Malaysia has a distinctive initiatives building sold and concrete grounding floor to 
market users. Islamic finance index and Bursa ‘Suq Al-Sila’ are the remarkable initiatives. Here more details 
and highlights about by Abdullah et al., (2004) Bursa Malaysia (2010) and Securities Commission (2007). 
 
Islamic Finance Index  
The Islamic Index is an index that tracks the performance of the Shariah compliant securities on Bursa 
Malaysia. The first Islamic equity index was introduced by RHB Unit Trust Management Berhad (a unit trust 
company that is a subsidiary of RHB Capital Berhad) in May 1996. Subsequently, the Dow Jones Islamic 
Market Index (DJIM) was launched in February 1999 by Dow Jones and Company, the Kuala Lumpur Shariah 
Index (KLSI) was launched in April 1999 by Bursa Malaysia, and the FSTE Global Islamic Index Series was 
launched by the FSTE Group in October 1999. The FBM (FTSE Bursa Malaysia) Shariah Index replaced the 
KLSI on 22nd January 2007.  
All these indices were launched in order to expand participation of investors who are passionate investing in 
securities approved in accordance to the Islamic law. These indices allow investors to track and benchmark the 
performance of Shariah compliant securities, and aid investors make better investments decision (Securities 
Commission, 2007e). The Shariah indices measure the performance of Islamic equity, and in April 2006, the 
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Dow Jones Citigroup Sukuk Index was launched by Dow Jones Indexes and Citigroup Inc. The objectives for 
the launching of the Sukuk Index are to educate investors about Sukuk, build awareness of the vehicles, 
improve market transparency and provide a benchmark and a basis for investments and tradable products 
(Siddiqui, 2008).  
 
Islamic Financial Market (Bursa Suq Al-Sila’)  
Another milestone project to further strengthen Malaysia’s position as an international Islamic financial hub is 
the Bursa ‘Suq Al-Sila', a world first commodity trading platform specifically dedicated to facilitate Islamic 
liquidity management and financing by Islamic banks (Bursa Malaysia, 2010). One notable features of this 
market is that it is a fully electronic web-based platform that provides industry players with an avenue to 
undertake multi-commodity and multi-currency trades from all around the world. In essence it integrates the 
global Islamic financial and capital markets together with the commodity market.  
 
Malaysian Sukuk Market  
Demand for an Islamic debt instrument in Malaysia, which accounted for only 7% of total bonds raised in 1999, 
grew to 25% in 2000 and subsequently to 76% in 2005, primarily due to awareness of alternative funding 
sources (Ashhari, Chun & Nassir 2009). 
Sukuk is one of the most vibrant and significant components in the global Islamic financial industry as it seen 
earlier in pervious chapters. Sukuk dynamic movement inherited from the development of Malaysian Sukuk 
Market. The development of Sukuk in Malaysia in the last two decades has transformed the Islamic financial 
landscape at the national and international levels, and has propelled governments and jurisdictions to 
accommodate Islamic finance business and transactions by reviewing their existing tax, Shariah, regulatory 
and legal frameworks. Hence, this leads increasing number of multilateral development institutions, 
governments, and multinational corporations are using and considering Sukuk as an attractive source of 
funding. There is also growing acceptance from sophisticated global investors of Sukuk as a viable and 
competitive asset class. Malaysia represented 59.5% of the global Sukuk outstanding (Bloomberg, 2013), a 
total value exceeding USD$148 million; and issued 70% of global new Sukuk for the first quarter of 2013 
(Bloomberg, 2013), a total of USD$58 million. It is considered to be the most liquid Sukuk market and larger 
than the country’s corporate Conventional bond market, which is the largest in South- East Asia. Islamic 
financial institutions have a track record of success in structuring sophisticated and sizeable Sukuk deals that 
conform to international best practices.  
 
The Malaysian Sukuk market is open to global issuers to tap multicurrency funding. As the top listing 
destination for Sukuk as at Sept 2013, issuances listed here enjoy high visibility and high demand from global 
investors. The figure 4 below presents the Sukuk outstanding market share in Malaysia. Tenures for Sukuk in 
Malaysia span from less than a year to one, two, three, five, seven, ten, fifteen, twenty-five and fifty years 
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catering to a diverse investor base. The facilitative environment for Sukuk includes a trading and reporting 
platform that provides an efficient price-discovery mechanism and a framework with a high level of post-trade 
transparency. Securities Commission Malaysia has also implemented a market-friendly, efficient approval 
process for new issuances. 
 
Moreover, in Malaysia, Sukuk are considered financial obligations whereby investors are recognised as 
creditors and rank equally with Conventional creditors. This provides a level of comfort to investors as they 
are adequately protected in unforeseen event. The legal and recovery process, guidelines and laws are cohesive 
and have been market-tested. 
 
‘‘The structuring, approval and issuance process for Sukuk does take longer than a conventional instrument 
but it is certainly a smooth process whichever route you take. The Malaysian government and regulators are 
very much in touch with market participants, arrangers and issuers alike; making the nation’s end-to-end debt 
securities issuance process the envy of many’’ Said by Raja Arshad Bin Raja (MIFC report, 2015). 
 
Figure 4: Sukuk outstanding in Malaysian market 
 
Source: Bloomberg, KFH Research, 2013 
 
As it seen in the figure above that Malaysia has a healthy movement trend increasing on Sukuk outstanding. In 
the other words, Sukuk are the major interest in Malaysia capital market and it is implying how Sukuk superbly 
penetrating into Malaysian Capital Market.  
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Figure 5: Sukuk issuance in the global market  
 
Source: Bloomberg, KFH Research, 2013 
 
In terms of size of room of Sukuk issuance Malaysia reached 70% from the global market share in Sukuk 
issuance, lifting a big gap between Malaysia and other markets to enter the competitive zone. Saudi Arabia 
catching up and line up behind Malaysia with achieving around 10% of the global Sukuk market share.   
Furthermore, Sukuk story in Malaysia began earlier in 1990s then increase Sukuk trend flow to reach the global 
leadership in Sukuk market. It could be summarised this story following the major Sukuk issued in Malaysia 
by the figure below. 
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Figure6: Notable Sukuk Issued in Malaysia 
1990 2005 2010 2013 
First RM-denominated 
Sukuk by Shell MDS, 
a foreign multinational 
Company. 
RM125 million 
First Islamic Residential 
Mortgage Backed 
Securities by 
Cagamas MBS. 
5.4x oversubscribed. 
RM1.8 billion 
Second global sovereign 
USD Sukuk by the 
Government of Malaysia. 
4.8x oversubscribed. 
USD1.25 billion 
USD Sukuk by Nomura. 
USD100 million 
RM sukuk by Cagamas. 
2.7x subscription rate. 
RM1 billion 
USD sukuk by Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB). 
USD500 million 
International Islamic 
Liquidity Management 
Corporation (the IILM) 
Inaugural USD 
denominated 
short-term 
Sukuk. 
USD490 million 
SGD exchangeable Sukuk 
by Khazanah Nasional. 
SGD600 million 
USD Emas Sukuk by Sime 
Darby. 
USD800 million 
1996 2006 
The Kuala Lumpur 
International Airport 
Sukuk. 
RM2.2 billion 
First exchangeable USD 
Sukuk by Khazanah 
Nasional. 
6x oversubscribed. 
USD750 million 
2001 2007 2011 
First global corporate 
USD Sukuk by Kumpulan 
Guthrie. 
USD150 million 
First Islamic asset-backed 
RM-denominated Sukuk 
by 
Cagamas. 
RM60 billion 
First global subordinated 
Sukuk by Maybank. 
7x oversubscribed. 
USD300 million 
First Sukuk by a British 
multinational company, 
Tesco. 
RM3.5 billion programme 
World’s first China 
Renminbi denominated 
‘Emas’ sukuk by Khazanah 
Nasional. 
RMB500 million 
(RM246 million) 
2002 2008 2012 
First sovereign USD Sukuk 
by the Government of 
Malaysia. 
2x oversubscribed. 
USD600 million 
First RM-denominated 
Sukuk by Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB). 
RM1 billion programme 
World’s single largest Sukuk issuance, by PLUS. 
RM30.6 billion 
 
Khazanah National issues exchangeable Sukuk that is 
first to be priced at a negative yield and first Malaysian 
equity-linked deal since 2010. 
USD357.8 million 
 
Noble Group Hong Kong based Sukuk. 
RM300 million 
 
Golden Assets International Finance Limited Singapore 
based Sukuk programme. 
RM1.5 billion 
 
Danainfra Malaysia’s first Exchange 
Traded Bonds and Sukuk (ETBS). 
RM300 million 
2004 2009 
First supranational 
RM-denominated sukuk 
by International Finance 
Corporate, privately owned 
unit of the World Bank. 
RM500 million 
USD Emas* Sukuk by 
Petronas. 
6.28x oversubscribed. 
USD1.5 billion 
Source: MIFC, 2015 
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Regulatory Bodies and Regulatory Framework  
The development of an Islamic capital market requires an in-depth understanding of the operations of the 
current capital market and contemporary analyses to fulfil the present day needs of investors, especially 
Muslims who wish to participate in economic activities in accordance to Shariah principles of Islam (Abdul 
Rahman, 2007). Therefore, the regulatory bodies play a vital role in the development and operation of the 
Islamic capital market.  
 
In addition, Malaysia’s financial industry is regulated by four financial and market regulatory authorities; each 
with a specific role and responsibility: 
 
1) Bank Negara Malaysia, the central bank, is a statutory body wholly owned by the Government of 
Malaysia and responsible for Malaysia’s monetary and financial sector policies. This body also governs 
the Islamic banking, takaful and re-takaful sectors. 
2) Securities Commission Malaysia is the regulator for Malaysia’s capital market, both conventional and 
Islamic finance. It is a self-funding statutory body with investigative and enforcement powers.  
3) Labuan Financial Services Authority (Labuan FSA) leads and coordinates efforts to regulate and 
develop Labuan as an international business and financial centre. It also governs Islamic finance activities 
conducted in Labuan. 
4) Bursa Malaysia is a fully integrated exchange. In supporting the three financial regulatory authorities of 
Malaysia, Bursa Malaysia regulates its stakeholders and offers a complete range of exchange-related 
services including trading, clearing, settlement and depository services. 
 
Furthermore, although that Sukuk considered as a new class of investment instrument that appeared recently, 
Malaysia treats Sukuk from different approach against other Sukuk market such as Saudi Arabian Sukuk 
Market the research context interest. The next section presents similarities and dissimilarities between Malaysia 
and Saudi Arabia in terms of Sukuk industry. Then attempts to screen the gap among both market and draw the 
comparison frame.  
 
The Summary  
This chapter draw the context of Malaysian Sukuk market as the main player in the global base of Sukuk 
market. This chapter concludes that Malaysian Sukuk market has different mechanism of Sukuk and this 
enhance the development cycle more than other Sukuk market such as Saudi Arabia. The comparison between 
both market has been analysed and explained. The next chapter moves from introducing Sukuk market 
development to other angel of sukuk instrument itself as a new class of investment instrument.  
 
**** 
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Appendix D:  
Illustration of Shariah law 
 
Definition Islamic law is covering both civil and criminal justices as well as regulating 
individual conduct both personal and moral. The custom-based body of law is 
based on the Qur’an and the religion of Islam.  
Therefore, it could be said that Muslim states are theocracies, religious texts are 
Law, the latter distinguished by Islam and Muslims in their application, as 
Shariah Law. 
Shariah Law sources Shariah Law comes from a combination of sources including the Qur'an (the 
Muslim holy book), the Hadith (sayings and conduct of the prophet 
Muhammad) and fatwas (the rulings of Islamic scholars). 
What does it cover? All aspects of a Muslim's life are governed by Shariah. For example, Shariah 
deals with many topics addressed by secular law, including crime, politics and 
economics, as well as personal matters such as business trades, hygiene, diet, 
prayer, and fasting. 
Shariah Law categories 
 
Shariah can be divided into five main branches: 
1. Ibadah (ritual worship) 
2. Mu'amalat (transactions and contracts) 
3. Adab (morals and manners), 
4. I'tiqadat (beliefs) 
5. 'Uqubat (punishments). 
Example topics of 
Shariah Law 
Purification, Prayer, Funeral prayer, Taxes, Fasting, Pilgrimage, Trade, 
Inheritance, Marriage, Divorce, and Justice 
In some areas, there are substantial differences in the law between different 
schools of Fiqh, countries, cultures and schools of thought. 
 
 
Sources: Razack, 2007. 
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Appendix E:  
Summary of recent literature on Sukuk 
Summary of common studies on sukuk. 
Author(s) Type of research Objectives Methodology Findings 
Rohim and Shereeza 
(2013) 
Nature of sukuk; 
Qualitative 
Analyze the thought of 
Imam 
Descriptive analysis. The study finds that both 
  Abu Hanifah and Imam  schools of thought in essence 
  Shafi’i on sukuk 
instruments. 
 accepted sukuk as an Islamic 
    financial instrument 
Usmani (2008) Nature of sukuk; 
Qualitative 
Analyze the mechanisms 
of 
Descriptive analysis. The study proposes that sukuk 
  sukuk and on the extent 
to 
 be issued for new commercial 
  which these comply with 
the 
 and industrial ventures. The 
  precepts and principles 
of 
 returns of enterprises should 
  Islamic jurisprudence.  be returned to sukuk holders 
    regardless of the amount after 
    costs. 
Rosly and Sanusi 
(1999) 
Nature of sukuk; 
Qualitative 
Analyze pertinent issues 
on 
Descriptive analysis. The study finds no significant 
  the creation of Islamic 
bonds 
 Shari’ah justification of bay’ 
  in Malaysia and analyze 
the 
 al-inah. While the trading of 
  underlying reasons 
behind 
 Islamic bonds at a discount 
  the rejection of bay’ al-
in h 
 using bay’ al-dayn has been 
  and bay’ al dayn.  found unacceptable by the 
    majority of ulema’ (Jumhur 
    Ulama’) including al-Shafi’i. 
Cakir and Raei (2007) Nature of sukuk; 
Quantitative 
Analyze the difference Value-at-risk (VaR) 
method 
This paper shows that sukuk 
  between sukuk and based on delta-normal – contrary to earlier literature 
  eurobonds for the same method and Monte 
Carlo 
– are different types of 
  issuer. This paper 
assesses 
simulation method. instruments from conventional 
  the impact of bonds 
issued 
 bonds, as evidenced by their 
  according to Islamic  different price behavior. The 
  principles (sukuk), on the analysis employing the 
  cost and risk structure of  delta-normal as well as 
  investment portfolios.  Monte-Carlo simulation 
    methods implies such gains 
    are present and in certain 
    cases very significant. 
(continued on next page)
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Author(s) Type of research Objectives Methodology Findings 
Godlewski, Turk-Ariss, 
and 
Nature of sukuk; 
Quantitative 
Examine whether A standard market 
model to 
The study finds the absence of significant 
Weill (2010)  announcements of sukuk 
and 
estimate abnormal 
returns 
stock market  reaction to conventional 
  conventional bond issues arou d the event date 
for a 
bond announcements negative reaction 
  lead to significant 
abnormal 
security issue to sukuk issues and, as a corollary, a 
  returns for the issuers 
for 
 significant difference between stock market 
  Malaysian listed 
companies, 
 reactions to sukuk and 
  which issued 
conventional 
 conventional bond issues. The results 
suggest   b ds and sukuk.  s st that sukuk instruments are priced 
Ariff and Safari (2015) Nature of sukuk; 
Quantitative 
Examine whether sukuk Statistical and causality 
tests 
significantly differently and  
  instruments are 
equivalent to 
using a large traded data 
set 
that their yields are not Granger-caused by 
  conventional bonds as on sukuk and 
conventional 
conventional security yields or vice versa. 
  practiced by the market. b ds. This empirical finding does not support the 
    market’s current practices based 
    based on the assumption that  
    sukuk are like normal bonds. 
Jobst, Kunzel, Mills, 
and Sy 
Operational aspects of 
sukuk; 
Review the current state 
of 
Descriptive analysis. The study suggests that 
(2008) Qualitative the sukuk market, 
examines 
 administrative considerations 
  pertinent legal and 
economic 
 can lead to additional costs 
  implications of Shari’ah  while limiting fiscal 
  compliance on the  flexibility. The initial 
  configuration of sukuk  structuring and issuance 
  issuance, and informs 
the 
 costs of sukuk are likely to 
  debate about the 
prospects of 
 be higher than they are for a 
  sukuk issuance by 
sovereign 
 standard security. Sovereign 
  issuers  issuers’ revenues may need 
    to be ring-fenced, effectively 
    limiting fiscal flexibility. Non-Islamic 
    sovereigns, in particular, would need to 
    consider the necessary organisational 
    changes needed to administer the 
    Shari’ah-compliant structure. 
Kordvani (2009) Operational aspects of 
sukuk; 
Examines the key 
elements 
Descriptive analysis. An examination of Shi’a 
 Qualitative of sukuk within the 
context 
 jurisprudence on the contract 
  of the Shi’a fiqh  of ijarah (leasing contract) 
  (jurisprudence) and the  shows that such an 
  principles of contract 
law in 
 adjustment can be accomplished in Iran. 
  Iran, which is based  It has been shown how obstacles to 
  primarily on the Shariah  
fiqh. 
 the legitimacy of 
    lease-to-purchase agreements 
    have been overturned by 
    relying on a more flexible 
    interpretation of contractual 
    conditions. 
(continued on next page)
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Author(s) Type of research Objectives Methodology Findings 
Rahman (2003) Operational aspects of 
sukuk; 
Examines contemporary Descriptive analysis. The study suggests that a 
 Qualitative accounting regulatory 
issues 
 proper development of the 
  on Islamic bonds or 
Islamic 
 Islamic financial market 
  private debt securities 
(IPDS) 
 requires a well-regulated 
  or sukuk. Investments in  Islamic financial instrument 
  Islamic bonds (sukuk) 
give 
 that is in accordance with 
  rise to a number of  Islamic accounting 
  accounting and reporting  regulations. It requires a 
  issues.  sound accounting and 
    reporting standard for 
    Islamic financial instruments 
    that meet the requirements of 
    Shari’ah and can be 
    practiced. 
Fathurahman and 
Fitriati 
Operational aspects of 
sukuk; 
Analyze the ratio 
between 
Basic statistical tests 
for 
The paper concludes that the 
(2013) Quantitative yields on sukuk and sukuk and conventional mean yield to maturity of 
  conventional bonds 
using 
bonds in Indonesia. sukuk is greater than the 
  model calculations yield 
to 
 mean yield of conventional 
  maturity and portfolio  bonds. In term risks, sukuk 
  optimization model  standard deviation is 
    relatively larger than the 
    standard deviation of 
    conventional bonds. 
Wijnbergen and 
Zaheer 
Operational aspects of 
sukuk; 
Examine the resolution Case studies of four 
sukuk 
These case studies make 
(2013) Quantitative process following 
default, 
defaults. clear that most of the 
  not the reasons the 
default 
 problems that triggered 
  was triggered and the 
recent 
 defaults or blocked smooth 
  sukuk (near) defaults 
from an 
 resolution of distress 
  Islamic finance 
perspective. 
 afterward arose from 
    ill-defined property rights 
    and conceptual mismatches 
    between relevant 
    jurisdictions and the legal 
    structures chosen. In most 
    cases, the problems can be 
    traced back to clauses and 
    structures that made the 
    sukuk more like conventional 
    bonds. 
Tariq and Dar (2007) Operational aspects of 
sukuk; 
Assess the sukuk 
structures 
Descriptive analysis. The study highlights that 
 Qualitative and analyze the various 
risks 
 different Shari’ah 
  underlying the Islamic  perceptions could be a risk, 
  sovereign and corporate  which may affect sukuk 
  sukuk structures.  pricing. Furthermore, 
    through Shari’ah-compatible 
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    financial engineering, sukuk 
    can also become highly 
    competitive in the market 
    and accessible to the public 
    as an investment opportunity. 
Shafi, Ariffin, and Operational aspects of 
sukuk; 
Identify strategies to 
reduce 
Descriptive analysis. The study suggests the 
Salamudin (2013) Qualitative sukuk risk, propose 
sukuk 
 application of sukuk with 
  model with embedded 
option 
 embedded options as to 
  and a mathematical 
model to 
 mitigate the risk faced by 
  compute returns before  sukuk holders. Embedded 
  conversion  options are a way to mitigate 
    the risk, so the study 
    proposes using a real asset, 
    such as real estate. 
(continued on next page)
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Author(s) Type of research Objectives Methodology Findings 
Wilson (2008) Operational aspects of 
sukuk; 
Examines the market for, 
and 
Descriptive analysis. The study proposes sukuk 
 Qualitative usage of, sukuk, notably 
as 
 based on participatory 
  tools for liquidity  structures, with risk sharing 
  management. There is 
also 
 by investors, as a way 
  an analysis of different 
sukuk 
 forward. The risk with these 
  structures from a 
financial 
 proposed structures is of 
  perspective.  variable returns rather than 
    of default, which may well 
    be more acceptable to 
    informed investors in any 
    case. 
Alam, Hassan, and 
Haque 
Operational aspects of 
sukuk; 
Examines the impact of Event study 
methodology to 
The study shows that from a 
(2013) Quantitative sukuk and conventional calculate the abnormal short-run perspective, the 
  bonds announcement on returns of sukuk or effect of announcement of 
  shareholder wealth and 
their 
conventional bond 
issuance 
sukuk on firm value is 
  determinants using 79 
sukuk 
and a multivariate negative, while the effect of 
  and 87 conventional 
bonds 
regression. announcement of 
  over the period of  conventional bond is positive 
  2004–2012 in six 
developed 
 for all periods except for the 
  Islamic financial market.  post-crisis period. Therefore, 
    in spite of having a religious 
    motivation to issue sukuk, 
    the negative effect might 
    hinder firms in raising funds 
    for sukuk. 
Ashhari, Chun, and 
Nassir 
Operational aspects of 
sukuk; 
Study the impact of 
Islamic 
A standard event study The study finds that there 
(2009) Quantitative bond and conventional 
bonds 
methodology with beta is a wealth effect on sukuk 
  announcement on refinement using 
Blume’s 
issues announcement but 
  shareholder wealth for 
firms 
method. not for conventional bond 
  listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia 
 announcement. The study 
  (stock market) for the 
period 
 further establishes that 
  2001 to 2006.  the size of the bond 
    offering is a significant 
    factor in stock returns for 
    both sukuk and conventional 
    bonds, but the sign for 
    sukuk was negative and 
    contrary to that for 
    conventional bonds. 
Ahmad and Rahim 
(2013) 
Operational aspects of 
sukuk; 
Investigate whether the Event study 
methodology 
The results support the 
 Quantitative market reacts 
asymmetrically 
using cumulative 
average 
hypothesis of positive market 
  to the issuance of 
selected 
abnormal return on reaction on FTSE KLCI 
  sukuk structures (ijarah 
and 
symmetric and 
asymmetric 
index after ijarah and 
  musharakah) in 
Malaysia. 
events. musharakah issuance in 
    Malaysia. The positive 
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    market reactions can be 
    interpreted in two ways. 
    First, the market can readily 
    distinguish the news. 
    Second, there are confidence 
    effects that shareholders 
    wealth will be increased 
    through the issuance of ijara 
    and musharakah sukuk. 
Majid, Shahimi, and Operational aspects of 
sukuk; 
Discuss the sukuk 
defaults in 
Descriptive analysis The study indicates that 
Abdullah (2010) Qualitative Malaysia and its 
implications 
 sukuk default in Malaysia 
  on the Malaysian capital  may not pose a significant 
  market with special 
reference 
 threat to the local capital 
  to the selected 
Malaysian 
 market. However, it does 
  defaulted sukuk.  have an impact on the 
    overall reputation of 
    Malaysia as the hub for 
    global Islamic finance. 
  (continued on next page)
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Ibrahim and Minai 
(2009) 
Sukuk and economic Examine the wealth 
effect of 
Event study analysis 
and 
The study finds that 
 development Islamic debt issuance 
and its 
cross-sectional 
regression 
investors reacted positively 
  determinants.  to the announcement of 
    Islamic debt issues, while 
    they are indifferent to the 
    announcement of 
    conventional issues. 
Danila and Sukuk and economic Examine factors that 
affect 
Descriptive analysis The study supports the 
Malangkucecwara 
(2010) 
development retail sukuk investment 
by 
 important role of Muslim 
  individual investors.  governments in financing the 
    budget through domestic 
    sukuk issuance, but not to be 
    exposed to exchange rate 
    risks related to sukuk 
    denominated in nondomestic 
    currency. The result also 
    suggests that the rate of 
    return (mudarabah deposit) 
    and foreign exchange rate 
    have an impact on sukuk 
    price. 
Ahmad, Daud, and 
Kefelia 
Sukuk and Economic Examine 
macroeconomic 
Vector autoregressive 
model 
The findings indicate that the 
(2012) Development; 
Quantitative 
influences on sukuk 
issuance 
(VAR) causality runs from sukuk to 
  in Malaysia based on  GDP. In the short-horizon, 
  aggregate level data  sukuk is driven by its own 
    dynamics. The study argues 
    that since sukuk issuance 
    Granger-causes GDP, policy 
    makers should introduce 
    policies to modernize the 
    functional aspects of Islamic 
    capital market. 
Said and Grassa (2013) Sukuk and economic Investigate the influence 
of 
Multivariate regression The results show that 
 development; 
Quantitative 
the macroeconomic 
factors 
 macroeconomic 
  the construction of a 
certain 
 factors—GDP per capita, 
  structure of sukuk in the  Muslim population, 
  most sukuk issuers’ 
countries 
 economic size and trade 
  namely: Saudi Arabia,  openness as well as 
  Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain,  regulatory quality—have a 
  Qatar, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, 
 positive impact on the 
  Brunei, Pakistan, and  development 
  Gambia.  of sukuk market. However, 
    since the amount of sukuk 
    issued has declined 
    considerably in recent 
 266 
 
    years, the financial crisis 
    has affected negatively the 
    development of sukuk 
    market. 
AbdulJalil & 
Abdulrahman (2012) 
Nature of sukuk; 
Quantitative 
Comparison of the profits 
obtained by using Ijarah 
and Musharakah 
Mutanaqisah principles 
with long‐ term.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event study 
methodology used to 
calculate profit. This 
calculation model is 
based on ijarah and 
musharakah 
mutanaqisah principles. 
Formulas are derived 
from ijarah and 
musharakah and 
mutanaqisah principles 
used in sukuk. 
 
 
 
 
Sukuk investment using ijarah principle 
is found to be a better investment 
alternative than musharakah 
mutanaqisah principle, regardless of the 
number of years of the sukuk, as long as 
it is a long‐ term tenure. However, for 
short‐ term tenure, the latter is 
preferred based on the amount of profits 
generated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
   
   
Source: Zulkhibri (2015) and updated by the author (2016)
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Appendix F:  
(Related to chapter 7): Graphs and tables of regression analysis between Sukuk indices 
and conventional bonds indices  
 
Figure 1: All maturities indices of Sukuk and Conventional bonds graph  
 
 
Figure 2: All maturities indices of Sukuk and Conventional bonds Histogram relationship   
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Table 1 Correlations test of Sukuk index over conventional bond index  
 
Correlations 
 DJSUKTXR JGAGGUSD 
Pearson Correlation 
DJSUKTXR 1.000 .310 
JGAGGUSD .310 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
DJSUKTXR . .000 
JGAGGUSD .000 . 
N 
DJSUKTXR 127 127 
JGAGGUSD 127 127 
 
 
Table 2 Summary output of Regression Statistics Test of Sukuk index and conventional bond index for overall 
period 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .310a .096 .089 .02035697 
a. Predictors: (Constant), JGAGGUSD 
b. Dependent Variable: DJSUKTXR 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .005 1 .005 13.265 .000b 
Residual .052 125 .000   
Total .057 126    
a. Dependent Variable: DJSUKTXR 
b. Predictors: (Constant), JGAGGUSD 
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Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 
(Constant) .002 .002  1.292 .199 -.001 .006 
JGAGGUSD .412 .113 .310 3.642 .000 .188 .635 
a. Dependent Variable: DJSUKTXR 
 
 
On the other side, sub-indices based on maturity factor shows different regression analysis results as presents 
below 
 
Figure 3: Overall period of 1-3 years sub-indices of Sukuk and Conventional bonds graph  
 
  
 270 
 
Figure 4: overall period of 1-3 years sub-indices of Sukuk and Conventional bonds Histogram relationship   
 
 
Table 3: Correlations test of overall period of 1-3 years sub-indices Sukuk over conventional bond.  
 
Correlations 
 DJSukuk1.3Yrs FECM3.1.3Yrs 
Pearson Correlation 
DJSukuk1.3Yrs 1.000 -.038 
FECM3.1.3Yrs -.038 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
DJSukuk1.3Yrs . .333 
FECM3.1.3Yrs .333 . 
N 
DJSukuk1.3Yrs 128 128 
FECM3.1.3Yrs 128 128 
 
Table 8 Summary output of Regression Statistics Test of overall period of 1-3 years sub-indices Sukuk and 
conventional bond  
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .038a .001 -.006 .01659380 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FECM3.1.3Yrs 
b. Dependent Variable: DJSukuk1.3Yrs 
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ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .000 1 .000 .186 .667b 
Residual .035 126 .000   
Total .035 127    
a. Dependent Variable: DJSukuk1.3Yrs 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FECM3.1.3Yrs 
Coefficients 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) .004 .001  2.538 .012 
FECM3.1.3Yrs -.025 .057 -.038 -.432 .667 
a. Dependent Variable: DJSukuk1.3Yrs 
 
Figure 5: Overall period of 3-5 years sub-indices of Sukuk and Conventional bonds graph  
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Figure 6: overall period of 3-5 years sub-indices of Sukuk and Conventional bonds Histogram relationship   
 
 
 
Table 9: Correlations test of overall period of 3-5 years sub-indices Sukuk over conventional bond.  
 
Correlations 
 Sukuk3.5Yrs FECM5.3.5Yrs 
Pearson Correlation 
Sukuk3.5Yrs 1.000 -.065 
FECM5.3.5Yrs -.065 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Sukuk3.5Yrs . .233 
FECM5.3.5Yrs .233 . 
N 
Sukuk3.5Yrs 128 128 
FECM5.3.5Yrs 128 128 
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Table 10 Summary output of Regression Statistics Test of overall period of 3-5 years sub-indices Sukuk and 
conventional bond  
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .065a .004 -.004 .01979 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FECM5.3.5Yrs 
b. Dependent Variable: Sukuk3.5Yrs 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .000 1 .000 .535 .466b 
Residual .049 126 .000   
Total .050 127    
a. Dependent Variable: Sukuk3.5Yrs 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FECM5.3.5Yrs 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) .003 .002  1.781 .077 
FECM5.3.5Yrs -.082 .112 -.065 -.732 .466 
a. Dependent Variable: Sukuk3.5Yrs 
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Figure 7: Overall period of 5-7 years sub-indices of Sukuk and Conventional bonds graph  
 
 
Figure 8: overall period of 5-7 years sub-indices of Sukuk and Conventional bonds Histogram relationship   
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Table 11: Correlations test of overall period of 5-7 years sub-indices Sukuk over conventional bond.  
Correlations 
 Sukuk5.7Yrs FECM5.5.7Yrs 
Pearson Correlation 
Sukuk5.7Yrs 1.000 .059 
FECM5.5.7Yrs .059 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Sukuk5.7Yrs . .312 
FECM5.5.7Yrs .312 . 
N 
Sukuk5.7Yrs 71 71 
FECM5.5.7Yrs 71 71 
 
Table 12 Summary output of Regression Statistics Test of overall period of 5-7 years sub-indices Sukuk and 
conventional bond  
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .059a .004 -.011 .02801 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FECM5.5.7Yrs 
b. Dependent Variable: Sukuk5.7Yrs 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .000 1 .000 .244 .623b 
Residual .054 69 .001   
Total .054 70    
a. Dependent Variable: Sukuk5.7Yrs 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FECM5.5.7Yrs 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) .001 .003  .388 .699 
FECM5.5.7Yrs .130 .263 .059 .494 .623 
a. Dependent Variable: Sukuk5.7Yrs 
 
  
 276 
 
Figure 9: Overall period of 7-10 years sub-indices of Sukuk and Conventional bonds graph  
 
 
Figure 10: overall period of 7-10 years sub-indices of Sukuk and Conventional bonds Histogram relationship   
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Table 13: Correlations test of overall period of 7-10 years sub-indices Sukuk over conventional bond.  
 
Correlations 
 Sukuk7.10Yrs FECM10.7.10Y
rs 
Pearson Correlation 
Sukuk7.10Yrs 1.000 -.045 
FECM10.7.10Yrs -.045 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Sukuk7.10Yrs . .325 
FECM10.7.10Yrs .325 . 
N 
Sukuk7.10Yrs 106 106 
FECM10.7.10Yrs 106 106 
 
Table 14 Summary output of Regression Statistics Test of overall period of 7-10 years sub-indices Sukuk and 
conventional bond  
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .045a .002 -.008 .04602 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FECM10.7.10Yrs 
b. Dependent Variable: Sukuk7.10Yrs 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression .000 1 .000 .208 .649b 
Residual .220 104 .002   
Total .221 105    
a. Dependent Variable: Sukuk7.10Yrs 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FECM10.7.10Yrs 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) .004 .004  .908 .366 
FECM10.7.10Yrs -.191 .419 -.045 -.456 .649 
a. Dependent Variable: Sukuk7.10Yrs 
*** 
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Appendix G: 
(Related to chapter 7): Case study of the Saudi Arabian market 
The main body of the chapter 7 was concerned the comparison of the risk and return profiles of global Sukuk 
and conventional bond indices. It is of interest to examine Sukuk performance in a domestic context, by a case 
study conducted on the Saudi Arabian Sukuk market, comparing the Sukuk local market performance with the 
global Sukuk index performance. 
 
Formulas for fair value and duration 
 
To do so, similar to the practice for conventional bonds, Sukuk values are directly related to cash flows and 
these cash flows are discounted at the yield rate (YR) to find the fair value and duration of Sukuk. The 
periodical payment received is the cash flow. The period payment for each year is computed by multiplying 
the face value of the Sukuk by the coupon rate (CR). At maturity, the holder will get back his money invested 
earlier along with the final periodic payment. The principal amount returned is known as the redemption value.  
 
The formula is:  CRFVC  , where: 
 
C = Cash Flow (interest) 
 
FV = Face Value 
 
CR = Coupon Rate. 
 
It is questionable whether those techniques applicable to conventional bonds can be applied to Sukuk. Helmi, 
Munisamy and Ramasamy (2011) justified that the techniques are applicable to both because, whether it is 
Sukuk or conventional bonds, both have a yield rate. It is only in coupon rates that the difference exists. The 
coupon rate is based on time for interest, but for Sukuk it is profit based. As the yield rate measures the rate of 
return, it is the common parameter for evaluating both Sukuk and conventional bonds. 
 
Interests or profits accrue in all years till maturity and in the final year the redemption value is also received. 
Therefore the cash flows are: C1, C2, …, Cn + RV, where: 
 
RV = Redemption Value, 
k = Life of the bond. 
 
The above cash flows are to be discounted at YR and added to get the fair value of the Sukuk. 
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
 Total discounted cash flow or fair value of the bond 
 
The total present value of the cash flows is the fair value in the secondary market. The present values 
(discounted cash flows) of cash flows are to be multiplied by the time (years) and multiplied for computing 
duration. 
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Now duration can be computed with the above two totals of cash flow. 
D


  
D= Duration (weighted average life of the bond)  
 
Duration gives the slope of the price yield curve but not the expected drop in the value of Sukuk. To calculate 
the loss or gain modified duration is calculated, as follows: 
)1( y
D
MD

  
MD = Modified duration 
 
Any change in the Sukuk value is proportional to modified duration. This parameter is the direct measure, 
which quantifies the value fall or value increase when YR changes. The value loss or value gain can be easily 
calculated with the help of modified duration as stated below. In accordance with conservative accounting 
principles, the future losses are to be accounted for while prospective profits are ignored. Hence modified 
duration is always quoted with a minus. 
dyMD
p
dp
   
Where: 
Dp = change in value of the bond 
MD = Modified duration 
Dy = Change in YR 
 
In addition, statistical calculations such as mean, median and standard deviation will be used. These statistical 
measurements will enhance the measuring of the financial ratios. 
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Results and discussion of Saudi Arabian Sukuk market  
Saudi Arabian Sukuk market is one of the core market of the Sukuk industry. It has developed rapidly over the 
last 8 years, where the Sukuk secondary market officially opened in 2009, operated by the Saudi Arabian 
Capital Market Authority.  
 
Demand for Sukuk has flourished in the Saudi market. Saudi Arabia, the first hub for Sukuk in the GCC, had 
already smashed records in 2012 with its international and domestic Sukuk issuances, as mentioned in previous 
studies such as Wilson (2008).  The strength of the Saudi market is derived from the Saudi obligator of Sukuk 
issuance. The positive economic environment in the Kingdom in 2012 led to successful repayment of three 
Saudi Sukuk issues: Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) repaid its SR8bn Sukuk ahead of maturity; 
Dar Al-Arkan repaid its $1bn benchmark Sukuk and Saudi Binladin Group repaid a SR1 billion Sukuk. The 
most frequent type of Sukuk exercised in the Saudi market is Sukuk Mudarabah. This is an equity-based model 
which is considered to have a lower risk profile than other types of Sukuk. For example, credit risk is considered 
higher in debt-based models such as Sukuk Ijarah than equity-based models such as Sukuk Mudarabah. These 
findings further support the idea of Sukuk structures risk matrix presented in Chapter 4. 
 
 
The results show that YRs reveal the true profitability of a financial asset like bonds, whether Islamic or 
conventional. The duration provides information on the sensitivity of the financial assets as financials lose 
value when YR goes up. If the sensitivity is known, the expected loss could be hedged easily. The descriptive 
statistics of the Dow Jones Global Sukuk index and the Saudi Arabian Sukuk index are given in the table below.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Dow Jones Global Sukuk index and the Saudi Arabian Sukuk index 
Index Average Coupon YTM Duration Mean Std. Deviation 
DJ Global Sukuk 4.1 2.24 4.1 3.9 0.915 
Saudi Arabian Sukuk 2.1 5 6.44 2.1 0.994 
 
 
The Saudi index has a higher YTM and longer duration; the average Sukuk in the Saudi market has a maturity 
redemption between 5-7 years. This is in line with the theoretical risk and return relationship of conventional 
finance. Both indices represent a positive return and reflect the profitability of Sukuk as an investment 
instrument.  
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The table below provides the calculation of the probability of the difference in YR between the Dow Jones 
Global Sukuk market and the Saudi Arabian Sukuk market being equal to 0. The YR P-value is 0.79; it is 
significant at the 10% level of significance. It implies that there are differences in YRs between the global 
market and the Saudi market.  
 
 
Table 2: Calculation of P-value for the Dow Jones Global Sukuk index and the Saudi Arabia Sukuk index  
 
 P-value t Stat Standard Error 
Yield 0.79 0.2695 0.38 
 
 
 
*** 
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Appendix I:  
Comparison between Sukuk, Conventional Bonds and Shares 
 
 
Based on the literature, this is a summary of the top five differences between those three asset instruments 
presented as follows: 
 
 
No. Sukuk Conventional Bonds Shares 
1 
Indicate ownership of an 
asset 
Indicate a debt obligation 
Indicate ownership of an 
asset 
2 Shariah compliant Non-Shariah complaint 
It is compliant  to Shariah 
according to the status of the 
stock 
3 
Return generation mechanism 
relies on the underlying asset 
Return generation mechanism 
relies on the credit rating 
Return generation 
mechanism relies on the 
company profit generation 
4 
The Sukuk certificate life is 
not linked to the life of the 
Sukuk issuer and ends at the 
redemption date 
The conventional bond 
certificate life is not linked to 
the life of the Sukuk issuer and 
it ends at the redemption date 
The share’s life and validity 
is linked to the life of the 
company issuer and does not 
have a redemption date if the 
company issuer continues as 
a legal entity 
5 
At financial liquidation, 
Sukuk holders re paid in line 
with the rights determined by 
the legal status and structure 
of the Sukuk 
At financial liquidation, 
conventional bond holders are 
paid in line with their ranking 
with other creditors 
At financial liquidation, 
share holders receive the 
residue after all other 
financial obligations have 
been paid in full 
 
 
 
 
 
